In re Jaime P.

• Decision Date: 21 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 101602.,101602.
• Citation: 308 Ill.Dec. 393,223 Ill.2d 526,861 N.E.2d 958
• Parties: In re JAIME P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jaime P., Appellant).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

861 N.E.2d 958

223 Ill.2d 526

308 Ill.Dec. 393

In re JAIME P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jaime P., Appellant).

No. 101602.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 21, 2006.

G. Joseph Weller, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defenders, and Mark G. Levine, Assistant Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, and Eric M. Levin, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

On November 19, 1999, at age 17, respondent, Jaime P., was adjudicated delinquent based upon her admission of guilt to the offense of aggravated arson, a Class X felony, and was sentenced to, inter alia, five years' probation. On October 27, 2003, several weeks after her twenty-first birthday, respondent petitioned the juvenile division of the circuit court of Kane County to terminate her probation on the ground that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court expired when she attained the age of 21. The juvenile court held that respondent's probation did not automatically terminate. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, finding that the plain language of section 5-715(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (hereinafter, the Juvenile Court Act or Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 1998)), "evince[d] the legislature's intent to limit probationary periods to 5 years or until the minor is 21, whichever is less, with exceptions for those convicted of first-degree murder, a Class X felony, or a forcible felony." 361 Ill.App.3d 213, 215-16, 296 Ill.Dec. 862, 836 N.E.2d 385. The appellate court rejected respondent's alternate interpretation of the statute, finding that it would "render[ ] meaningless the reference to the exception appearing in the first sentence of section 5-715(1)." 361 Ill.App.3d at 216, 296 Ill.Dec. 862, 836 N.E.2d 385. This court granted respondent's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

Respondent was born on October 3, 1982. On June 26, 1999, when she was 16 years of age, respondent and five other youths entered the home of an acquaintance whom they knew was away on vacation. Respondent and her codefendants took items from the house and set a fire inside. Firefighters responded to the blaze and one firefighter suffered injury to his lung while trying to extinguish the fire. Respondent was prosecuted under article V of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-101 et seq. (West 1998)), and was adjudicated guilty of aggravated arson. On November 19, 1999, the juvenile court ordered respondent to: (1) pay, jointly and severally with her codefendants, restitution of $6,250 to the victim; (2) serve a period of residential placement; (3) perform 100 hours of community service or volunteer work; and (4) serve five years of probation. Additionally, the court entered a money judgment of $191,457 to Country Mutual Insurance, to be paid jointly and severally with respondent's codefendants. While the juvenile court told respondent that it would have jurisdiction over her "until you are 21," the written sentencing order states: "Minor placed on 5 years [sic] probation until 11-19-04." Respondent completed her community service and was discharged from residential placement when she reached 18, in 2000.

During 2000 and 2001, the State filed several petitions to revoke respondent's probation alleging, inter alia, that she had violated her curfew, had committed criminal damage to property, and was not living in the placement approved by the court. Following a hearing on September 18, 2001, the juvenile court found that respondent had violated probation by failing to follow through with aftercare following her residential placement. The petitions to revoke probation were resolved by negotiated disposition on October 24, 2001, and respondent was ordered to spend 45 days on work release. On December 20, 2002, the juvenile court ordered an end to respondent's curfew and to her mandatory counseling.

On January 6, April 10, June 9, September 11, and October 2, 2003, the State filed additional petitions to revoke probation. The record does not show any resolution of these petitions. On October 27, 2003, respondent filed a motion seeking relief from judgment. She asked the court to terminate her probation and to dismiss the pending petitions to revoke probation based on the fact that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had expired on October 3, 2003, when she attained the age of 21. Following a hearing on November 20, 2003, this motion was denied. After respondent's counsel stated that she intended to appeal the juvenile court's ruling, the court stated: "That's fine. In the meantime, the case continues to go on because you are appealing just an issue, not the minor's underlying sentence. * * * So we will continue this over to January [2004] for status."

Although not argued by the State, we note our agreement with respondent's contention that this appeal is not moot, as even though she is now 24 years of age, her juvenile proceeding has not been completely terminated. The record on appeal shows that status hearings in respondent's case have continued throughout 2004 and 2005, and, additionally, a supplemental petition to revoke probation was filed on January 5, 2005. The parties agree that the juvenile court's docket sheet reveals that the court terminated respondent's probation as "unsatisfied" on January 6, 2006, over a year after the written termination date of November 19, 2004, but ordered that the file remain open. Indeed, the case apparently remains open to this day, with the juvenile court continuing to regularly conduct status hearings, according to the State, "to enforce the restitution order." See 705 ILCS 405/5-710(4) (West 1998); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f), (i) (West 1998).¹

Under section 5-710(4) of the Act, section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 1998)) provides the terms and conditions of restitution in delinquency cases. Respondent does not argue the propriety of the continued "open" status of her case to "enforce the restitution order," and, indeed, a restitution order is not discharged by the completion of the sentence imposed for the offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(n) (West 1998). However, restitution is to be paid in full within "a period of time not in excess of 5 years" (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f) (West 1998)), except that where certain circumstances exist, the court may impose an additional period of time, not to exceed two years, within which to make restitution (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f), (i) (West 1998)). Thus, here, the court-ordered period for payment of restitution cannot extend beyond November 19, 2006, seven years from the date the order was imposed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f), (i) (West 1998); People v. Brooks, 158 Ill.2d 260, 267-68, 198 Ill.Dec. 851, 633 N.E.2d 692 (1994) (restitution period normally begins at sentencing for non-incarcerated defendants). Regardless, payment of any amounts remaining due on the restitution and money judgment orders after seven years may be enforced by means of a proceeding provided by section 2-1601 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1601 (West 1998)). See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(m)(3), (m)(4) (West 1998); 735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 1998).

Addressing the merits of respondent's contention that the lower courts' reading of section 5-715(1) is erroneous, we first note that resolving an issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 364, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945 (2005); In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 208, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (2001). This court, in People v. Taylor, 221 Ill.2d 157, 302 Ill. Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134 (2006), recently decided another case involving a question of statutory interpretation involving a minor adjudicated delinquent in proceedings conducted under article V of the Act. In Taylor, we set forth the principles governing our analysis of such statutory questions, stating:

"Courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 135, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641 (2002). But our inquiry must always begin with the language of the statute itself, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of the legislature's intent. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill.2d 36, 42, 248 Ill.Dec. 237, 733 N.E.2d 1235 (2000). When the language of a statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to further aids or tools of interpretation. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill.2d 428, 433, 300 Ill.Dec. 350, 844 N.E.2d 22 (2006). Furthermore, criminal or penal statutes are to `be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute.' People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill.2d 330, 337, 233 Ill. Dec. 639, 701 N.E.2d 489 (1998). * * * However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may look to tools of interpretation—such as the doctrine of in pari materia—to ascertain the meaning of a provision." Taylor, 221 Ill.2d at 162-63, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134.

The statute at issue here, section 5-715(1), entitled "Probation," provides as follows:

"(1) The period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 5 years or until the minor has attained the age of 21 years, whichever is less, except as provided in this Section for a minor who is found to be guilty for an offense which is first degree murder, a Class X felony or a forcible felony. The juvenile court may terminate probation or conditional discharge and discharge the minor at any time if warranted by the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice; provided, however, that the period of probation for a minor who is found to be guilty for an offense which is first...