Johnson v. Schrader
| Citation | 507 P.2d 814 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 4084,4084 |
| Parties | Daniel JOHNSON et al., Appellants, v. Robert SCHRADER, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
John J. Rooney, of Rooney & Horiskey, Cheyenne, for appellants.
Jerome F. Statkus, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellees.
Before PARKER, C. J., and McEWAN, GUTHRIE and McINTYRE, JJ.
ON REHEARING
A rehearing was granted in the above matter after our earlier decision appearing in 502 P.2d 371. The application for rehearing was based upon two grounds, which are as follows:
'* * * That the Court made an erroneous conclusion and may have overlooked specific information in the Record in holding that, 'We fail to find anything in the Record which would justify a conclusion that Plan 3 would not have reasonably met all of the criteria requirements set forth in Section 21.1-109.' * * *
'* * * That the Court made an erroneous conclusion in remanding the matter to the District Court: 'In light of what we have said, it becomes apparent this case must be remanded to the district court for the taking of evidence and a determination of whether Plan 3 of the county committee reasonably met the statutory criteria requirements.' * * *'
After argument on rehearing wherein our attention was directed at portions of the record not theretofore mentioned and a careful reexamination of the rather confusing and voluminous record, this writer confesses a misapprehension of the record at the time of the preceding opinion. We affirm and reassert all that portion of the earlier opinion through the first full paragraph on page 375. It is now our view that the decision in that case was not consonant with the entire record and must be modified to conform thereto.
No factual statement will be included herein except when it appears necessary to make clear the reasons for this disposal.
One of the principal thrusts of appellants in attacking the reorganization plan approved by the state committee was that the so-called Plan 3 should have been approved and that in rejecting it the state committee acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers because the resubmitted plan included the changes recommended when the state committee rejected the first plan. As pointed out in the earlier decision, if Plan 3 did not meet the statutory criteria then its rejection was justified, and if it did comply with the statutory requirement the state committee should be ordered to approve it. The matter was then remanded to the district court for this determination. Our reexamination of the record discloses that from the evidence and information available to the state committee it is readily determinable there was substantial evidence upon which a decision could be based that Plan 3 did not comply with the criterion as set out in § 21.1-109(e), W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp.
The record discloses that had Plan 3 been approved the following would have been true as to the assessed valuation per pupil:
Assessed
Number of Valuation
Pupils Per Pupil
--------- ---------
Torrington No. 1 2,058 7,827
Goshen Hole No. 5 255 17,627
LaGrange No. 8 145 17,062
Lingle No. 12 443 14,093
No amount of evidence which might be received by the district court can or will alter these figures nor can argument dissipate the obvious disparity. Not only do they demonstrate a great disparity per pupil, they also clearly demonstrate that well over one-half (approximately 70 percent) of the pupils in Goshen County would be the victims of this disparity and retained in the district with the lowest valuation. The state committee was justified in its position that the plan did not effectuate the command for 'a ratio of average daily membership to assessed valuation as nearly equalized as practicable.'
In addition thereto the following statement appears in Plan 3 as submitted:
(Emphasis supplied.)
This admission of noncompliance cannot be justified by the explanation included nor does it alter the mandatory character of this statutory criterion. Section 21.1-109 provides:
'All districts organized after the effective date of this act shall conform to the following criteria * * *'
Section 21.1-106 states that one of the purposes of the act is to:
'* * * provide a wiser and more efficient use of public funds for education by making it possible to reduce the disparity in per pupil valuation among school districts. * * *.'
In addition to the statutory requirements, the importance of this criterion and its indicated mandatory character have been earlier recognized by this court when it was suggested the problem of unequal assessed valuation may necessarily become the subject of statewide action, Sweetwater County Planning Committee for Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle, Wyo., 491 P.2d 1234, 1238; 493 P.2d 1050.
We cannot ignore the fact that in several states in recent years it has been held that students are denied equal protection in the event the disparity of valuation becomes too great. 1 This is persuasive of the necessity that such criterion must be considered mandatory under the terms of our statute and emphasizes the importance thereof when such disparity can be a denial of 'equal protection.'
The state committee then properly rejected Plan 3 for failure to comply with this criterion, and it follows that under the terms of the remand in the original opinion there would be nothing for the district court to determine in this area. The record contains substantial credible evidence upon which the state committee could make this determination, which should not be disturbed.
Because we make this resolution of this matter it becomes necessary to consider such other issues raised as are necessary and material to the disposal of this matter.
Appellants strongly contend that they were denied a hearing and had no proper hearing on this plan, or as they phrase it, 'appellants had never had a day in court to present evidence, and that, therefor (sic) the information then (and now) in the record was incomplete and could not be a basis for a factual decision by any tribunal.' Appellants ignore the fact that on September 29, 1971, a hearing was had on the one-district plan after published notice. A transcribed report of that meeting appears in this record. A roster was kept and request made that those in attendance sign it. This evidences the attendance of 175 persons, or more if some failed to register. Among those present and appearing on the list are the appellants O'Brien, Kluherz, and Booth. Mrs. George Marlatt was listed as attending and if our assumption is correct that she is the wife of appellant George Marlatt, we might infer he was advised of this meeting and acquainted with the proceedings. Copies of a one-district plan were available to attendants at that meeting. Much opposition to this plan was expressed but this was almost entirely directed to administrative detail and accountability of trustees to the patrons. In addition, written protests were solicited, which appear in the record.
The one-district plan which was approved by the state committee was the plan discussed and presented at this meeting as evidenced by the minutes of the county committee on November 22, 1971. After the defeat of a motion to ask the state committee to write the plan, it was moved 'that we submit the one School District Plan for Goshen County that a Public Hearing was held in regard to on September 29, 1971.' This motion carried and the plan was submitted.
Appellants contend that by virtue of this being a non-contested case under Rule 72.1(h), W.R.C.P., they were entitled to present other evidence and to have the district court determine certain of these issues. This rule is not to be construed as in any manner repealing or modifying § 9-276.32(c), W.S. 1957, 1971 Cum.Supp., which defines the areas of the court's review. This is a non-contested case, Lund v. Schrader, Wyo., 492 P.2d 202, 209. The reorganization process is a delegated legislative function, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Byron School Dist. No. 1, 37 Wyo. 259, 260 P. 537, 539; School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, in County of Campbell v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751, 759. Both these factors negative the necessity of a trialtype hearing, Lund v. Schrader, supra; School District No. 23 of Dakota County v. School District No. 11 of Dakota County, 181 Neb. 305, 148 N.W.2d 301, 303; 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, ch. 7, § 7.06, p. 430 (1958). It is further interesting to note that it has been held that a legislature cannot constitutionally delegate to the courts the power of laying out or altering boundaries of school districts, this being a legislative function, North v. Board of Education of Community High School Dist. No. 203, 313 Ill. 422, 145 N.E. 158, 159. An excellent expression appears in the Oregon case of School District No. 7 of Wallowa County v. Weissenfluh, 236 Or. 165, 387 P.2d 567, 570:
'Whether the board's action is denominated as legislative or judicial is, however, unimportant and the attempt to make the distinction is perhaps fruitless. * * *
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