People v. Clayton, No. 08SA353.

• Decision Date: 18 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08SA353.
• Citation: 207 P.3d 831
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Brian Scott CLAYTON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

207 P.3d 831

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Brian Scott CLAYTON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08SA353.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

May 18, 2009.

Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District, Amy C. Fitch, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Gentry and Prudek, LLP, Elvin L. Gentry, P.C., Marla Prudek, P.C., Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Chief Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Introduction

The prosecution brings this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-2-102(2), C.R.S. (2008), challenging the trial court's order suppressing statements made by Defendant Brian Scott Clayton to police officers after he signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. The trial court found that his waiver was not valid and granted Clayton's motion to suppress. After reviewing the record and the video of the recorded interview, we conclude that Clayton validly waived his Miranda rights and that his statements should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand for further proceedings.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Witnesses attending a house party contacted police to report that, after stabbing two people, a suspect, who possibly had the last name Clayton, left the scene in a white Ford Explorer. The report was broadcast to an officer on patrol who, shortly thereafter, spotted a white Ford Explorer with a license plate registered to an owner with the last name Clayton. The officer pulled the vehicle over, identified the driver as twenty year old Brian Clayton, and observed blood on Clayton's hands and clothes. The officer arrested Clayton, informed him that he was being arrested in relation to the reported stabbing, and advised him of his Miranda rights, reading them verbatim from a "Miranda card." Clayton stated that he understood his rights and wanted to talk to the police. Instead of questioning him at that time, the officer drove Clayton to the police station. The officer did not discuss the incident with Clayton during the approximately fifteen minute drive. The officer testified that at some point before arriving at the police station, Clayton said, "Those guys jumped me; I just defended myself."

At the police station, Clayton met with Detective Losasso, who asked if Clayton had been advised of his Miranda rights. Although Clayton stated that he had been so advised, Losasso advised him again of his Miranda rights, reading them from a standard form. After Clayton again expressed that he understood his rights, Losasso presented a written copy of the Miranda rights for Clayton to sign as a waiver. Clayton moved to sign the waiver but then hesitated, asking "What do you mean `talk to us?'" and stating "I mean, I have no problem, it's just, you said this could be used against me in court." Losasso responded that this was Clayton's opportunity to tell his side of the story.

As the discussion continued, Clayton asked to call his mother to "ask her if I should sign yes or no." Losasso responded that he did not have a telephone and that the decision of whether to waive his rights and give a statement was "up to you but, you know, um, if you don't want to sign it, that's your right." Clayton subsequently signed the waiver and made several incriminating statements. For example, Clayton admitted that he was at the party with the victims, he had pulled a knife, and he had thrust his knife in the direction of the victims. While he remained adamant that he acted in self-defense, some of his statements were inconsistent and contradicted statements given by other witnesses. The prosecution later charged Clayton with two counts of first degree assault¹ and four counts of a violent crime.²

Prior to trial, Clayton moved to suppress his statements, alleging that they were made without adequate advisement of his Miranda rights, that they were involuntary because they were the product of coercion, and that the police had violated a statutory requirement permitting him to call his family. The trial judge found that Losasso's actions "clearly were coercive to this young man," and expressed several concerns, including that Clayton was not allowed to call his mother, that he "looked like he was under pressure [and] uncomfortable in the situation," that Clayton "really rushed into things without stopping to take the time," and that Losasso should have explained further what he intended to discuss. For these stated reasons, the trial court found Clayton's waiver of his Miranda rights invalid and granted the motion to suppress. The prosecution appealed the trial court's suppression order.

III. Analysis

The prosecution argues that Clayton's statements should not be suppressed because (1) Clayton's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (2) even if the police violated section 16-3-401(1), C.R.S. (2008), which requires officers to allow an arrestee to contact family "at the earliest possible time after arrival at the police station," suppression is not an appropriate remedy for such a violation. We agree with the prosecution and therefore reverse the suppression order.

A. Validity of Waiver.

Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), a suspect must be advised of and waive certain constitutional rights before being subjected to a custodial interrogation. Determining the validity of a Miranda waiver "requires a two-step analysis: first, the court must determine whether the defendant was adequately warned of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel; and, second, the court must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived these rights." People v. Chase, 719 P.2d 718, 720 (Colo. 1986). When the validity of a Miranda advisement is questioned, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the validity of a Miranda waiver, and must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo.1998).

In the present case, it is undisputed that Clayton was advised of his Miranda rights, twice verbally and once in writing. However, the trial court concluded that the prosecution had not met its burden of proving a valid waiver and granted the motion to suppress. We review the validity of a Miranda waiver under a de novo standard. People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462 (Colo. 2002) (citing People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704 (Colo.1999), and People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208 (Colo.1998)). Under this standard, we conclude that Clayton's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and therefore valid.

1. Clayton was adequately advised of his Miranda rights.

Turning to the first inquiry, we find that Clayton was sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights. Clayton argues that Losasso's second verbal warning was inadequate because it was conducted "in a perfunctory way," emphasizing that Losasso quickly read the rights from the form and leaned over as if uninterested. Clayton also complains that Losasso failed to read the last sentence containing the question, "do you wish to talk to us/me now?" However, there is no requirement that Miranda advisements be conducted with specific language. Losasso read Clayton his rights verbatim from a standard form and Clayton acknowledged that he understood them. Although he did not read the last line, he conveyed its meaning because, according to the trial court, Losasso indicated, "through his actions" of presenting Clayton with the written waiver, the question of whether Clayton wished to speak to him. We therefore conclude that the content of Losasso's verbal advisement at the police station, particularly in combination with the written Miranda form, was adequate to advise Clayton of his rights.

In addition to finding Losasso's verbal advisement sufficient, we note that the police advised Clayton of his rights twice more; the arresting officer had advised him less than thirty minutes before Clayton spoke to Losasso, and Losasso provided him with a written copy of his rights. Because each of the advisements was individually adequate, we conclude that the combination of the three sufficiently informed Clayton of his Miranda rights.

2. Clayton's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Next, we consider the validity of Clayton's waiver of his Miranda rights. The trial court cited several "troubling" factors and concluded from them that Clayton's waiver was not valid. After reviewing the record and considering the totality of the circumstances, People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1065 (Colo.2004), we reverse.

i. Knowledge and intelligence

We first conclude that the waiver was both knowing and intelligent. The trial court expressed concern that Losasso did not "explain further what was going on in the interrogation." However, police interrogators "have no obligation to inform a suspect of the possible subjects of an interrogation or the facts and circumstances which may be pertinent to his or her decision to talk to police." People v. Humphrey, 132 P.3d 352, 358 (Colo. 2006). Additionally, the record reveals that Clayton was actually aware of the subject of the discussion. The arresting officer informed Clayton that he was being arrested in connection with the stabbing. When Clayton inquired about what would be discussed, Losasso responded that he wanted to hear Clayton's side of the story. Although Losasso did not specifically refer to the stabbing incident,³ it is clear from the context of the discussion, as well as Clayton's repeated unsolicited statements that he "was jumped" and was defending himself, that Clayton was fully aware of the content of "what was going on in the interrogation."

The trial court was also concerned that Losasso did not read the last line of the Miranda war...