State v. Ramos, s. 1
| Decision Date | 24 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1,CA-CR,s. 1 |
| Citation | 155 Ariz. 468,747 P.2d 629 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carlos Villa RAMOS, Appellant. 10936 to 1 10938. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This appeal presents the question of how many felony assessments the trial court may impose at a single sentencing proceeding upon a person who stands convicted of multiple felonies. This requires an interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-812 1, which provides in part that "each person convicted of a felony shall be assessed a penalty of [o]ne hundred dollars." In the present case, appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of two felonies in Maricopa County Superior Court No. CR-159523. He entered Alford pleas of guilty to two additional felonies in Maricopa County Superior Court Nos. CR-159668 and CR-159851. At the single sentencing proceeding, the trial court imposed a penalty assessment of $100 on each of the four felony counts for a total of $400. Appellant argues that there should have been only one $100 felony penalty assessment, not four $100 felony penalty assessments as ordered by the trial court. We disagree.
We hold that A.R.S. § 13-812 requires that an individual be assessed a separate $100 felony penalty for each felony of which he or she is convicted. Accordingly, the trial court properly imposed four $100 felony penalty assessments upon appellant for his four felony convictions at the single sentencing proceeding.
On November 4, 1986, in Maricopa County Superior Court No. CR-159523, a jury found appellant guilty of second degree burglary, a class 3, nondangerous repetitive felony, and theft, a class 3, nondangerous repetitive felony. Appellant admitted that he had two prior felony convictions.
On November 4, 1986, after the jury entered its verdict in CR-159523, appellant entered into a plea agreement pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), in which he pled guilty to (1) burglary in the third degree with two prior felony convictions, a class 4 nondangerous repetitive felony (CR-159668); and (2) possession of narcotic drugs with two prior felony convictions, a class 4 nondangerous repetitive felony (CR-159851). The plea agreement also provided that there would be a mandatory assessment of $100 for each felony count pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-812. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss Counts II and III in CR-159668 and the allegation of a third prior conviction in CR-159668 and CR-159851. The state also stipulated that the sentences imposed in CR-159668 and CR-159851 would run concurrently to each other and concurrently with the sentences imposed in CR-159523. At the change of plea hearing, the trial court clearly informed appellant that he would be assessed a $100 felony penalty for each felony count.
Appellant's three cases (CR-159523, CR-159668, and CR-159851) were then consolidated for sentencing. On December 2, 1986, the trial court sentenced appellant to: (1) two presumptive terms of 11.25 years for the burglary and theft convictions in CR-159523; (2) a presumptive term of 10 years for the burglary conviction in CR-159668; and (3) a presumptive term of 10 years for the possession of narcotic drugs conviction in CR-159851. The trial court ordered that all sentences imposed in the three cases run concurrently to each other. The trial court, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-812, also ordered appellant to pay four $100 felony penalty assessments for his four felony convictions, totalling $400, broken down as follows: (1) $100 for the burglary conviction and $100 for the theft conviction in CR-159523; (2) $100 for the burglary conviction in CR-159668; and (3) $100 for the possession of narcotic drugs conviction in CR-159851.
Appellant first argues that the language of § 13-812 unambiguously requires that the $100 felony penalty assessment be imposed on a "per person" basis and not on a "per felony conviction" basis. Appellant concludes that, since the trial court misinterpreted § 13-812 and imposed four $100 felony penalty assessments upon him for his four felony convictions, the trial court erred and the amount of the felony penalty assessment imposed upon him should be reduced to $100.
Our analysis begins with an examination of the language of § 13-812. Specifically, A.R.S. § 13-812 provides:
A. In addition to any other fine or assessment, each person convicted of a felony shall be assessed a penalty of:
1. One hundred dollars if the person is an individual.
2. Five hundred dollars if the person is an enterprise.
B. Monies received pursuant to this section shall be transferred to the victim compensation fund established pursuant to section 41-2401.01.
As previously stated, the critical determination is the interpretation of the phrase "each person convicted of a felony shall be assessed a penalty" as set forth in § 13-812.
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the statute's meaning and the legislature's intent in enacting it. Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., Inc., 145 Ariz. 374, 377, 701 P.2d 1182, 1185 (1985); Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 144 Ariz. 291, 294, 697 P.2d 684, 687 (1985); Long v. Dick, 87 Ariz. 25, 28, 347 P.2d 581, 583 (1959). In addition, "A.R.S. § 1-211(A) gives us the clear direction to honor the intent of the legislature" in interpreting statutes. State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 271, 693 P.2d 921, 926 (1985). 2 To arrive at the legislative intent, we look to the statute's words, context, subject matter, effects and consequences, reason or purpose, and spirit of the law. State ex rel. Flournoy v. Mangum, 113 Ariz. 151, 152, 548 P.2d 1148, 1149 (1976); State v. Stockton, 85 Ariz. 153, 155, 333 P.2d 735, 736 (1958).
We first consider the wording in § 13-812. Legislative intent is first to be determined from the statute's language and if that language is plain and unambiguous, leading to only one meaning, we must follow that meaning, for it is presumed to be what the legislature intended. Members of Board of Education of Pearce U.H.S. Dist. v. Leslie, 112 Ariz. 463, 465, 543 P.2d 775, 777 (1975); Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co., 89 Ariz. 62, 64, 358 P.2d 168, 169-70 (1960). In considering the wording of § 13-812, we consider the ordinary meaning of the words and adopt the meaning which best harmonizes with the context of the statute. State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470, 671 P.2d 909, 911 (1983); Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Burns, 96 Ariz. 332, 335, 395 P.2d 532, 533 (1964).
Considering the language of the phrase "each person convicted of a felony shall be assessed a penalty" in § 13-812, we conclude that, regardless of the fact that sentencing is based upon multiple felony convictions, this language contemplates that an individual be assessed a penalty for each felony of which he or she is convicted. First, the inclusion of the article "a" in the phrases "a felony" and "a penalty" supports this conclusion. Resorting to Webster's New International Dictionary (3rd ed. 1981), we find a number of varying meanings for the article "a." Among the meanings is: "4c: ANY, EACH." Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary states that the article "a" is not necessarily a singular term and is often used in the sense of "any" applied to more than one individual object. Black's Law Dictionary 1 (5th ed. 1979). The word "any" may be employed to indicate "all" or "every," and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and subject matter of the statute. Id. at 86. If a word in a statute has two or more definitions according to the standard dictionaries, the definition that will best subserve the general purpose for which the statute was enacted should be adopted. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 223 (1974). Although there are other meanings listed for the article "a" in Webster's New International Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, we believe the legislature had meanings similar to "each," "any," and "every" in mind when choosing this word.
Second, had the legislature intended to impose only one felony penalty assessment upon an individual regardless of the number of felony convictions, it would no doubt have embodied that limitation in the plain language of the statute. Surely, the legislature contemplated the not infrequent scenario of an individual being convicted of numerous felonies and could have provided for appellant's interpretation if it so desired. For example, had the legislature decided to adopt appellant's interpretation, it could have utilized a phrase like "each person convicted of one or more felonies shall be assessed only one penalty," rather than the phrase it adopted. It did not do so. This indicates that the legislature's intent in enacting § 13-812 was to impose a felony penalty assessment upon an individual for each felony conviction.
Third, we note that, in interpreting a statute, it should be given a sensible construction that will accomplish the legislative intent and purpose while avoiding an absurd conclusion or result. State v. Weible, 142 Ariz. 113, 118, 688 P.2d 1005, 1010 (1984); State ex rel. Flournoy v. Mangum, 113 Ariz. 151, 152, 548 P.2d 1148, 1149 (1976). Appellant would have us hold that § 13-812 requires that an individual convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced for them in a single proceeding be assessed only one $100 felony penalty. The results of such an interpretation are illogical and absurd because the number of felony penalty assessments imposed upon an individual would depend, not upon the number of felony convictions, but whether the sentences for those felony convictions were imposed in a single proceeding.
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