Petroleum Inc. v. STATE EX REL. BD. OF EQUALIZATION
| Decision Date | 16 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-226.,98-226. |
| Citation | 983 P.2d 1237 |
| Parties | PETROLEUM INC., Appellant (Petitioner), v. STATE of Wyoming ex rel. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Appellee (Respondent). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Thomas F. Reese of Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
Gay V. Woodhouse, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Harry D. Ivey, Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.
Appellant Petroleum Inc. petitioned the district court for a review of the State Board of Equalization's order which affirmed the Department of Revenue's assessment of a penalty against it. The district court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
We affirm the State Board of Equalization's decision.
Petroleum Inc. presents two related issues for our review:
Oil and gas producers were required by statute to file annual production reports with the Department of Revenue.1 The deadline for filing the reports for the 1994 production year was February 27, 1995. Petroleum Inc. produced oil and gas in Wyoming during that production year, but it did not file the required reports for several of its wells until September 7, 1995.
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-5-101(g) (Michie 1994) (repealed 1998), the Department of Revenue assessed a $169,652 penalty against Petroleum Inc. because of its delinquent filings. The Department of Revenue subsequently reviewed the circumstances surrounding Petroleum Inc.'s late filings and reduced the penalty assessment by fifty percent to $84,826.
Petroleum Inc. appealed to the State Board of Equalization, and the board affirmed the Department of Revenue's decision. Petroleum Inc. filed a petition for a review of the State Board of Equalization's order with the district court, and the district court certified the case to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).
When we review cases which have been certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to the court of the first instance. Union Telephone Company, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission, 907 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Wyo.1995). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) governs judicial review of administrative decisions. W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo.1998).
The issues presented in this case require us to interpret § 39-5-101(g), Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Newton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 922 P.2d 863, 864 (Wyo.1996); Trefren v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo.1993). We affirm an agency's conclusions of law when they are in accordance with the law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo.1996). When an agency has not invoked and properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's errors. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 855 (Wyo.1998); Gneiting v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo.1995).
Petroleum Inc. claims that the State Board of Equalization misinterpreted § 39-5-101(g) when it affirmed the Department of Revenue's penalty assessment against it. The state argues that the State Board of Equalization's interpretation of the statute was consistent with the plain language of the statute and the legislature's intent. We agree with the state.
Our rules of statutory interpretation are well established. We first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers' Compensation, 957 P.2d 843, 845 (Wyo.1998). This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo.1993); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo.1991). A "statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d at 220. A "statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d at 219-20.
If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. Lyles, 957 P.2d at 846; Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo.1996).
We begin by making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia.
State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). If we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d at 1044.
"[I]n ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute ... the court ... must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking body."
Id. (quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942)).
We generally defer to the construction placed on a statute by the agency that is charged with its execution, provided, however, that the agency's construction does not conflict with the legislature's intent. Laramie County Board of Equalization v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Wyo.1996). In this case, we are also cognizant of the principle that statutes which are penal in character are generally strictly construed. Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 224 (Wyo.1997); Albany Mut. Bldg. Ass'n v. City of Laramie, 10 Wyo. 54, 65 P. 1011, 1019 (1901).
Section 39-5-101(g) stated in pertinent part:
(g) If any person fails to file the report required by W.S. 39-2-201(b)(i) by the due date or any extension thereof, the department may impose a penalty equal to a total of one percent (1%) of the taxable value of the production from the well, mine or mining claim but not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) for each calendar month or portion thereof that the report or information is late.
Petroleum Inc. claims that, under § 39-5-101(g), the Department of Revenue had the authority to penalize it up to a maximum of $5,000 per month and that the Department of Revenue could not assess a separate penalty for each well. The state maintains that § 39-5-101(g) allowed the Department of Revenue to assess a penalty of up to $5,000 per month on each well for failure to file the required reports.
We look at the arrangement and connection of the words in a statute to determine the statute's meaning. "`The reader naturally assumes that the parts of a sentence that are placed next to each other are logically related to each other.'" Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 844 (Wyo.1998) (). In this case, the "production from the well, mine or mining claim" language was directly followed by the phrase "but not to exceed five thousand dollars," and the term "well" was stated in the singular. Section 39-5-101(g). The language of the statute suggested, therefore, that the Department of Revenue was authorized to assess a penalty of up to $5,000 per month for each well. Nevertheless, we agree that the statutory language is arguably susceptible to the construction asserted by Petroleum Inc. We conclude, therefore, that the statute is ambiguous and that extrinsic aids of interpretation will be helpful to us in determining the legislature's intent.
In ascertaining the legislature's intent, we look at the mischief that the statute was intended to cure. In other words, we view the statute in the light of the object and purpose that the legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted the statute. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d 97, 100 (Wyo. 1985). The purpose of the penalty provision was to encourage mineral producers to comply in a timely fashion with the reporting requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-201(b)(i) (Michie 1997) (repealed 1998). The Department of Revenue used the reports to determine the fair market value of the gross mineral production for taxation purposes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-201(a) (Michie 1994) (repealed 1998). The legislature specifically linked the amount of the penalty to the value of the mineral production by stating that the amount of the penalty was one percent of the taxable value of a well's production but was not to exceed $5,000 per month. Section 39-5-101(g). The number of wells obviously affected the total value of a taxpayer's mineral production and, accordingly, the amount of taxes assessed. If the $5,000 limitation did not apply to each well, a person who had not reported on a single well and a person who had not reported on several...
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