In re SAJB
Decision Date | 12 May 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-1364.,03-1364. |
Citation | 679 N.W.2d 645 |
Parties | In the Interest of S.A.J.B., Minor Child, J.E.B., Father, Appellee, v. K.C., Mother, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Derek E. Johnson, Iowa City, for appellant.
Richard E. Boresi of King, Smith & Boresi, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Barbara Connolly, Cedar Rapids, for minor child.
An indigent mother wants a court-appointed attorney to help fight the termination of her parental rights. The father of the child initiated the termination so his new wife could adopt. The district court refused to appoint the mother an attorney at public expense.
The sole question in this appeal is whether an indigent parent has a right to have an attorney appointed, at public expense, to help defend against an involuntary termination of parental rights brought under Iowa Code chapter 600A. We hold the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution guarantees this right.
James and Krista are the biological parents of Shi Anne, a three-year old. James and Krista were never married. Shi Anne lives with James and his wife, Cynthia.
In July 2003, James asked the district court to terminate Krista's parental rights. James alleged Krista had abandoned Shi Anne. In his petition—filed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 232 (2003)—James also indicated Cynthia wanted to adopt his daughter.
The next month, an Iowa Legal Aid attorney appeared on Krista's behalf for the limited purpose of helping her obtain court-appointed counsel. Krista pointed out chapter 232, under which the petition was brought, guaranteed her counsel at public expense. See Iowa Code § 232.113(1) (). Anticipating James might move to amend his petition to state a claim under chapter 600A, Krista argued the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions would still guarantee her counsel at public expense.
As anticipated, James amended his petition to chapter 600A. He did not resist Krista's request for counsel.
The district court denied Krista's request. The court found Krista was indigent, but ruled there was no legal authority in chapter 600A to authorize appointment of counsel at public expense.
The case is now before us on interlocutory appeal. James has not filed a brief in this matter.
Appellate review of constitutional claims is de novo. In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Iowa 2002).
Krista maintains the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions required the court to appoint counsel at public expense. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, §§ 6, 9. We were presented with these same arguments over twenty years ago. See In re Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 481, 482-83 (Iowa 1981). In Jacobs, however, the parent requesting counsel at public expense did not establish his indigency, and so we did not reach the merits. Id. at 484. In the case at bar, however, the district court expressly found Krista indigent, and her financial status is not challenged on appeal. We may now squarely address the merits of her arguments.
Krista's equal protection argument is two-fold: she maintains the district court's failure to appoint counsel (1) unjustifiably discriminates against indigent parents facing involuntary termination of their parental rights in chapter 600A proceedings, in favor of those in chapter 232 proceedings, and (2) denies indigent parents in 600A terminations the same access to courts enjoyed by those who can afford private counsel. Krista also asserts due process requires she receive counsel at public expense. Because we find Krista's first equal protection argument has merit, we do not address her other claims.
"Iowa has alternative statutory proceedings for terminating parent-child relationships." In re J.L.L., 414 N.W.2d 133, 133 (Iowa 1987). Under Iowa Code chapter 232, several parties, including the county attorney and the department of human services, may petition the district court to terminate a parent-child relationship. Iowa Code § 232.111(1). Once filed, generally only the county attorney may present evidence in support of the petition. Id. § 232.114(1). But see id. § 232.114(2) ( ). This procedure, which we shall refer to as a "232 termination," "calls for the furnishing of an attorney at public expense when requested by indigent parties." J.L.L., 414 N.W.2d at 134; Iowa Code § 232.113(1). Another termination procedure, utilized in adoption proceedings, is contained in Iowa Code chapter 600A. Pursuant to chapter 600A, "a parent or prospective parent" may petition a juvenile court to terminate parental rights. Iowa Code § 600A.5(1); see, e.g., In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998). This procedure, which we shall characterize as a "600A termination," is prosecuted by the private party filing the petition, not the county attorney. Chapter 600A "omit[s] the express necessity of counsel at public expense...." J.L.L., 414 N.W.2d at 134.
As previously indicated, Krista's first equal protection argument alleges the foregoing legislative framework unjustifiably discriminates against indigent parents who must defend against involuntary 600A terminations, because there is no provision in Iowa Code chapter 600A for court-appointed counsel. Krista points out similarly situated parents in 232 terminations are afforded counsel at public expense.
Because the question before us remains open under the federal constitution, we first focus upon Krista's state constitutional claim. See Chester James Antieau & William J. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law § 29.34, at 199-200, 200 n. 47 (2d ed.1997) ( ); In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D.1993) ( ); Zockert v. Fanning, 310 Or. 514, 800 P.2d 773, 777 (1990) (same); cf. Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Bd. of R.R. Comm'rs, 207 Iowa 461, 466-68, 221 N.W. 364, 367 (1928) ( ). The Iowa Equal Protection Clause states:
Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986)). Our review, then, is not dependent upon a "view of the reach of [the federal constitution]." Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979) ( ).
In analyzing equal protection claims, we have repeatedly held parental rights are fundamental rights. See, e.g., Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2001) ; Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999); In re Bruce, 522 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1994); Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984). This principle is consistent with federal authority. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56 (2000) ( ); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S.Ct. 555, 565, 136 L.Ed.2d 473, 489 (1996) ( ). Because the challenged statutory scheme involves a fundamental right, "to withstand challenge under our state constitution, the infringement on parental liberty interests implicated by the statute must be `narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'" Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 318 (quoting State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2000)); see also In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 615-16 (Iowa 1987). When this stringent review of legislation, commonly known as "strict scrutiny," is applied, we will not presume legislation constitutional. In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 2001).
In order to determine if the disparity in the current statutory framework is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, we must first discuss In re J.L.L., 414 N.W.2d 133 (Iowa 1987). J.L.L. also involved an equal protection challenge to the lack of a provision for appointing counsel at public expense in Iowa Code...
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