People v. Rodriguez
| Citation | 463 Mich. 466,620 N.W.2d 13 |
| Decision Date | 27 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 115939. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rudolfo G. RODRIGUEZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and K. Naomi Lim, Assistant Attorney General, Detroit, MI, for the people.
Hugh M. Davis, Jr., Detroit, MI, for the defendant.
The defendant has been convicted of tax evasion, for failure to pay use tax on several motor vehicles. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court because the circuit court failed to instruct the jury regarding a statutory exemption to the tax.
The defendant lived in Hudson and owned carpeting stores in Adrian and Hillsdale. He also bought and sold used vehicles. He knew an automobile dealer in Texas who allowed him to use some of that dealership's temporary permits. While there was no fixed pattern to his purchases and sales, the defendant typically would buy a vehicle at auction in Ohio, place the Texas permit on it, and bring it back to Michigan. Here, he would repair the vehicle, and then sell it, again at auction.
A tax investigation led to the present charges. The defendant faced six felony counts of evading the use tax1 owed on six vehicles. MCL 205.27(2); MSA 7.657(27)(2). They included (a) a 1985 oneton Ford cube van that was painted with the name of the defendant's carpet business, (b) a 1988 Pontiac Bonneville that was titled in the name of the defendant's wife and that she sometimes drove, (c) a 1988 Chevrolet van that police found hooked to a trailer that contained carpeting for the defendant's business, (d) a 1978 Jaguar, (e) a 1984 Mazda 626, and (f) a 1985 Chevrolet Blazer.
This case was tried in January 1997. The jury's conclusion was that the defendant was guilty of one felony count, for evading the use tax on the Ford cube van. The jurors also found him guilty of misdemeanor counts for evading the tax on the Bonneville and the Chevy van. MCL 205.27(4); MSA 7.657(27)(4). They acquitted him of the charges pertaining to the other three vehicles.
The defendant was fined and placed on probation. He appealed his convictions, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. 236 Mich.App. 568, 601 N.W.2d 134 (1999).2 Judge SMOLENSKI dissented.
The defendant has filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in this Court.
The defendant raises three issues in this Court. Two have merit, and require that we remand this case to the circuit court for a new trial.
The defendant's theory of the case was that he acquired the vehicles with the intent to hold them just long enough to do necessary repairs and then to resell them. He therefore believed himself to fall within M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c), which exempts from the use tax "[p]roperty purchased for resale."3 The defendant asked the circuit court to instruct the jury regarding the exemption stated in M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c).4 The court refused the request, agreeing with the Attorney General5 that the "resale" exemption applied only to persons who held Michigan dealer licenses. The court came to this conclusion on the basis of the language in the first sentence of a different subsection, M.C.L. § 205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2).6 That sentence provides:
The tax imposed by this section for the privilege of using, storing, or consuming a vehicle, ORV, mobile home, aircraft, snowmobile, or watercraft shall be collected before the transfer of the vehicle, ORV, mobile home, aircraft, snowmobile, or watercraft, except a transfer to a licensed dealer or retailer for purposes of resale that arises by reason of a transaction made by a person who does not transfer vehicles, ORVs, mobile homes, aircraft, snowmobiles, or watercraft in the ordinary course of his or her business done in this state.
The court's refusal to give the requested instruction limited defense counsel to arguing that the defendant had not intended to evade the use tax.
The Court of Appeals majority agreed with the circuit court that the instruction need not be given. It said that the exemption stated in M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) was inapplicable to this case because M.C.L. § 205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2) is more specific, and thus controls. 236 Mich.App. at 572, 601 N.W.2d 134.
This analysis failed to persuade the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, who wrote:
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that defendant could not take advantage of the resale exemption in M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) ... because the more specific section for vehicle transfers, M.C.L. § 205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2) ... applied. On the contrary, I conclude that [MCL 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) ], which creates a separate tax exemption for property purchased for resale, specifically applies to defendant's transactions. I further conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant was exempt from paying use tax if he intended to resell the vehicles pursuant to the specific exemption set forth in [MCL 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) ]. [236 Mich.App. at 574, 601 N.W.2d 134.]
The meaning of these statutory provisions In re Investigation of 1999 Riots, 463 Mich. 378, 383, 617 N.W.2d 310 (2000).
In M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c), the Legislature provided in clear and unambiguous language an exemption for property purchased for resale. The reliance by the Court of Appeals majority on M.C.L. § 205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2) was misplaced. The latter provision spells out such details as the time of payment and the identity of the payee.
The Attorney General argues that the M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) and M.C.L. § 205.93(2); MSA 7.555(3)(2) "are complements of one another and are intended to provide the same exemption for licenced dealers who purchase vehicles for the purpose of resale." Otherwise, "a person could buy vehicles out of the state, tax-free, and bring them into Michigan and never pay taxes on the vehicles in Michigan, arguing that he intended to resell it eventually, perhaps 50,000 or 100,000 miles later." Two responses are apparent. First, in enacting the language of M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c), the Legislature did not restrict the "purchased for resale" exemption to dealers. Second, the plain meaning of the phrase "purchased for resale" conveys a legislative intent inconsistent with purchase for another purpose.
With regard to transactions exempt from the use tax, Judge SMOLENSKI is correct that M.C.L. § 205.94(c); MSA 7.555(4)(c) provides the specific and controlling language. Under that provision, the defendant was—if a properly instructed jury were to believe his version of the facts—exempt from the tax.
The Legislature has mandated that a trial court "instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case." MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052. The court's obligation to instruct on a proposed defense was described in People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 80-81, 537 N.W.2d 909 (1995):7
A criminal defendant has the right to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence against him. People v. Vaughn, 447 Mich. 217, 524 N.W.2d 217 (1994); People v. Lewis, 91 Mich.App. 542, 283 N.W.2d 790 (1979). However, a trial court is not required to present an instruction of the defendant's theory to the jury unless the defendant makes such a request. People v. Wilson, 122 Mich.App. 1, 3, 329 N.W.2d 513 (1982). Further, when a jury instruction is requested on any theories or defenses and is supported by evidence, it must be given to the jury by the trial judge. People v. Rone (On Remand), 101 Mich. App. 811, 300 N.W.2d 705 (1980). A trial court is required to give a requested instruction, except where the theory is not supported by evidence. People v. Stubbs, 99 Mich.App. 643, 298 N.W.2d 612 (1980); People v. Stapf, 155 Mich. App. 491, 400 N.W.2d 656 (1986).
In the present case, the statutory exemption would apply if the evidence introduced by the defendant were believed by the jury, and thus the circuit court erred in failing to give the requested instruction. There remains, however, the question whether this error was harmless.
A chart outlining the principles governing an inquiry into harmless error is set forth in People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 774, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). As one can readily see from that page of Carines, nonconstitutional preserved error is evaluated under the standard set forth in People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 596 N.W.2d 607 (1999). In Lukity, we quoted our statement in People v. Mateo, 453 Mich. 203, 211, 551 N.W.2d 891 (1996), that M.C.L. § 769.26; MSA 28.1096 "should be viewed as a legislative directive to presume the validity of verdicts." In light of that presumption, we said in Lukity:
These principles were further refined in People v. Snyder, 462 Mich. 38, 45, 609 N.W.2d 831 (2000), and People v. Elston, 462 Mich. 751-766, 614 N.W.2d 595 (2000). As we explained in Elston:
In order to overcome the presumption that a preserved nonconstitutional error is harmless, a defendant must persuade the reviewing court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rakestraw v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.
...... Frank W Lynch Co. v. Flex Technologies, Inc., 463 Mich. 578, 583, 624 N.W.2d 180 (2001) ; People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466, 471, 620 N.W.2d 13 (2000) . . In interpreting a statute, our obligation is to discern the legislative ......
-
People v. Carpenter
...II. Standard of Review The proper application of M.C.L. § 768.21a is a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466, 471, 620 N.W.2d 13 (2000). III. The Traditional Insanity Defense In Michigan, use of the insanity defense has been governed by statute since ......
-
People v. Riddle
...(2001). A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence against him. People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466, 472, 620 N.W.2d 13 (2000); People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 80-81, 537 N.W.2d 909 (1995). When a defendant requests a jury instruction on a theory......
-
People v. Cornell
...... Carines, supra at 774 , 597 N.W.2d 130 ; Lukity, supra at 495 , 596 N.W.2d 607 . 18 . People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466, 620 N.W.2d 13 (2000) provides further guidance concerning how these principles are applied in cases involving instructional errors. In Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of evading the use tax. The trial court refused to instruct the jury regarding a statutory exemption to ......