Massey v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 12 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. S027681,S027681
• Citation: 854 P.2d 117,20 Cal.Rptr.2d 825,5 Cal.4th 674
• Parties: , 854 P.2d 117 Martin MASSEY, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Steele & Thompson et al., Respondents.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 825

20 Cal.Rptr.2d 825

5 Cal.4th 674, 854 P.2d 117

Martin MASSEY, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Steele & Thompson et al., Respondents.

No. S027681.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 12, 1993.

Warren W. Greene, Ventura, for petitioner.

Don E. Clark, Krimen, Klein, Da Silva, Daneri & Bloom, San Francisco, for respondents.

BAXTER, Justice.

In this case, we consider the conditions under which certain time limits on commencing proceedings for workers' compensation death benefits are suspended in favor of dependent minors by section 5408 of the Labor Code. (All statutory references are to that code unless otherwise indicated.)

Section 4700 et seq. provides for payment of death benefits to persons dependent for support upon an employee who dies as a result of industrial injury. Dependency is generally determined as of the time of injury. (§§ 3501, 3502.) Section 5406 provides that no proceeding to collect such benefits "may be commenced more than one year after the date of death, nor more than 240 weeks from the date of injury." It is settled that under that provision, no claim can ever accrue to an adult dependent for benefits from an industrially caused death that occurs more than 240 weeks after the date of injury. (Ruiz v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 409, 289 P.2d 229.)

Section 5408 provides that "[n]o limitation of time provided by this division shall run against any person under 18 years of age or any incompetent unless and until a guardian or conservator of the estate or trustee is appointed." The question presented is whether section 5408 tolls the running of section 5406's 240-week period after injury and before death (i.e., before accrual of any death benefit claim), so as to enable minor or incompetent dependents to collect death benefits that are beyond the reach of a competent adult dependent, such as a surviving spouse. As will be made clear, section 5408 tolls only the portion of the 240-week period that remains unexpired at the time of death.

FACTS

Tommy G. Thompson, while employed as an attorney at Steele and Thompson, suffered cumulative injuries resulting in a heart attack on October 19, 1979. After receiving workers' compensation benefits for temporary and permanent disability, he died during heart surgery on October 28, 1987, 417 weeks after the date of injury. ¹ On April 21, 1988, the decedent's widow, Paulette Thompson, applied for death benefits on behalf of herself, her son, Martin Massey (Massey), who was born on December 15, 1967, and her two older daughters, born in January 1963 and July 1964, respectively. Massey and his two sisters were all alleged to be the dependent stepchildren of the decedent.

In a memorandum of points and authorities to the workers' compensation judge (WCJ), applicants' counsel admitted that Mrs. Thompson's claim was barred because the 240-week period subsequent to injury, within which section 5406 requires that death benefits be applied for, had expired at the end of May 1984, long before the application was filed. Counsel contended that the running of the 240-week period against Massey's sisters was tolled by section 5408 until they turned 18, but even on that theory conceded their claims were barred, in that the period expired in September 1985 and February 1987, respectively. As to Massey himself, however, counsel argued that the 240-week period was tolled until Massey's 18th birthday, on December 15, 1985, and that therefore his April 1988 application for death benefits was timely, having been filed less than 240 weeks after he turned 18 and less than one year after Thompson's death. The WCJ agreed with that argument and awarded death benefits to Massey only.

On petition for reconsideration, filed by the employer's insurer, State Compensation Insurance Fund, the WCJ's award was vacated by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). The Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the WCAB's decision on the ground that once Thompson survived the date of injury by 240 weeks, none of his dependents, minor or otherwise, could claim death benefits, and so "there was no statute of limitations to toll." The dissenting justice, however, viewed the 240-week period prescribed by section 5406 as a "limitation of time" tolled, for minors, by section 5408.

As the dissenting opinion pointed out, the majority's holding is contrary to decisions by two other Courts of Appeal in Fisher v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 924, 133 Cal.Rptr. 471 (Fisher ) and Roblyer v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 574, 133 Cal.Rptr. 246 (Roblyer ). We granted review to resolve that conflict and, for the reasons stated herein, conclude that the Court of Appeal's decision denying benefits to Massey should be affirmed.

TIME LIMITATION FROM DATE OF INJURY (§ 5406)

We first examine the scope of the time limitation from which Massey claims protection, i.e., that no proceeding to collect death benefits "may be commenced ... more than 240 weeks from the date of injury" (§ 5406). ² As enacted in the original Labor Code (Stats.1937, ch. 90, p. 295), section 5406 provided in relevant part that death benefit proceedings could be commenced within "(a) One year from the date of death, and in any event within--[p] (1) Two years from the date of injury, except as otherwise provided in this section. [p] (2) 240 weeks from the date of injury, where the injury causing death also caused disability which continued to the date of death and for which a disability payment has been made, or agreed to be made, or [timely] proceedings for its collection had been instituted...."

This original version of section 5406 was construed in Bianco v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 584, 150 P.2d 806. There, the employee suffered the "injury" (silicosis) in April 1939 and died in June 1941. The dependent filed her claim for death benefits in December 1941 (two years and eight months after the injury), and the 240-week period (former § 5406, subd. (a)(2)) was factually inapplicable. The claim was held to be timely on the ground that the statute allowed the claim to be filed either within one year of death or within two years from the date of injury. The court explained that a contrary interpretation would result in cutting off the dependent's death benefit rights before they accrued (since death was more than two years after the injury) and thus would disregard the statutory principle of liberal construction in favor of the worker (§ 3202). A contrary holding in Glavich v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 517, 112 P.2d 774 was disapproved. This court recognized, however, that its "construction of section 5406 [might be] fraught with some dangers in respect to fraudulent and stale claims made by dependents long after the injury which ultimately causes death has occurred. If such should be the result, we believe that this is a matter for the Legislature...." (24 Cal.2d at p. 591, 150 P.2d 806.)

In apparent response to Bianco, the Legislature amended section 5406, revising the permissible periods for commencing death benefit proceedings and adding the provision with which we are now concerned, that "[n]o such proceedings may be commenced more than one year after the date of death, nor more than 240 weeks from the date of injury." (Stats.1947, ch. 1034, § 4, p. 2307, italics added.) ³ This court subsequently held in Ruiz v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 45 Cal.2d 409, 289 P.2d 229, that under the amended section 5406, a death benefit proceeding is untimely unless commenced within one year after the date of death and within 240 weeks from the date of injury. This holding was based both on the literal meaning of the conjunction "nor" and on the history of the amendment as a response to the Bianco decision. "Significantly, no change was made in the statute in its 1937 form following its application in the Glavich case in 1941, and it was only after a contrary construction was placed upon it in the Bianco case in 1944 that the statute was amended." (Ruiz, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 412-413, 289 P.2d 229.)

In Ruiz, the employee died 253 weeks after the date of injury, and his widow filed for death benefits five weeks after that. This court noted that in contrast to the usual statute of limitations, which commences to run when the cause of action accrues, section 5406's 240-week limitation may expire before death, and thus before any death benefit can be claimed. The court further pointed out, however, that this anomaly had been recognized in Bianco, and was known to the Legislature when it amended the statute. (45 Cal.2d at pp. 413-414, 289 P.2d 229; see Johnson v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964, 972, 88 Cal.Rptr. 202, 471 P.2d 1002.) "Accordingly, the time limitation appears to be not a normal statute of limitations, but rather to be more in the nature of a qualifying condition in the exercise of any right to death benefits. Diligence in the presentation of the claim, so as not to be guilty of sleeping on one's rights, apparently has no bearing if the specified time provisos are not satisfied." (45 Cal.2d at p. 414, 289 P.2d 229.)

The last-quoted statement of Ruiz necessarily pertains only to the portion of the 240-week period that precedes death, since any unexpired part of the period subsequent to death would relate to "sleeping on one's rights" to assert death benefit claims. The 240-week period appears to reflect a legislative judgment that allowing a longer interval between injury and death would create unacceptable difficulties in proving industrial causation, as evidence grows stale and the possibilities of intervening causes increase. (See Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 57, 62, 216 Cal.Rptr. 115, 702 P.2d 197; Antonucci v. W.C.A.B. (U.S. Steel) (1990) 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 273, 576 A.2d 401, 405 [300-week limitation between injury and death satisfies...