State v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 387, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 15 March 2000
• Docket Number: (SC 16121)
• Citation: 747 A.2d 480,252 Conn. 467
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 387, AFL-CIO

252 Conn. 467

747 A.2d 480

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 387, AFL-CIO

(SC 16121)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 4, 1999.

Officially released March 15, 2000¹.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Peters and Callahan, Js.

J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Jason W. Cohen, for the appellant (defendant). Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Charles A. Overend, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The defendant union, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, appeals from the judgment of the trial court for the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, granting its application to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418,² and denying the defendant's cross application to confirm the arbitration award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417.³ On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly vacated the arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator's award violated public policy. We disagree with the defendant, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Gregory Frederick, a correctional officer employed by the state department of correction and assigned to the John Manson Youth Correctional Center, had attended a union rally at the state capitol in early May, 1997. This rally was called by the defendant in response to the Senate's recent rejection of an interest arbitration award that affected the labor contract covering correctional officers. At the rally, the defendant asked its rank and file members to contact Senate members to protest the rejection of the contract and distributed telephone lists for that purpose. While on duty at the Manson Youth Correctional Center on May 15, 1997, Frederick called approximately six legislators, including Senator Alvin W. Penn from Bridgeport. Frederick used a state owned telephone for this purpose. The telephone call to Senator Penn is the subject of this appeal.

Without identifying himself, Frederick left a profane and racist message⁴ on the Senator's voice mail.⁵ Senator Penn reported the call to legislative security and an investigation ensued. Frederick initially denied making the call. The next day, however, he admitted to the investigator that he had made the telephone call. As a result of this action, Frederick's employment with the correction department was terminated, effective June 18, 1997. Frederick also was arrested for harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a).⁶ He applied for accelerated rehabilitation, which was granted by the court. The court imposed a two year period of probation and ordered Frederick to perform 300 hours of community service. General Statutes § 54-56e.⁷

Frederick filed a grievance concerning his dismissal through the defendant claiming that he was discharged without cause and that the discipline was too severe. The grievance was denied at the initial stages, and the defendant subsequently filed for arbitration pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The parties joined in framing the following issue to be submitted to the arbitrator, Thomas Staley: "Was the dismissal of the grievant, Gregory Frederick, for just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy consistent with the contract?" As documented by the certificate of record before the arbitrator, certified by the office of labor relations and filed with the clerk of the Superior Court on May 8, 1998, the arbitrator reviewed Department of Correction Administrative Directives, Unit Directives and General Post Orders, which were relevant to Frederick's alleged misconduct.⁸ The arbitrator issued the following award: "The termination of [Frederick] effective June 18, 1997, is vacated and same is reduced to a suspension of sixty (60) working days without pay. The [plaintiff] is ordered to reinstate [Frederick] forthwith with all benefits and pay lost by [Frederick] from June 18, 1997, to the date of his reinstatement less the pay covering the sixty (60) working days suspension. Further, the back pay award is to be further decreased by any form of compensation received by [Frederick] during the time of June 18, 1997, to the date of his reinstatement except for the first sixty (60) working days commencing with what would have been [Frederick's] first working day after June 18, 1997. The back pay award should be paid at the rate [Frederick] would have earned during the applicable time period. The [plaintiff] shall place a copy of this arbitration award in [Frederick's] personnel file. Employment record should include a copy of this award."

The plaintiff applied to the trial court to vacate the arbitration award, pursuant to both § 52-418 and the common law. The plaintiff claimed that the arbitrator, by ordering Frederick's reinstatement on the ground that he had not been dismissed for just cause, "exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made as hereinafter set forth: (A) The award does not draw its essence from the contract. (B) The arbitrator exceeded his powers in violation of ... § 52-418 and the common law. (C) This award violates explicit, well defined and dominant public policy referenced in both the statutory and common law of this state. (D) Enforcement of this award would violate explicit, well defined and dominant public policy referenced in both the statutory and common law of this state." The defendant cross applied to confirm the award.

The trial court granted the plaintiffs application to vacate the arbitrator's award and denied the defendant's cross application to confirm the award. The court concluded that "the arbitrator's award violates an explicit, well-defined and dominant policy of the state warranting the termination of employees who engage in behavior such as [Frederick's], which is wholly incompatible with continued employment by the [plaintiff]. Anything less than termination is not sufficient to uphold this important policy."

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c)⁹ and Practice Book § 65-1.¹⁰ The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that § 53a-183 (a) establishes a public policy sufficient to justify vacating the arbitration award and that the trial court wrongfully vacated the award as violative of such public policy. In doing so, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly based its decision to vacate the arbitration award on considerations of supposed public interest, not on policy grounded in statutory law and legal precedent. We conclude that the trial court's decision was properly grounded in statutory law and legal precedent, and that the trial court correctly concluded that the arbitration award was violative of public policy clearly expressed in statutes and relevant administrative regulations that were properly before the arbitrator and, subsequently, the trial court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We begin our analysis with a restatement of familiar principles reflecting this court's traditional deference to arbitral awards. "`We have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes.' Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266, 270, 487 A.2d 553 (1985); Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 173 Conn. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 323 (1977); International Union v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 Conn. 650, 653, 201 A.2d 656 (1964); Board of Education v. Local 818, 5 Conn. App. 636, 639, 502 A.2d 426 (1985). `A challenge of the arbitrator's authority is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission.' Bic Pen Corporation v.Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579,584,440 A.2d 774 (1981); see also American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 186, 530 A.2d 171 (1987); Board of Education v. AFSCME, supra, 271; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 340, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed.2d 557 (1985); Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159, 183 Conn. 102, 106, 438 A.2d 1171 (1981); Board of Education v. Local 818, supra, [639]." Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 338, 555 A.2d 406 (1989).

"Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 248 Conn. 108, 115, 728 A.2d 1063 (1999).

"In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator's authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists under § 52-418 (a) (4) when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy. New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411, 416-17, 544 A.2d 186 (1988); Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 590-91, 519 A.2d 1 (1986); Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979); Stamford v. Stamford Police Assn., 14 Conn. App. 257, 259, 540 A.2d 400 (1988); State v. Connecticut Council 4, CEU, AFSCME, 7 Conn. App. 286, 290, 508 A.2d 806 (1986).... This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than par...