Powers v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 4D19-2934,4D19-2934
• Citation: 316 So.3d 352
• Parties: John POWERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

316 So.3d 352

John POWERS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D19-2934

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 14, 2021]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Forst, J.

Appellant John Powers appeals his fifteen-year sentence for Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") Manslaughter—Unlawful Blood Alcohol Level ("UBAL"), arising out of a resentencing hearing. Principally, Appellant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in imposing a fifteen-year sentence without a probationary component and (2) Appellant's judgment contains an error with respect to listing two subsections of section 316.193, Florida Statutes, as his offense statute numbers.¹

We find merit in both of these arguments, and thus reverse and remand for a de novo resentencing, with instructions to the trial court to correct the error in Appellant's judgment and to fashion a sentence that complies with the pertinent statutes, as discussed below.

Background

Appellant was charged by Information with one Count of DUI Manslaughter under sections 316.193(1)(a) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) 3.a., Florida Statutes ("Count 1"), and one count of DUI Manslaughter—UBAL under sections 316.193(1)(b) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) 3.a., Florida Statutes ("Count 2"). Appellant pled guilty on both counts, however the trial court dismissed Count 1 due to double jeopardy implications.

Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty on Count 2, sentencing him to eleven years in prison, followed by two years of community control, and then two years of probation. Despite the Information charging Appellant under sections 316.193(1)(b) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) 3.a. for Count 2, Appellant's written judgment listed his offense statute numbers as those charged under Count 1— sections 316.193(1)(a) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) 3.a.

Appellant subsequently appealed his judgment and sentence, raising six issues on appeal. Powers v. State , 260 So. 3d 318, 319–320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Relevant for purposes of the instant appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in considering a scoresheet containing improper prior record points and that the trial court made "a scrivener's error in the written judgment regarding the offense statute number." Id. Based on the trial court's consideration of a scoresheet with improper prior record points, this court reversed and remanded for a de novo resentencing. Id. at 322.

As to the "scrivener's error in the written judgment regarding the offense statute number," the State conceded error. Id. at 320. However, rather than going into detail on the issue, our opinion merely expressed our "trust [that] the trial court w[ould] not commit the same error[ ] upon resentencing." Id. at 322. Accordingly, the opinion did not address the "offense statute number" issue to the extent that Appellant now argues that inclusion of section 316.193(1) on his written judgment is improper, or his alternative argument that, if the inclusion of section 316.193(1) is proper, there should be a reference to section 316.193(1)(b) and not 316.193(1)(a).

Subsequently, Appellant appeared before a different trial court judge for a de novo resentencing hearing, wherein the State presented an updated scoresheet that removed all prior record points. Following the presentation of testimony from the victim's family as to the impact of Appellant's actions, defense counsel requested that the trial court sentence Appellant to seven years in prison, followed by either three or four years of probation, "along with whatever DUI mandatory minimums there are pursuant to the statute." The State, in turn, requested that the trial court sentence Appellant to thirteen years in prison, followed by two years of probation, with a four-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen years in prison with a four-year mandatory minimum sentence. Despite the requests of both parties, the trial court did not impose probation as the predecessor judge had done during Appellant's initial sentencing. Moreover, the trial court did not enter a corrected written judgment.

Appellant timely appealed his fifteen-year sentence. While this appeal was pending, Appellant filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Errors, asserting once more that the written judgment contained a "scrivener's error" and that his written judgment should only have listed section 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) 3.a. Appellant also filed an Amended Second Motion to Correct Sentencing Errors, asserting that his sentence lacked a probationary component. Both motions were deemed denied through the passage of time. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B). Thus, Appellant now seeks our review of both his sentence and the denial of his rule 3.800(b)(2) motions.

Analysis

"The standard of review for a motion to correct a sentencing error is de novo ."

Terry v. State , 263 So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing Willard v. State , 22 So. 3d 864, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ). We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo . Larimore v. State , 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).

A. Probationary Component

Section 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) 3.a., Florida Statutes (2011), provides that a person who violates subsection (1), operates a vehicle, and causes the death of another by operation of such, commits "[a] felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." Section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2011), further provides that the maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is "a term of imprisonment of 15 years."² However, when a defendant is convicted under section 316.193, "[t]he court shall place all offenders convicted of violating [that statute] on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a substance abuse course ...." § 316.193(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Moreover, "[w]hen a defendant is sentenced to a term in prison followed by probation, the combined times must not exceed the statutory maximum." Jackson v. State , 276 So. 3d 972, 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting Gonzales v. State , 816 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ).

When construing a statute, if "the plain language ... is unambiguous and conveys a clear meaning, the statute must be given its obvious meaning." McNeil v. State , 215 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 2017). If the statute is clear, "courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent." State v. Burris , 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004).

Here, looking first at section 316.193(5) ’s plain language, in fashioning a sentence for a person convicted under section 316.193 (as here), the court shall place this person on "monthly reporting probation" and shall require this person to complete a substance abuse course. § 316.193(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). However, the State argues an apparent conflict exists between section 316.193(5) ’s two requirements, on the one hand, and the general sentencing statute—section 775.082—referenced within section 316.193(3), which provides for a maximum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. The State asserts that because section 775.082 allows a defendant to be sentenced up to fifteen years for a felony of the second degree, and because the Legislature has signaled its intent to give a trial court the authority to sentence a defendant "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense[,]" § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2011), statutory construction is warranted.

Even looking beyond the plain language and applying statutory construction principles, the law disfavors the State's argument. Statutory provisions must "be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Larimore , 2 So. 3d at 106 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A. , 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007) ). Further, "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms." McKendry v. State , 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994).

Here, it is undisputed that Appellant's maximum sentence for DUI Manslaughter—UBAL was fifteen years pursuant to section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2011). The trial court could easily have construed sections 316.193(5) and 775.082(3)(d) in harmony by simply sentencing Appellant to a prison term less than the statutory maximum of fifteen years and by providing for a probationary component, with the combination of time in prison and time on probation not exceeding fifteen years. Indeed, the predecessor judge imposed such a sentence at Appellant's initial sentencing, and both Appellant and the State requested this at the resentencing hearing. Notably, this would have satisfied the additional rule of statutory construction that specific statutes control over general statutes. McKendry , 641 So. 2d at 46. This approach would also have complied with the requirement that a sentence split between prison and probation not exceed the statutory maximum. See Jackson , 276 So. 3d at 973.

This court's existing precedent is instructive. We have previously considered the interplay between section 316.193(3) ’s reference to the general sentencing statute and section 316.193(5) ’s probationary requirements. In McGhee v. State , 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the defendant argued that "under section 316.193(3)(c) 1., a conviction for DUI causing damage to property is punishable solely as provided in section 775.082 and section 775.083 [.]" Id. at 501. Despite section 775.082 merely outlining a first-degree misdemeanor's statutory maximum sentence, the McGhee court still held that ...