Miller, State Tax Collector for Use of Mississippi Levee Dist. v. Columbus & G. Ry. Co

• Decision Date: 06 May 1929
• Docket Number: 27678
• Citation: 122 So. 366,154 Miss. 317
• Parties: MILLER, STATE TAX COLLECTOR FOR USE OF MISSISSIPPI LEVEE DIST. v. COLUMBUS & G. RY. CO
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

122 So. 366

154 Miss. 317

MILLER, STATE TAX COLLECTOR FOR USE OF MISSISSIPPI LEVEE DIST. v. COLUMBUS & G. RY. CO

No. 27678

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 6, 1929

APPEAL from circuit court of Montgomery county.

(In Banc.)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Levees and flood control. Statute for levee tax purposes dividing railroads into classes, depending on mileage in district, held to violate due process and equal protection clauses (Laws 1926, chapter 259; Constitution United States Amendment 14).

Laws 1926, chapter 259, imposing levee taxes on railroads and dividing railroads into two classes: First, railroads having not more than twenty-five miles of railroad in levee district; and, second, all other railroads therein---held arbitrary and unreasonable, and in violation of due process and equal protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment to Federal Constitution, since classification has no reasonable relation to purpose for which statute was enacted.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Tax collector could raise constitutionality of statute taxing railroads, where railroads discriminated against would have gained nothing by having statute held void (Laws 1926, chapter 259; Laws 1914 chapter 282).

Tax collector could raise constitutionality of Laws 1926, chapter 259, imposing levee tax on railroads on ground that it discriminated between railroads, where railroads discriminated against would have gained nothing by having statute held void, since Laws 1914, chapter 282, would remain in full force and effect, under which complaining railroads' tax would be three hundred fifty dollars per mile, the exact amount imposed by Laws 1926, chapter 259.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. It was unnecessary to allege that statute was void because of arbitrary discrimination where defect appeared on face of statute (Laws 1926, chapter 259).

It was unnecessary to allege in declaration that Laws 1926, chapter 259, was void, because it arbitrarily discriminated between railroads, where defect appeared on face of statute.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Constitutional provision held to recognize validity of statutes in effect at time of adoption imposing levee tax on railroads (Constitution 1890, section 236; Laws 1886, chapter 7).

Constitution 1890, section 236, providing that "legislature shall impose for levee purposes, in addition to the levee taxes heretofore levied or authorized by law, a uniform tax," etc., held to recognize validity of Laws 1886, chapter 7 imposing levee tax on railroads, which laws were in effect at time of adoption of constitutional provision.

HON JOHN F. ALLEN, Judge.

HON JOHN F. ALLEN, Judge.

Action by W. J. Miller, state tax collector, for the use of the Mississippi levee district, against the Columbus & Greenville Railway Company. From a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Franklin, Easterling & Fox, of Jackson, and P. C. Canizaro, of Vicksburg, for appellant.

The proviso of chapter 259 of Laws of 1926, which attempts to fix the tax per mile at fifty dollars upon any railroad company owning a railroad of less than twenty-five miles situated in the levee district is an unreasonable, arbitrary and unlawful discrimination and renders the exception or proviso of sala law inoperative, null and void.

Chapter 282 of the Laws of 1914; Section 236 of Constitution of 1890; Johnson, State Rev. Agt., v. Long Furniture Co., 74 So. 282; Adams, State Rev. Agt., v. Standard Oil Co., 97 Miss. 879, 53 So. 692; Smith, Tax Collector, v. Perkins, 73 So. 797; 12 C. J., page 1152; New Jersey Central Ry. Co. v. Jersey City, 199 F. 237; Johnson County v. Johnson, 173 ind. 76., 89 N.E. 590; Peo v. Raynes, 136 A.D. 417, 120 N.Y.S. 1053; State v. Donald, 161 Wis. 188, 153 N.E. 238; State v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Fuller, 205 F. 86;New York Consolidated Gas Co., 190 N.Y. 350, 83 N.E. 299, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 163 Wis. 484, 155 N.W. 609, 158 N.W. 328; 12 C. J., page 1153; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 F. 168; 12 C. J., page 1155; People v. Mesching, 187 N.Y. 8, 10 Ann. Cas. 104; Vicksburg v. Mulane, 106 Miss. 199; 63 So. 412, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 421; 26 R. C. L., secs. 216 and 217; Fiscal Court of Owen County v. S. & A. Cox Co., 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 85; Adams v. Standard Oil Co., 97 Miss. 879, 53 So. 692; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (7 Ed.), 246-248; Hyland, Sheriff, v. Sharp, 41 So. 264, 88 Miss. 567; Lowisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Clell Coleman, Advance Opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 12, page 486 (May 15, 1928).

The state tax collector may attack the constitutionality of a statute on the ground of unjust discrimination, although he does not belong to class discriminated against.

12 C. J. 764, sec. 181; Toombs v. Sharkey, 140 Miss. 676, 106 So. 273; Section 236 of the State Constitution; Chapter 280, Laws of Mississippi of 1914; Davis Construction Co. v. Bache County, 132 N.E. 629, 21 A. L. R,. 557; 6 R. C. L. 91, 92; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 23; Zuelly v. Casper, 160 Ind. 255, 63 L. R. A. 133, 67 N.E. 103; Miller v. Jackson, 178 Ind. 503, 99 N.E. 102, 111; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 30 L.Ed. 178; State v. Candland, 104 P. 285, 36, Utah, 406, 140 Am. St. R. 834; 12 C. J. 765, section 183; Johnston v. Long Furniture Co., 74 So. 293; Adams, Revenue Agt., v. Standard Oil Co., 97 Miss. 879, 53 So. 692; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 72, 62 L.Ed. 149; L. R. A. 1918C 210.

Gardner, Odom & Gardner, of Greenwood, for appellee.

One cannot attack the constitutionality of an act without pointing out in express direct terms that section of the Constitution that is violated or that he invokes.

Meek v. Humphreys County, 133 Miss. 386; Maxey v. The State, 40 Miss. 570; Williams v. Warren County, 146 Miss. 727; Dart v. Gulfport, 147 Miss. 534.

Objection that a statute is unconstitutional because discriminatory can only be taken and made by those discriminated against.

14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 787; 18 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1146; 56 L. R. A. 252; 176 U.S. 114, 44 L.Ed. 392; 187 U.S. 540, 47 L.Ed. 293; 105 U.S. 305, 26 L.Ed. 1044; 183 U.S. 300, 46 L.Ed. 207.

Watkins, Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, for appellee.

Act of the state legislature should not be stricken down as being in violation of either state or National Constitution, unless such conflict appears beyond a reasonable doubt.

Richards v. City Lbr. Co., 101 Miss. 678, 57 So. 977; University of Mess. v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 628; Johnson, State Bev. Agt., v. Reeves & Co., 112 Miss. 227, 72 So. 925; Miller v. State, 130 Miss. 564, 94 So. 706; State v. Wheatley, 113 Miss. 555, 74 So. 426.

Great liberality and discretion allowed legislature in matter of classification, and a statute will never be stricken down by the courts by reason of legislative classification, unless the same be arbitrary and unreasonable.

Justice Harlan F. Stone, Address, American Bar Ass'n. Seattle, Wash., Vol. 53, p. 271; Weaver v. Palmer, 270 U.S. 402, 70 L.Ed. 654; United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 70 L.Ed. 986; Ft. Smith L. & T. Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U.S. 487, 71 L.Ed. 1112; Rest, Tax Collector, v. Vandeman, 240 U.S. 342, 60 L.Ed. 679; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 44 L.Ed. 392; Railway Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 58 L.Ed. 1135; South Carolina v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 65, 59L. Ed. 839; Middleton v. Texas P. & L. Co., 249 U.S. 152, 63 L.Ed. 527; Dominion Hotel v. State of Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 63 L.Ed. 597; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 71 L.Ed. 1095; Traction Co. v. Bd. of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387, 71 L.Ed. 1112; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 47 L.Ed. 669; Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 43 L.Ed. 909; Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 58 L.Ed. 1011; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 43 L.Ed. 552; Heath v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338, 52 L.Ed. 236; Mutual Line Co. v. Mattel, 222 U.S. 225, 56 L.Ed. 175; Halter v. Nebraska, 205, U.S. 234, 51 L.Ed. 696; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 59 L.Ed. 628; Huggins v. Home Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 65 So. 646, 107 Miss. 650; Robertson, Rev. Agt., v. Express Co., 94 So. 210, 130 Miss. 305; State ex rel. Knox v. R. R. Co., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689; Railroad Co. v. State, 110 Miss. 290, 70 So. 355; Knox, Atty.-Gen., v. G., M. & N. R. Co., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689.

The legislature may, in its discretion, for purposes of taxation, classify railroads on mileage basis, such classification being neither palpably arbitrary nor unreasonable.

C., B. R. R. Co. v. Curtis, Atty,-Gen., 94 U.S. 155, 24 L.Ed. 94; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680, 31 L.Ed. 841; New York & N. H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 41 L.Ed. 858; Erb, Receiver, v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584, 44 L.Ed. 837; Chi., R. I. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 55 L.Ed. 290; Chas. & Ohio R. Co. v. Conley, Atty.-Gen. (W. Va.), 230 U.S. 513, 57 L.Ed. 1597;Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 57 L.Ed. 1206; Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 58 L. Ed, 1312; Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 60 L.Ed. 691; Iron Mountain Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518, 60 L.Ed. 776; Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 61 L.Ed. 755; Middleton v. Tex. P. & L. Co., 249 U.S. 152, 63 L.Ed. 527; So. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bartime, 170 F. 743; Consumers' League v. Ry. Co. (Colo.), Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1158; So. Ind. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Commission (Ind.), 87 N.E. 972; R, R. Co. v. Conley (W. Va.), 67 S.E. 637; Wellman v. Chi. Ry. Co. (Mich.), 47 N.W. 493; Storrs v. R. R. Co., 11 So. 230; Northern Pac. v. Barnes (N. D.), 51 N.W. 393; N.O. R. R. Co. v. State, 110 Miss. 290.

Argued orally by P. C. Canizaro and Lamer F. Easterling, for appellant, and by A. F. Gardner, for appellee.

OPINION

SMITH, C. J.

The defendant owns and operates a railroad, eighteen and...