People v. Rouse
| Decision Date | 25 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 93,93 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Clarence ROUSE, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (John Vang of counsel), for appellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Robert C. McIver, Nancy D. Killian and Rafael Curbelo of counsel), for respondent.
In People v. Smith , 27 N.Y.3d 652, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 57 N.E.3d 53 (2016) we observed "that law enforcement witnesses should be treated in the same manner as any other prosecution witness for purposes of cross-examination" ( id. at 659, 57 N.E.3d 53 ). In this case we recognize that, much as a lay witness may be subject to cross-examination with respect to acts of dishonesty not proven at trial, so too may a law enforcement witness be impeached through such questioning. Applying that rule here, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law and committed reversible error in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine the two police officers central to this case in two specific areas involving officer dishonesty.1
At 2:30 a.m. on August 11, 2013 a person followed a group of teenagers on a public street in a neighborhood in the Bronx and fired a single gunshot at them. No one was struck or injured. Critical to this appeal, two police officers identified the shooter as defendant. The officers were patrolling the neighborhood at the time of that incident, and both officers saw defendant raise the gun to eye level, fire the gun, drop that weapon, and flee on foot. One of the officers initially chased defendant on foot but lost sight of him. Several minutes later, however, the officers saw defendant while they were driving in their police cruiser. They exited that vehicle and arrested him.
One of the officers collected the gun almost immediately after defendant dropped it. That weapon was not tested for fingerprints or for DNA evidence. Consequently, at trial, the People's case rested almost entirely on the identification of defendant as the shooter by the police officers, both of whom said that defendant fired the gun from eye level, and that they had a clear, well-lit view of defendant at the time of the shooting. The jury credited that testimony and defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree ( Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1] ), criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (§ 265.09[1][a] ), and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§§ 265.03[1][b], [3] ).
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, reasoning that the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence ( 159 A.D.3d 530, 530, 73 N.Y.S.3d 45 [1st Dept. 2018] ), and that defendant's challenges to various evidentiary rulings and comments of the trial court lacked merit ( id. at 531, 73 N.Y.S.3d 45 ). A Judge of this Court subsequently granted defendant leave to appeal ( 32 N.Y.3d 941, 84 N.Y.S.3d 867, 109 N.E.3d 1167 [2018] ).
Defendant initially contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish the element of intent necessary to support his convictions of attempted murder in the second degree and, by extension, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree. We disagree (see generally People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ).
" ‘[I]ntent is rarely proved by an explicit expression of culpability by the perpetrator’ " ( People v. Hatton , 26 N.Y.3d 364, 370, 23 N.Y.S.3d 113, 44 N.E.3d 188 [2015], quoting People v. Bueno , 18 N.Y.3d 160, 169, 936 N.Y.S.2d 636, 960 N.E.2d 405 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). "In recognition of the inherent challenges to demonstrating an actor's mental state, [we have long] accepted that ‘[i]ntent may be inferred from conduct as well as the surrounding circumstances’ " ( id. at 370, 23 N.Y.S.3d 113, 44 N.E.3d 188, quoting People v. Steinberg , 79 N.Y.2d 673, 682, 584 N.Y.S.2d 770, 595 N.E.2d 845 [1992] ; see People v. Bracey , 41 N.Y.2d 296, 301, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094 [1977], rearg. denied 41 N.Y.2d 1010, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 363 N.E.2d 1194 ).
In view of those rules, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes , 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983] ), we conclude that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found that defendant had the requisite intent to kill (see generally People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). The testimony of the subject officers established, among other things, that defendant was seen chasing the group of fleeing teenagers on foot in advance of the shooting before he stopped, steadied the gun at eye level, and fired in their direction. That testimony could have allowed a rational person to reach the conclusion that defendant intended not to warn or to merely scare in shooting the gun, but instead to kill one of those teenagers (see People v. Bennett , 79 N.Y.2d 464, 469–470, 583 N.Y.S.2d 825, 593 N.E.2d 279 [1992] ; People v. Yazum , 13 N.Y.2d 302, 304, 246 N.Y.S.2d 626, 196 N.E.2d 263 [1963] ).
Turning to the primary issue before us, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial inasmuch as the trial court refused to allow him to explore multiple grounds for impeachment on cross-examination, namely, (a) misstatements that one of the officers made to a federal prosecutor in a different matter, and (b) prior judicial determinations in which each officer was found to have given unreliable testimony. On these points, we agree with defendant.
Truth, though rarely pure and never simple, is one of society's most essential virtues. In the criminal justice context, cross-examination is universally recognized as a preeminent truth-seeking device (see Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6–301 [Farrell 11th ed 1995] ), and it "is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the [veracity] of [the witness's] testimony are tested" ( Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 [1974] ). Subject to the discretion of a trial judge to impose reasonable limits based on concerns about, among other things, prejudice, confusion of the issues, and relevance, "the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness'[s] story to test the witness'[s] perceptions and memory, but ... has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness" ( id. ; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 [1986] ).
"Given these central principles, prosecution witnesses—and indeed, even a testifying defendant—may be cross-examined on ‘prior specific criminal, vicious or immoral conduct,’ provided that ‘the nature of such conduct or the circumstances in which it occurred bear logically and reasonably on the issue of credibility’ " ( People v. Smith , 27 N.Y.3d 652, 660, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 57 N.E.3d 53 [2016], quoting People v. Sandoval , 34 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413 [1974] ). Along those lines, in People v. Smith , 27 N.Y.3d 652, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 57 N.E.3d 53 we considered the suitability of cross-examination of a police officer based on allegations of false arrest in a federal lawsuit. There we concluded that, even where a prior bad act by a law enforcement officer is not criminal, " ‘it may be a proper subject for impeachment questioning where it demonstrates an untruthful bent or significantly reveals a willingness ... to place the advancement of his individual self-interest ahead of principle or of the interests of society’ " ( id. at 661, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 57 N.E.3d 53, quoting People v. Walker , 83 N.Y.2d 455, 461, 611 N.Y.S.2d 118, 633 N.E.2d 472 [1994] ).
Based on that maxim, we established an uncomplicated rule for determining whether a defendant should be permitted to ask a law enforcement officer about allegations that the officer had committed prior bad acts (see id. at 662, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 57 N.E.3d 53 ). That is, provided that they have a good faith basis for the inquiry, we said that defendants should be permitted to explore specific allegations of wrongdoing relevant to the credibility of the law enforcement witness, subject to the discretion of the trial court (see id. ).2 ( id. ).
Applying those principles here, we conclude that the court abused its discretion as a matter of law in refusing to allow defense counsel to explore misstatements one of the officers made to a federal prosecutor.
At the suppression hearing held before trial, that officer's testimony supported defendant's contention that, in preparing to testify in an unrelated federal criminal proceeding, he had misled the prosecutor in that case with respect to his involvement in a ticket-fixing scheme. That officer also acknowledged that the firearm at issue in the federal proceeding – which he and his police partner had recovered – was suppressed. The People revisited that issue at trial, eliciting testimony from that officer that he had been involved in the ticket-fixing scheme and had been disciplined by the NYPD with respect to those activities. Defense counsel cross-examined that officer with respect to that issue, but was not permitted to explore what defense counsel characterized as that officer's lies to the federal prosecutor regarding those activities.
The trial court questioned whether that dishonesty was a bad act, concluding, among other things that the elicitation of that officer's "lack of specificity" to the federal prosecutor would...
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