Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 24 February 1972
• Docket Number: No. 41811,41811
• Citation: 80 Wn.2d 283,494 P.2d 216
• Parties: SNOW'S MOBILE HOMES, INC., a Washington corporation, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Allen B. MORGAN, King County Assessor; and M. J. R. Williams, King County Treasurer, Appellants/Cross-Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 283

80 Wn.2d 283

494 P.2d 216

SNOW'S MOBILE HOMES, INC., a Washington corporation Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Allen B. MORGAN, King County Assessor; and M. J. R Williams, King County Treasurer Appellants/Cross-Respondent.

No. 41811.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Feb. 24, 1972.

Rutherford, Kargianis & Austin, George Kargianis, Russell A. Austin, Jr., Seattle, for respondent cross-appellant.

Christopher T. Bayley, Pros. Atty. for King County, Michael L. Cohen, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for appellants-cross-respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

In 1943, the legislature enacted Laws of 1943, ch. 144, imposing an excise tax upon motor vehicles 'used, or of the type designed primarily to be used, upon the public streets and highways.' That law expressly excluded 'motor vehicles or their trailers used entirely upon private property.' Section 12 of that act provided that no motor vehicle should be listed and assessed for ad valorem taxation 'so long as this act remains in effect.'

The legislature in 1955 enacted chapter 139, whereby it imposed an excise tax on certain house trailers not licensed 'to operate on the public streets and highways and taxed as motor vehicles under RCW 82.44.020.' This chapter, in section 19, provided that trailers subject to the excise tax should be exempt from ad valorem taxes. No mention was made of house trailers in the inventory of a dealer, held for sale, but section 6 provided:

Except as provided herein, the tax imposed by this chapter is in addition to all other licenses and taxes otherwise imposed.

A similar provision was contained in Laws of 1943, ch. 144, § 7.

In 1961, the legislature amended both the motor vehicle excise tax statute and the house trailer excise tax statute. Laws of 1961, ch. 15, RCW 82.44 and 82.50. At that time, in amending RCW 82.44.010, 'house trailers as defined in RCW 82.50.010' were expressly excluded from the definition of 'motor vehicle' and RCW 82.50.180 was enacted, providing for exemption from the operation of the house trailer excise statute of

Any unoccupied house trailer when it is part of an inventory of house trailers held for sale by a manufacturer or dealer in the course of his business.

In 1967, the house trailer excise tax statute was amended. At that time, vehicles which were previously called 'house trailers' were classified as either 'travel trailers' or 'mobile homes.' The 1967 amendments did not affect the question presented in this action. That question concerns the effect to be given to Laws of 1969, Ex.Ses., ch. 225 (RCW 82.50.190), which provided:

No mobile home or travel trailer which is a part of the inventory of mobile homes or travel trailers held for sale by a dealer in the course of his business and no mobile home or travel trailer with respect to which the excise tax imposed by this chapter is payable shall be listed and assessed for ad valorem taxation.

Section 2 of the act declared that it was necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions and should take effect immediately.

The bill passed the house and senate on May 2nd. It was signed by the Governor on May 12, 1969.

We are told that during this legislative history, the county assessors had never listed inventories of motor vehicles, travel trailers or mobile homes for ad valorem taxation, and that this had been pursuant to directions of the State Tex Commission and its successor, the Department of Revenue. ¹ However, in January 1969, the assistant director of the Department of Revenue advised all county assessors and county auditors that, upon advice of counsel, the department had determined that dealers' inventories of mobile homes and travel trailers were, unlike such inventories of motor vehicles, 'not specifically exempt' from ad valorem taxes. The assessors and auditors were therefore advised to assess such inventories.

When the assessors accordingly sent notices to mobile home and travel trailer dealers to list their inventories, most of them requested and were granted extensions of time in which to do so. Only a few had listed their inventories before the day upon which chapter 225 went into effect. In the meantime, they had taken their problem to the legislature and had received the favorable action embodied in that chapter.

Nevertheless, the assistant director of the Department of Revenue, on May 13, 1969, sent another letter to the assessors and auditors, advising them that, '(s)ince the March 31 deadline (RCW 84.40.040) for listing personal property passed before the Governor signed House Bill 542 (chapter 225), the amendment in no way effects the assessment for ad valorem purposes of mobile home and travel trailer inventories for the 1969 assessment roll.'

When it learned that it was still the intent of the King County Assessor to require the listing of its inventory, the plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, naming the assessor and treasurer defendants and asking for injunctive relief. The Attorney General was not made a party, but no issue has been made of that fact in this court. ²

The plaintiff sought a declaration either that the 1969 act was meant to apply to the listing and assessing of inventories in 1969, or that such inventories had always been exempt as 'motor vehicles' under the language of RCW 82.44.130 (Laws of 1943, ch. 144, § 12); or that inventories listed and assessed after the effective date of the 1969 act were uncollectible under the provisions of the act. The trial court rejected the first two theories but accepted the third, holding that those who had listed their properties before the effective date of the act were assessable but those who had not done so were exempt.

Both the plaintiff and the defendants have appealed. Both agree that the conclusion reached by the trial court cannot be sustained. As the defendants point out in their brief, if there was an obligation to list inventories, it arose on the first day of January under the provisions of RCW 84.40.020.

Const. art. 7, § 1 (amendment 14), provides that all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. To hold that those who complied with the directions of the assessor and listed their property before the effective date of the amendatory act the subject to the tax but those who had not done so are exempt would be a manifest violation of this constitutional provision, as well as a denial of equal protection of the laws. It is fundamental that all persons within the same class must be treated equally. See State ex rel. Namer Inv. Corp. v. Williams, 73 Wash.2d 1, 435 P.2d 975 (1968) and authorities cited therein.

It is agreed therefore that either the 1969 amendment applied to all assessments in 1969 or it applied to none. The question confronting us is: which of these two results did the legislature intend?

The assessor maintains that because the plaintiff's obligation to list its inventory arose on January 1st, the obligation to pay the tax arose on that date and could not be extinguished by the subsequent amendment of the statute. Assuming that the obligation did exist on that date, the legislature nevertheless had the power to extinguish it. In Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444, 451, 100 P. 991 (1909), this court said:

All taxes are levied under the express or implied power of the state. The state can fix the subject of taxation and exempt property. It can limit or extend the time of payment. The authority so delegated, when exercised, is none the less the execution of the state's power. If it can do all these things, it can take away not only the power to tax, but the subjects of taxation as well. No person or municipality can acquire as against the state a vested right to taxes or the right to insist upon the collection of taxes when levied.

See also North Spokane Irrigation Dist. No. 8 v. Spokane County, 173 Wash. 281, 22 P.2d 990 (1933), holding that the legislature may abolish a tax lien. The question remains whether the legislature intended to abolish the right to assess and levy ad valorem taxes in the year 1969, when it enacted Laws of 1969, Ex.Ses., ch. 225.

We approach this question mindful of applicable rules of construction. First, where a statute is plain, unambiguous and clear on its face, there is no room for construction. King County v. Seattle, 70 Wash.2d 988, 425 P.2d 887 (1967). Here the question in whetehr the act was intended to apply to 1969 assessments. The act itself contains no express language to answer this question. Without the emergency clause, the presumption that statutes are intended to have a prospective rather than a retrospective effect and the presumption against tax exemptions might well lead to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend this law to be retrospective. But the existence of the emergency clause raises an ambiguity. If the statute was meant to apply only to exemptions in future years, there was no apparent necessity for such a clause, since its provisions would control the 1970 assessments if it became effective in the ordinary course of its enactment.

It is of course the rule that the courts are obliged to interpret a statute, if possible, so that no portion of it is superfluous, void, or insignificant. Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash.2d 130, 437 P.2d 171 (1968); See State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970).

If the emergency clause was intended to have any effect, it must have been the intent that it affect the listing and assessing of property in 1969. But, as we have noted, the legislature could not, in compliance with the constitution simply arrest the listing and assessing of inventories on and after May 12, 1969, leaving properties already listed and assessed subject to whatever ad valorem taxes the county should...