State v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 01 May 1970
• Docket Number: No. 41742,41742
• Citation: 177 N.W.2d 40,287 Minn. 83
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brenda EDWARDS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 40

177 N.W.2d 40

287 Minn. 83

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brenda EDWARDS, Appellant.

No. 41742.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 1, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

The legislative requirement that motorcyclists, while operating a motorcycle on the streets and highways of this state, shall wear protective headgear that complies with standards established by the commissioner of highways, Minn.St. 169.974, subd. 4(a), is constitutionally valid under well-established authority which recognizes that the legislature has plenary power over the regulation of the privilege to use the streets and highways for the safety and best interests of the public.

Robins, Meshbesher, Singer & Spence, and Morley Friedman, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Larry Leventhal, Minneapolis, amicus curiae.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Keith Stidd, City Atty., Austin Ditzler, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, James E. Sutherland, St. Paul, for respondent.

OPINION

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the municipal court denying a motion by defendant, Brenda Edwards, for dismissal and from a judgment whereby she was convicted of violating Minn.St. 169.974, subd. 4(a). The motion to dismiss asserts that the statute 'is unconstitutional since it is repugnant to the reserved powers clause of the Ninth Amendment and to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to Article I, Section II, the rights and privileges clause and Article I, Section XVI, the reserve powers clause of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota, and, as such, constitutes an illegal exercise of the police powers of the State of Minnesota.' In this court defendant urges that the statute has no relation to public welfare and safety, does not promote the general welfare, invades fundamental rights of the individual, and denies to motorcyclists equal protection of the laws.

It appears from the record that defendant was arrested on the public streets of Minneapolis on May 1, 1968, the effective date of the so-called Minnesota Motorcycle Helmet Law, and charged with the operation of a motorcycle in violation of § 169.974, subd. 4(a):

'When operating a motorcycle on the streets and highways of this state, the operator and passenger, if any, shall wear protective headgear that complies with standards established by the commissioner.'

The facts are undisputed. At the time of her arrest, Mrs. Edwards was not wearing a protective headgear as required by statute. She argues that the statute exceeds the police power of the state because it protects the motorcyclist from self-harm with no concomitant benefits to the public health, safety, or welfare. She contends that the statute not only interferes with her personal right in that it discriminates against her as a motorcyclist but also denies equal protection of the law. In support of this claim she points out that the statute does not apply equally to automobilists, bicyclists, and pedestrians.

The trial court determined that the statute is constitutional and in an interesting and well-written memorandum stated:

'The Court finds said statute is a valid exercise of the State's police power and is therefore constitutional.

'With few exceptions the defendant and other cyclists appearing before this Court do appear to agree that the use of a helmet does contribute to the safety of a rider. In the instant case the defendant stated on direct examination that she almost always wears a helmet because '* * * if I fell, you know, it would protect my head, I hope--I think. That is what it is supposed to do.'

'A significant rise in motorcycle and motorscooter registrations and in the number of serious accidents and fatalities has caused legislation similar to Minnesota's to be enacted to date in some 30 states. The annual Minnesota motorcycle and motorscooter registration in 1966 was 49,775. Statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Transportation show motorcycle registrations nationally rose from 754,080 in 1960 to 1,914,700 in 1966, with a projected annual increase by 1970 to 4,000,000.

'To be a valid exercise of the State's police power, as this Court holds in the instant case, a statute must meet two separate criteria: (1) The area of action must be within the legitimate concern of the state and not reserved to the individual; and (2) the method of control must be reasonably related to the legitimate end envisioned.

'While an exact definition of the term 'police power' is nearly impossible, it has been said that 'the police power extends to protection of the public health, * * * safety, morals and general welfare; to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the State, including public property; to the promotion of the comfort and welfare of society; and, in addition, to the enhancement of the public convenience and the general prosperity.' (See 11 Am.Jur. 1015--1018, Constitutional Law, Section 270.)

'Our courts have long recognized that the scope of police power changes with changing circumstances and changing conditions, and that as conditions demand, for the public good, some restraints on individual freedoms must be expected. In Euclid (Ohio) v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016, 1024, the United States Supreme Court said:

"Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions and respect of the use and occupation of private lands and urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even a half-a-century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive * * * and in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise.'

'Although not particularly a major consideration in this Court's decision, the fact that the legislation involves those using the highways is not completely irrelevant. The principle of state control of public highways and the necessity for regulation and on occasion prohibition, is touched on in State v. LeFebvre (1928), 174 Minn. 248, 219 N.W. 167, and State v. Palmer (1942), 212 Minn. 388, 3 N.W.2d 666. The public highways, roads, and streets are public property, the property of all the people of the state. The legislature has plenary power over the regulation of such use for the safety and best interests of the public. See also Kelly v. Anderson (1952), 74 Ariz. 364, 249 P.2d 833; Ragland v. Wallace (1946), 80 Ohio App. 210, 70 N.E.2d 118. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized and gave sanction to the plenary power of the states over use of the public way in Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.ed. 1091:

"Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways.'

'The Court has considered the defendant's argument that M.S.A. 169.974, Subd. 4(a), is class legislation. However, as is pointed out in Doyle v. Kahl (1951), 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52, 55, 'Legislation which applies equally to all in a reasonably designated group is not discriminatory nor does it constitute class legislation.'

"Finally, we are committed to the principle that unless a law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be sustained. The burden of proof in this respect is on the party seeking to set the law aside.' Minneapolis Federation of Teachers (Local 59, A.F.L.-C.I.O.) v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 356, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966). The defendant, Brenda Edwards, has not sustained that burden.

'Essentially this Court's decision is based on the premise that it is the province of the legislature to declare what acts are inimical to the public welfare and to prohibit the same and provide the penalties therefore. State v. Anderson, Et al., Minn.Sup.Ct. No. 166--1/2, filed June 21, 1968 (159 N.W.2d 892); State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N.W. 935; State v. Moilen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N.W. 345; 5A Dunnell Dig. (3rd Ed.), § 2407. It is not...