State v. Lapointe
| Decision Date | 06 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 75218-9-I.,75218-9-I. |
| Citation | 404 P.3d 610 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifford Paul LAPOINTE, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Stephanie C. Cunningham, Attorney at Law, 4616 25th Avenue Ne # 552, Seattle, WA, 98105-4183, Counsel for Appellant.
Alice Degen, Prosecuting Attorney King County, King County Prosecutor's Office/App Unit Supervisor, 516 3rd Avenue Suite W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362, Counsel for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 In 2013, the Washington State Legislature amended RCW 9A.52.100 to elevate the crime of gross misdemeanor vehicle prowling in the second degree to a class C felony "upon a third or subsequent conviction."1 The statute defines "a third or subsequent conviction" to mean "a person has been previously convicted at least two separate occasions of the crime of vehicle prowling in the second degree."2 The statute identifies two circumstances that "do not count as separate offenses": multiple counts either charged in the same information or based on the same date of occurrence.3 Clifford Paul LaPointe Jr. contends the court erred in denying his Knapstad 4 motion to dismiss the 2016 charge of felony vehicle prowling in the second degree. LaPointe argued that because he pleaded guilty to charges of misdemeanor vehicle prowling on the same day and in the same proceeding in 2013, he had not been previously convicted on two separate occasions. The State argued that because LaPointe was not charged in the same amended information and the charges were not based on the same date of occurrence, the 2013 convictions elevated the 2016 offense to a felony. The court denied the motion to dismiss the felony charge and convicted LaPointe of felony vehicle prowling in the second degree. Because the language of the statute is ambiguous, we conclude the 2013 convictions that occurred on the same day and in the same proceeding did not elevate the crime to a felony. We reverse denial of the Knapstad motion to dismiss and the conviction of felony vehicle prowling in the second degree, and remand.
¶ 2 On December 9, 2013, Clifford Paul LaPointe Jr. pleaded guilty as charged by amended information to two counts of misdemeanor vehicle prowling in the second degree in July 2013 and in September 2013; King County cause number 13-1-13980-1 KNT. LaPointe also pleaded guilty as charged by amended information to vehicle prowling in the second degree in May 2013; King County cause number 13-C-12822-1 KNT.
¶ 3 On January 3, 2014, the court sentenced LaPointe on the convictions. The court imposed a concurrent 364-day suspended sentence.
¶ 4 On January 6, 2016, the State charged LaPointe with felony vehicle prowling in the second degree. The information alleged LaPointe had "previously been convicted on at least two separate occasions of the crime of vehicle prowling in the second degree, each occurring on a separate date and not having been charged in the same charging document."
¶ 5 LaPointe filed a Knapstad motion to dismiss the charge of felony vehicle prowling in the second degree. LaPointe argued that under the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 9A.52.100(3), he had not been previously convicted on "two separate occasions." LaPointe asserted the undisputed record established he pleaded guilty in 2013 by amended information to the misdemeanor vehicle prowling in the second degree charges on the same day and in the same proceeding.
¶ 6 The State argued the court should deny the motion to dismiss under RCW 9A.52.100(4). The State asserted that because LaPointe pleaded guilty as charged in two amended informations to offenses that occurred on different dates, his 2013 convictions elevated the current offense to a felony.
¶ 7 The trial court denied the Knapstad motion. The court concluded LaPointe had been previously convicted on at least two separate occasions because he pleaded guilty in 2013 to misdemeanor vehicle prowling in the second degree "based on separate dates of occurrence" as charged in separate charging documents. The order states, in pertinent part:
¶ 8 LaPointe agreed to a trial on stipulated facts. The court convicted LaPointe of felony vehicle prowling in the second degree. The court ruled the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that LaPointe had been previously convicted on two separate occasions of the crime of misdemeanor vehicle prowling in the second degree. The conclusions of law state, in pertinent part:
¶ 9 LaPointe contends the court erred in denying his Knapstad motion to dismiss the felony charge of vehicle prowling in the second degree.
¶ 10 We review a trial court's decision on a Knapstad motion de novo. State v. Bauer, 180 Wash.2d 929, 935, 329 P.3d 67 (2014). Resolution of the Knapstad motion turns on statutory interpretation of RCW 9A.52.100. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010).
¶ 11 In 1975, the legislature added Title 9A as "a new title to the Revised Code of Washington." LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260. Chapter 9A.52 RCW, "Burglary and Trespass," includes the gross misdemeanor crime of vehicle prowling. LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.52.100 (codified as RCW 9A.52.100 ). Former RCW 9A.52.100 (1975) states:
¶ 12 In 1982, the legislature enacted a new section to define the crime of felony vehicle prowling in the first degree. LAWS OF 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 47, § 13. The new section states, in pertinent part:
LAWS OF 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 47, § 13 (codified as RCW 9A.52.095 ). The legislature amended misdemeanor vehicle prowling as a crime in the second degree. LAWS OF 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 47, § 14. Former RCW 9A.52.100 (1982) states, in pertinent part:
LAWS OF 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 47, § 14.5
¶ 13 In 2013, the Washington State Senate proposed an amendment to RCW 9A.52.100 to elevate the crime of misdemeanor vehicle prowling in the second degree to a felony "upon a third or subsequent conviction." S.B. 5053, at 1, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).6 Proposed Senate Bill 5053 states, in pertinent part:
S.B. 5053, at 1, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).7
¶ 14 The Washington State House of Representatives amended Senate Bill 5053 to define when a "third or subsequent conviction" elevates vehicle prowling in the second degree to a felony. The house also added a new subsection that identifies two situations that do not elevate the crime to a felony.
ENGROSSED S.B. 5053, at 1-2, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).8
¶ 15 On April 24, the senate passed Engrossed Senate Bill 5053 as amended by...
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State v. Conaway
...was used to establish a previous conviction as an element of a subsequent felony offense. Id. at 5-6 (citing State v. LaPointe , 1 Wash. App. 2d 261, 269, 404 P.3d 610 (2017) ; State v. Benitez , 175 Wash. App. 116, 123, 302 P.3d 877 (2013) ). Because "Washington case law dictates that a de......
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State v. Conway, 50032-9-II
...attempt to harmonize the provisions within a statute so that no portion is rendered superfluous or meaningless. State v. LaPointe , 1 Wash. App. 2d 261, 269, 404 P.3d 610 (2017). "If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then [our] inquiry is at an end." State v. Armendariz , 16......
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State v. Conaway
...a previous conviction as an element of a subsequent felony offense. Id. at 5-6 (citing State v. LaPointe, 1 Wn.App. 2d 261, 269, 404 P.3d 610 (2017); State v. Benitez, 175 116, 123, 302 P.3d 877 (2013)). Because "Washington case law dictates that a deferred sentence is a conviction," the Co......
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State v. Conaway
...interpretation that where the legislature defines a term, we will use that definition." State v. LaPointe, 1 Wn.App. 2d 261, 269, 404 P.3d 610 (2013). The 9.94A.030(9) definition of conviction is used consistently by our courts to establish the existence of a prior conviction as an element ......