State v. Rodgers

• Decision Date: 15 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CR,1
• Citation: 909 P.2d 445,184 Ariz. 378
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert Allen RODGERS, Appellant. 94-0157.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 445

909 P.2d 445

184 Ariz. 378

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert Allen RODGERS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 94-0157.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department A.

Aug. 15, 1995.

As Corrected Oct. 16, 1995.

Review Denied Jan. 17, 1996. ^*

[184 Ariz. 379] Grant Woods, Attorney General by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, and Dawn M. Northup, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for appellee.

John C. Williams, Prescott, for appellant.

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge.

Robert Allen Rodgers ("defendant") appeals from his conviction under Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 28-661 for leaving the scene of an injury accident. The sole issue is whether the evidence presented to the trial court supported defendant's conviction. We find that the evidence was sufficient and, therefore, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 10, 1993, at approximately 4:50 a.m., defendant was driving with the victim southbound on I-17 in Phoenix at a speed of 50-55 miles per hour. After an argument with defendant, the victim opened the vehicle's passenger door and jumped out. The victim apparently suffered a head injury upon impact with the roadway and, while lying prone in the middle of the roadway, was run over by a second vehicle. Although defendant was aware that the victim had jumped from the vehicle, he did not stop at or near the scene to report the incident, provide identification, or render assistance. Soon thereafter, defendant picked up an acquaintance and drove past the scene. Defendant observed that the victim was dead and that an investigation was underway, but did not stop. The victim died of injuries sustained either in the fall or as a result of impact with the second vehicle. The investigating police officer learned of defendant's identity from the acquaintance, who had returned to the scene.

The state charged defendant with leaving the scene of an accident involving death or serious physical injury, a class 5 felony. Defendant waived a jury trial in exchange for the state's agreement to amend the indictment to an open-ended class 6 felony, leaving the scene of an injury accident. The trial court convicted defendant based on the grand jury transcript, police reports, and a taped witness interview. At sentencing, defendant's violation was designated as a felony and defendant was placed on probation for three years.

Defendant timely appealed his conviction, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 9 and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, 13-4033, and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that because the victim deliberately jumped from his car, defendant was not involved in an "accident." Defendant maintains, therefore, that his failure to remain at the scene did not violate A.R.S. § 28-661, which directs that:

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of § 28-663.[ ¹

... Any person who is involved in an accident resulting in an injury ... and who fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of § 28-663 is guilty of a class 6 felony.

The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege of the person so convicted.

The word "accident" is not defined in Title 28, Chapter 6, nor have the courts defined the word within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, "accident" must be construed according to its common usage, unless it has acquired some "peculiar or appropriate meaning in the law." State v. Wilhite, 160 Ariz. 228, 230, 772 P.2d 582, 584 (App.1989); A.R.S. § 1-213.

Webster's defines "accident" as "an event occurring by chance ... lack of intention or necessity; an unfortunate event resulting from carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or a combination of causes; an unexpected happening causing loss or injury...." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981). According to The Oxford English Dictionary, an "accident" is "anything that happens ... an occurrence, incident, event ... an unfortunate event, a disaster, a mishap." The Oxford English Dictionary (1971). Indisputably, "accident" has more than one "common" usage. When a criminal statute's language is susceptible of more than one meaning, this court will adopt the meaning that is most in keeping with the legislative purpose behind the statute, examining the evil it seeks to remedy. State v. Pinto, 179 Ariz. 593, 596, 880 P.2d 1139, 1142 (App.1994).

One of the manifest objectives of § 28-661 is to prohibit drivers from seeking to evade civil or criminal liability by escaping before their identity can be established. State v. Milligan, 87 Ariz. 165, 169, 349 P.2d 180, 183 (1960). Were the word "accident" interpreted to cover only those vehicular incidents in which unintended harms occur, drivers who intentionally commit criminal acts with their vehicles would not be legally obligated to stop, identify themselves, and render aid. This narrow reading of "accident" would result in consequences totally contradictory to the statute's goal of determining culpability. The term "accident" must, therefore, be read to include any vehicular incident resulting in injury or death, whether or not such harm was intended.

We agree with the state that we should adopt the reasoning of the Alaska Court of Appeals, which gave broad scope to Alaska's "hit and run" statutes. In Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct.App.1990), defendant's wife jumped or fell from defendant's car. Defendant failed to stop and render aid, in violation of Alaska Statutes 28.35.050 and 28.35.060. ² The Alaska Court of Appeals defined a vehicular "accident" as "any incident in which someone suffers injury or death." Id. at 658. The court summarized:

[W]hen a passenger jumps from a moving vehicle and as a result suffers injury or death, the motorist is obligated to stop and render assistance and notify the proper authorities. In our view, this is true whether or not the operator was warned of the passenger's desire to leave the vehicle. In this way, liability will be more readily determined and further injury prevented.

Id. The California Court of Appeals and the Iowa Supreme Court have similarly interpreted their "hit and run" statutes. See People v. Jiminez, 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 (1992); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983).

Defendant asserts that, because the purpose of the statute is to insure that culpable persons involved in accidents are accounted for, and defendant was not responsible for the victim's injuries, the statute should not apply in his case. Defendant correctly notes that "[t]he gist of the offense is in concealing, or attempting to conceal the identity of one involved in an automobile accident wherein personal injuries are sustained." Milligan, 87 Ariz. at 169, 349 P.2d at 183. Of this the defendant is manifestly and literally guilty. Milligan also interpreted the purpose of the "hit and run" statutes to prohibit drivers "from leaving persons injured in collisions, in distress or danger, for want of proper medical or surgical treatment." Id. Because defendant left the victim in danger and in want of treatment, his omissions in this respect also are of the kind the statute was meant to protect against.

Defendant cites State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 610 P.2d 1051 (App.1980), as requiring knowledge of a collision before criminal liability attaches under the statute. Defendant contends that he could not have had knowledge of a collision in the instant case because no typical vehicular collision occurred. Although it indeed dealt with a collision between two vehicles, Porras focused on the scienter requirement found in People v. Holford, 63 Cal.2d 74, 45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423 (1965). The court in Holford held that the scienter requirement for the offense is met by proof that the defendant knowingly left the scene of an accident and knew that the accident was of such nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person. Id. at 427, 403 P.2d 423. Neither Porras nor Holford recognized a vehicular collision requirement or otherwise addressed the breadth of the word "accident." The text of § 28-661 does not support the assertion that the statutory duties are triggered only by the occurrence of a collision. We conclude that the defendant was "involved in an accident" from the moment the victim leapt from his car. Beca...