State v. Porter
| Decision Date | 14 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 92060–5,92060–5 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of Washington, Petitioner, v. Clifford Melvin Porter, Jr., Respondent. |
Thomas Charles Roberts, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, 930 Tacoma Ave S Room 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402–2171, Counsel for Petitioner.
Kevin Andrew March, Nielsen, Broman & Koch, PLLC, 1908 E Madison St., Seattle, WA, 98122–2842, Counsel for Respondent.
STEPHENS
, J.
¶ 1 The State challenges a Court of Appeals decision reversing Clifford Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. At issue is whether an information charging possession of a stolen motor vehicle must allege that the defendant withheld or appropriated the vehicle for the use of a person other than the true owner.
¶ 2 Applying a liberal construction, we hold that the charging document adequately captured the essential elements of the crime of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The information referenced the applicable criminal statutes and stated that Porter “did unlawfully and feloniously knowingly possess a stolen motor vehicle.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1. The State was not required to include language specifying that Porter withheld the vehicle from the true owner, as such language merely defines and limits the scope of the crime of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. State v. Johnson , 180 Wash.2d 295, 302, 325 P.3d 135 (2014)
(). We reinstate Porter's conviction and remand to the Court of Appeals to address his remaining issues on appeal.
and 9A.56.140, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.
¶ 4 At the close of trial, the jury convicted Porter as charged. On appeal, Porter argued for the first time that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege that Porter withheld or appropriated the vehicle from the true owner. Suppl. Br. of Appellant at 2–6. Relying on its decision in State v. Satterthwaite , 186 Wash.App. 359, 344 P.3d 738 (2015)
, issued while Porter's appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals held that this language constitutes an essential element of the crime, and reversed Porter's conviction. State v. Porter , noted at 188 Wash.App. 1051, 2015 WL 4252605 (2015). We granted review. State v. Porter , 184 Wash.2d 1026, 364 P.3d 119 (2016).
ANALYSIS
¶ 5 Porter argues that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document omitted an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle: RCW 9A.56.140(1)
's provision stating that possession means to “ ‘withhold or appropriate [stolen property] to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto.’ ” Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 4 (quoting RCW 9A.56.140(1) ). The State contends the information need not include the “withhold or appropriate” language because it merely defines the essential element of possession and is not itself an essential element. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 4–8. For the reasons explained below, we conclude the State has the better argument.
The Charging Document Captured All Essential Elements of the Crime of Unlawful Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle
¶ 6 Individuals charged with crimes have the constitutional right to know the charges against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI
; Wash. Const. Art. I, § 22. The State formally gives notice of the charges by information, which “shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” CrR 2.1(a)(1).
¶ 7 The information is constitutionally sufficient “only if all essential elements of a crime, statutory and nonstatutory, are included in the document.” State v. Vangerpen , 125 Wash.2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)
. “ ‘An essential element is one whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior charged.’ ” State v. Zillyette , 178 Wash.2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ward , 148 Wash.2d 803, 811, 64 P.3d 640 (2003) ). “Words in a charging document are read as a whole, construed according to common sense, and include facts which are necessarily implied.” State v. Kjorsvik , 117 Wash.2d 93, 109, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). When, as here, the information is challenged for the first time on appeal, the charging document will be construed “quite liberally.” State v. Hopper , 118 Wash.2d 151, 156, 822 P.2d 775 (1992) ; see also
State v. McCarty , 140 Wash.2d 420, 435, 998 P.2d 296 (2000).
¶ 8 The primary purpose of the essential element rule is “to apprise the accused of the charges against him or her and to allow the defendant to prepare a defense.” Vangerpen , 125 Wash.2d at 787, 888 P.2d 1177
. A secondary purpose for the essential element rule is to bar “ ‘any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.’ ” State v. Nonog , 169 Wash.2d 220, 226, 237 P.3d 250 (2010) (quoting State v. Leach , 113 Wash.2d 679, 688, 782 P.2d 552 (1989) ). If the State fails to allege every essential element, then the information is insufficient and the charge must be dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 226 n. 3, 237 P.3d 250
.
¶ 9 Porter was charged with unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle under RCW 9A.56.068
. That statute reads, “A person is guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle if he or she possess [possesses] a stolen motor vehicle.” RCW 9A.56.068(1) (alteration in original). Porter argues that the information is deficient because it does not contain the statutory definition of “possess.” Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 4–5. Under RCW 9A.56.140(1), “ ‘[p]ossessing stolen property’ means knowingly to receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto.” At issue is whether RCW 9A.56.140(1)
merely defines the essential element of “possession” or instead provides an additional essential element the State must allege when charging a criminal defendant with possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
¶ 10 In reversing Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the Court of Appeals relied on Satterthwaite , 186 Wash.App. 359, 344 P.3d 738
, which addressed the identical issue presented in this case. In Satterthwaite, the Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.56.140(1) constituted an essential element of possession of a stolen motor vehicle—rather than a definition of an essential element—because withholding the stolen property from the owner is what ultimately makes possessing the stolen vehicle illegal. Id. at 365, 344 P.3d 738. Otherwise, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the law would not differentiate between “a person attempting to return known stolen property and a person choosing to keep, use, or dispose of known stolen property.” Id. at 364, 344 P.3d 738. The Court of Appeals therefore held that “ ‘withhold or appropriate’ ” is an essential element of RCW 9A.56.068 because it establishes the very illegality of the act. Id. at 365, 344 P.3d 738.
¶ 11 The State argues Satterthwaite
is inconsistent with Johnson. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 8. We agree. In Johnson, this court clarified the difference between an essential element and a definition of an element, holding that the 180 Wash.2d at 302, 325 P.3d 135
. In Johnson, the defendant was charged with unlawful imprisonment. Id. at 301, 325 P.3d 135. The information read:
(alteration in original). The defendant challenged the information, arguing it was constitutionally insufficient for not including the definition of “restrain.” Id. at 301–02, 325 P.3d 135. Finding the charging document sufficient, this court held that the State was not required to include definitions of elements and that it was enough for the State to allege all of the essential elements found in the unlawful imprisonment statute. Id.
¶ 12 Under our analysis in Johnson
, the information charging Porter with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle passes constitutional muster. Contrary to Porter's argument, the State was not required to include the definition of “possess.” Like the definition of “restrain,” the definition of “possess” defines and limits the scope of the essential elements of the crime of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle. the essential elements of the crime of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle. See also
State v. Allen , 176 Wash.2d 611, 626–30, 294 P.3d 679 (2013) ().
¶ 13 When liberally construed as required under Kjorsvik
, the charging document clearly put Porter on...
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