People v. S.O. (In re S.O.)

• Decision Date: 28 June 2018
• Docket Number: B281863
• Citation: 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 205,24 Cal.App.5th 1094
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE S.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.O., Defendant and Appellant.

24 Cal.App.5th 1094

235 Cal.Rptr.3d 205

IN RE S.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.S.O., Defendant and Appellant.

B281863

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed June 28, 2018

Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HOFFSTADT, J.

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, a juvenile court has the power to require a minor to pay restitution in the amount "sufficient to fully reimburse the victim ... for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of " the criminal conduct that makes him subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(1), italics added.)¹ Does a juvenile court have the authority to require restitution for losses beyond those that resulted from the criminal conduct with which the minor is charged? We conclude that the answer is "yes" if that restitution is a properly imposed condition of probation. Because the minor in this case was placed on probation and because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings that the minor was involved in the uncharged conduct and that holding him responsible for the full amount of loss to the victim furthers the purposes of probation, we affirm the juvenile court's restitution order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. First theft

On October 15, 2015, Luz Mora (Mora) parked her 2015 Hyundai Elantra in an underground parking lot. She parked in a "stacked" parking space, with her car parked behind her mother's car. Mora had left a set of her car keys in a purse in her mother's unlocked car. When Mora went to the lot to retrieve her car, the keys from her mother's car—and her car—were gone.

The next day, Mora's mother saw Mora's car parked on a nearby street. Using a second set of keys, Mora retrieved her car and parked it back in the underground lot. The car now had "scratches and bumps" on its exterior; the car's upholstery reeked of liquor; and $758 in Mora's personal items had been removed.

B. Second theft

On October 17, 2015 (the day after Mora retrieved her car), the car was once again stolen from the underground parking lot.

One month later, on November 17, 2015, law enforcement pulled over Mora's car, and S.O. (minor) was the driver and sole occupant of the car. Minor was using the set of car keys taken and used in the first theft.

II. Procedural Background

In January 2016, the People filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that minor had committed the felony of taking or driving a vehicle without consent on November 17, 2015 ( Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ).

The People subsequently amended the petition to allege that minor had committed the misdemeanor of receiving stolen property ( Pen. Code, § 496 ). That same day, minor admitted to the stolen property allegation. Rather than declare minor to be a "ward" of the court, the juvenile court placed minor on probation for six months pursuant to section 725, subdivision (a). One of the conditions of probation was the standard condition that minor "pay ... the victim for any damages to [ ]her or [ ]her property that you or your companions caused by committing this crime."

The juvenile court subsequently held a restitution hearing. Mora testified to the circumstances of the two thefts as well as the cost estimate to repair her car and the value of the items removed from her car. The court found Mora to be "credible" and imposed restitution in the amount of $4,946. The court recognized that this amount included, in part, the cost to repair damage to the car and the removal of Mora's personal items following the first, uncharged theft. However, the court determined that it was appropriate to hold minor responsible for paying restitution with respect to both thefts because the court "reasonabl[y] infer[red] [that minor] took the car itself since he had the keys [taken during the first theft]," because the court has a duty "to make the victim as whole as possible" and because "it's rehabilitative to the minor for him to pay for his wrongdoing."

Minor filed a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Minor argues that the juvenile court erred in imposing a restitution obligation that includes losses arising from the first, uncharged theft of Mora's car. To evaluate this argument, we must ask two questions: (1) can a juvenile court impose restitution based on losses arising from uncharged conduct, and, if so, (2) was the imposition of such restitution appropriate in this case?

As a general matter, we review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion. ( Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 37, 326 P.3d 969 ( Luis M. ).) However, where the specific issue is whether a court has the authority to issue restitution, we review that question of law independently. (In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 852, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ( Alexander A. ).) And where the specific issue is whether the court's factual findings support restitution, we review those findings for substantial evidence. ( In re A.M. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 668, 674, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 168( A.M. ); see generally Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 31, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29 [an "abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence" (italics omitted) ].)

I. Can a Juvenile Court Impose Restitution Based on Losses Arising From Uncharged Conduct?

The juvenile court has authority over a minor (that is, a person under the age of 18) if he or she violates any federal, state, or local law "other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age." (§ 602.) If the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the minor violated the law and is therefore a "person described by Section ... 602" ( People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1022, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 209 P.3d 946 ; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 ), the court may: (1) declare the minor to be a "ward" and either (a) place him or her in a juvenile home, ranch, camp, forestry camp, or county juvenile hall (§§ 726, 730, subd. (a) ), or (b) place him on probation (§ 730, subd. (b) ); or (2) not declare the minor to be a ward but place him or her on probation for up to six months (§ 725, subd. (a) ). (See generally § 725; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(a)(2).)

If the juvenile court declares a minor to be a ward and places him or her on probation, the court "may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the [minor] enhanced." (§ 730, subd. (b).) The same is true for minors who, under section 725, are placed on probation without being declared wards. ( In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 668 ["Sections 725 and 729.2 ... serve as a floor, not a ceiling, for juvenile probation conditions"]; see also § 725, subd. (a) [noting a non-ward minor's probation must "include" the three conditions set forth in section 729.2]; In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135-1136, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 [the word "including" is not a term of limitation].) In both instances, the court has "wide discretion" in selecting which conditions of probation to impose. ( In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282 ( Sheena K. ).)

"Restitution has long been considered a valid condition of probation." ( People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67 ( Carbajal ); People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 235, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205, 980 P.2d 912 ( Birkett ).) This is undoubtedly because restitution furthers the twin goals of reforming and rehabilitating a minor by (1) "impress[ing] upon the [minor] the gravity of the harm he [or she] has inflicted upon another," (2) "provid[ing] an opportunity to make amends," thereby giving the minor a chance to demonstrate "to himself [or herself ] that he [or she] is changing," and (3) "deterring future criminality" by deterring "future attempts to evade his [or her] legal and financial duties." ( Charles S. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 741, 747-748, 187 Cal.Rptr. 144, 653 P.2d 648 ; Carbajal , at p. 1124, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67 ; People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 27, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 685, 235 P.3d 11 ( Anderson ).)

But what is the scope of the restitution that may be ordered against a minor?

The statute explicitly governing restitution in juvenile cases is section 730.6. In pertinent part, section 730.6 obligates a court—"unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so"—to impose restitution in an "amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim ... for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602 ." ( § 730.6, subd. (h)(1), italics added.) This duty to impose restitution implements the right of crime victims to seek and obtain restitution, a right that is secured by our Constitution. ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subds. (a)(3) & (b)(13)(A), (B) ["Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case ... in which a crime victim suffers a loss"].) But the italicized language limits a juvenile court's statutory power to impose restitution to losses caused by the minor's charged, criminal conduct because that is the "conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602."

But does the statutory authority set forth in section 730.6 mark the outer boundary of the juvenile court's power to...