Minnesota Sugar Company v. Iverson

• Decision Date: 04 December 1903
• Docket Number: 13,565 - (7)
• Parties: MINNESOTA SUGAR COMPANY v. SAMUEL G. IVERSON
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

97 N.W. 454

91 Minn. 30

MINNESOTA SUGAR COMPANY v. SAMUEL G. IVERSON

Nos. 13,565 - (7)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

December 4, 1903

Writ of certiorari issued from the supreme court upon petition of Minnesota Sugar Company, to review the act of respondent, as State Auditor, in refusing to issue a warrant upon the state treasurer for $19,925.36, to which amount petitioner claimed to be entitled as bounty under the provisions of Laws 1895 c. 205, as amended by Laws 1899, c. 307. Writ discharged.

SYLLABUS

State Auditor.

The State Auditor refused to allow and issue warrants for the sugar bounty provided for in Laws 1895, c. 205, as amended by Laws 1899, c. 307, for the year 1900, upon the ground that both of the above-mentioned acts are in direct violation of sections 5, 10, article 9, of the Constitution. Held that when the Auditor refused to issue the warrants for the reasons before stated, he acted in a quasi judicial capacity, and in a manner affecting the rights or property of a citizen analogous to the manner in which they are affected by proceedings or decisions of the courts, and that certiorari will lie in such a case to review his acts, and to determine the rights of a petitioner to the bounty before mentioned.

Sugar Bounty Unconstitutional.

Laws 1895, c. 205, as amended by Laws 1899, c. 307, providing for the payment of certain bounties to manufacturers of sugar from beets grown in this state, is unconstitutional, because in violation of the provisions of sections 5, 10, article 9, of the fundamental law.

Unconstitutional Statute.

An unconstitutional statute is simply a statute in form, is not a law, and under every circumstance or condition lacks the force of law. It is of no more saving effect to justify legislative action taken under it than as though it had never been enacted. No moral obligation on the part of the state can be predicated upon an unconstitutional statute.

Douglas A. Fiske, Ell Torrance, and Childs, Edgerton & Wickwire, for petitioner.

Whether the act of an official is judicial or ministerial, is not determined by the character of the agency but by the nature of the act. Where, in the exercise of a power, an officer is vested with discretion his act is regarded as quasi judicial. Throop, Pub. Off. § 533; U.S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; U.S. v. California & Ore. Land Co., 148 U.S. 31; Commissioner v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 479; Kendall v. U.S., 12 Pet. 524; Brashear v. Mason, 6 How. 92, 100; State v. Sullivan, 50 F. 600; Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 424; State v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301. It matters not that the court cannot by certiorari cause the board to act and do its duty. It can review the erroneous determination of the board and then if the board should refuse to allow the claim, the relator can take such further remedy by mandamus, or otherwise, as the law gives. People v. Board, 51 N.Y. 442; State v. Dowling, 50 Mo. 134; Levy v. Lychinski, 8 Ark. 113, 116; Devlin v. Platt, 11 Abb. Pr. 398, 400.

The question whether, to what extent and by what means, the industrial resources of the state should be encouraged is essentially legislative in its nature. Hazen v. Essex, 12 Cush. 475; Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pinney, 131; Booth v. Town, 32 Conn. 118, 128; Todd v. Austin, 34 Conn. 78; Stockton v. Common Council, 41 Cal. 147. From the nature of the subject, the legislature is vested with great latitude in dealing with it, and its determination will not be disturbed unless wholly irreconcilable, from every possible view, with the Constitution. Attorney General v. City, 37 Wis. 400, 438; Dayton v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Town of Guilford v. Board, 13 N.Y. 143; Citizens' Sav. & L. Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655; State v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526; State v. Board of Commrs. of Polk Co., 87 Minn. 325. The bounty was intended for securing one of the factors -- a manufactory -- which was requisite to the accomplishment of the public purpose. The real purpose was not aid to the manufacturer. Nor was the distribution of the beet seed to aid any particular farmer.

The development of the industrial resources of a state is a proper subject of legislation, and appropriations of public moneys may be made therefor. Lowell v. City, 111 Mass. 454; Hand v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419; Dayton v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Commercial Nat. Bank v. City of Iola, 2 Dill. 353; City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 111; Town v. Park, 50 Vt. 178; State v. Cornell, supra.

The bounty was not a gift but rested upon an adequate consideration. Ingram v. Colgan, 106 Cal. 113. The petitioner having fully performed, a vested right in the bounty was acquired. Calder v. Henderson, 54 F. 802; Smith v. Board, 85 Mich. 407; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 60.

Conceding for the purpose of the argument that the original bounty act was invalid, yet performance by the petitioner under the previous legislation was sufficient to create a moral consideration for the enactment of Laws 1899, c. 307. U.S. v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644; Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U.S. 568 (citing New Orleans v. Clark); Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528; Bailey v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. St. 569, 573; Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N.Y. 604, 612; State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 357; State v. Bruce, 50 Minn. 491; Friend v. Gilbert, 108 Mass. 408.

The Constitution of Minnesota requires the application of a liberal rule in the construction of the statute in question. City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 111; Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 207.

W. B. Douglas, Attorney General, for respondent.

Both chapter 205 of the Laws of 1895 and chapter 307 of the Laws of 1899, provide for the expenditure of public funds for other than a public purpose, and are therefore not only invalid, independent of constitutional restrictions, but are in violation of the Constitution of the state. Const. art. 9, §§ 5, 10; Davidson v. Co. Commrs. of Ramsey Co., 18 Minn. 432 (482); Wm. Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118.

The legislature is without authority to appropriate money or provide for the imposition of a tax, except for a public purpose. City of Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Hotel Co., 80 Minn. 165; Lowell v. City, 111 Mass. 454; State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418; Michigan v. Auditor General, 124 Mich. 674.

A manufacturing company is not a public enterprise within the meaning of the above rule and a donation or bounty thereto is not a grant of money other than for a private purpose. Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 6.

OPINION

COLLINS, J.

At the last term of this court the petitioner herein applied for a writ of certiorari directed to the State Auditor, and requiring him to transmit certified copies of the records of his office, and all of the reports theretofore made to him, and all other papers relating to the claim of the petitioner for a bounty upon sugar manufactured by it during the year 1900, which bounty, it was asserted, was due from the state under the provisions of Laws 1895, p. 490 (c. 205) as amended by Laws 1899, p. 389 (c. 307). Upon the return to the order to show cause, and a stipulation, we directed that the writ issue as prayed for, but deferred stating our reasons for so determining until the question arising upon the return should be presented for decision. The return having been made, the cause was set down for argument upon the merits, and has been duly presented and submitted by counsel for the respective parties.

We shall first express our views on the right of the petitioner to the writ. In State v. Clough, 64 Minn. 378, 67 N.W. 202, it was stated that to render the proceedings of special tribunals, commissioners, or ministerial officers judicial in their nature, they must affect the rights and property of a citizen in a manner analogous to that in which such rights are affected by the proceedings of courts acting judicially. Further discussion in that opinion was merely elaborative of the above concise proposition. The perplexity in determining whether or not certiorari will lie in any given case arises out of the difficulty in distinguishing between legislative, executive, or ministerial acts, and those of a judicial nature, in which an officer, commissioner, or a special tribunal is called upon to act in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity. This is the chief distinguishing test, as is conceded by the Attorney General. If the determination of the tribunal or the officer called upon to act affects the rights or property of a citizen analogous to the manner in which they are affected by proceedings or decisions of courts acting judicially, the proceedings in question are of a judicial nature, and the writ will lie. If they do not so affect rights or property, the determination in question must be considered as ministerial, legislative, or administrative, as the case may be, and so treated by the courts. The character of the office or tribunal does not determine the question, but, rather, the nature of the act performed.

Under the 1899 statute the State Auditor is made the officer who has to pass upon and determine the validity of all claims for bounty made by any party under the act. If the Auditor, by acting in conformity with the statute, has the power of adjudication upon the rights of persons and property, his acts must be quasi judicial, at least. He is the special tribunal or officer called upon to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of the parties are, and he acts judicially when passing upon the constitutionality of the law and disposing of such rights. In the case at bar the State Auditor exercised no...