State v. Walls

• Decision Date: 20 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-0452.,07-0452.
• Citation: 761 N.W.2d 683
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Vincent Fitzgerald WALLS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

761 N.W.2d 683

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Vincent Fitzgerald WALLS, Appellant.

No. 07-0452.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

February 20, 2009.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jeff Noble and Susan Cox, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Vincent Walls, pro se, Anamosa, for appellant.

BAKER, Justice.

A jury convicted the defendant, Vincent Walls, of sexual abuse in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.2, sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3, willful injury causing serious injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1), and kidnapping in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 902.9 and 902.3 (2004). Walls appealed these convictions, contending the interrogating officer failed to honor his request for counsel in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, and therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during this interrogation. We transferred this case to the court of appeals, which determined that the district court should have suppressed the defendant's statements but that any error in admitting them was harmless. We granted Walls' application for further review. We conclude that the district court should have suppressed Walls' statements, and the erroneous admission of those statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Susan Lombard is a substitute teacher from Ankeny, Iowa. In 2004, Lombard was struggling with alcohol and drug addictions. On the weekend of May 5, 2004, she came to Des Moines to buy drugs. In the three days that followed, Lombard met drug dealers, loaned her car out in exchange for crack cocaine, and attended a drug party in a Des Moines hotel room. On Sunday, May 7, Lombard stumbled into the home of Nancy Pilcher bloody and disoriented. Lombard told Pilcher that she and another woman had been forcibly held against their will by a man, and that she had been pistol-whipped for refusing his sexual advances. Responding police were unable to locate the man.

Vincent Walls was arrested by the Des Moines police and brought in for questioning regarding Lombard's assault and kidnapping. After explaining the allegations that Lombard and Cathy Riley, the other victim, had made against Walls concerning the incident, Officer Bender read Walls his Miranda rights and asked him to sign a waiver. Walls responded by asking if Bender could get in contact with Roger Owens, his attorney. At this point, Bender attempted to clarify Walls' request for an attorney by asking, "Is [getting in contact with him] what you're wanting me to do?" To this Walls replied, "Yeah, because I'd love to talk to you but I couldn't talk to you on that recorder."

Instead of terminating the interview, Bender continued talking, informing Walls that their conversation was being taped in order to create a record and protect the rights of both parties. After this explanation, Bender asked Walls to once again clarify his request for an attorney before Bender proceeded with the interrogation. Walls never clearly answered Bender's second request for clarification; instead, he stated, "[s]ee, and then I've got to sign this paper." Bender again proceeded with the interrogation, questioning Walls about his involvement in Lombard's kidnapping and assault.

During the interrogation that followed, Walls confessed to some of the allegations. The State subsequently charged Walls with first- and second-degree sexual abuse, second-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, and willful injury causing serious injury. Prior to trial, Walls' attorney moved to suppress his confession on the ground that Officer Bender continued to question Walls after he asked for an attorney. The district court denied the motion. At trial, the confession was admitted, and the jury found Walls guilty of both counts of sex abuse, kidnapping, willful injury, and assault, a lesser included offense of robbery.

Walls appealed the jury's verdict, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his confession. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, concluding that the State violated Walls' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination but that the district court's denial of his motion to suppress was harmless error. Walls filed an application for further review with this court, requesting that his conviction be reversed and he be given a new trial. We granted further review.

II. Scope of Review.

We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Iowa 2003). In assessing the validity of a defendant's Miranda waiver, the State bears the heavy burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily without intimidation, coercion, or deception. State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 2006) (citing State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1997)). Our review of the record is de novo, and we will make our own evaluation of the circumstances. Id.

III. Fifth Amendment Violation.

The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution makes this right binding on the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658 (1964). According to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706-07 (1966), pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, a person "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" must first be warned by police that "he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." If at that point, the person indicates that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723. The Miranda Court dictated that:

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. . . . [The police] must respect his decision to remain silent.

Id.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981), the Court further clarified that when an individual expresses a desire for counsel, the authorities must cease any further interrogation until counsel is present or the accused individual has initiated further communication with the police. The State carries the burden of proving that the individual "knowingly and intelligently waived" these privileges afforded under the Fifth Amendment. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724.

After being read his Miranda rights by Bender, Walls stated, "Roger Owens. Can you get in contact with him? That's my attorney." To this Bender asked, "Is that what you're wanting me to do?" To which Walls responded, "Yeah." This is clearly a request for an attorney. Bender was then required to cease all interrogation until an attorney was present. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723. Bender's decision to proceed with the interrogation was in violation of Walls' Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to counsel. The district court erred in not granting Walls' motion to suppress his interrogation testimony.

IV. Harmless Error.

Most federal constitutional errors, including the erroneous admission of evidence in a criminal trial in violation of a defendant's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, do not require reversal if the error is harmless. State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 10 (2007) (citing Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 430). Harmless-error analysis looks to the basis on which the jury's verdict actually rested. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 431. "To establish harmless error, the State must `prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' " Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)).

To determine whether the State has met its burden under the harmless-error standard, the court employs a two-step analysis. Id. (citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 (1991)). First, the court asks what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict. Id. Second, the court weighs the probative force of that evidence against the probative force of the erroneously admitted evidence standing alone. Id. This step requires the court to ask "whether the force of the evidence is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same without the erroneously admitted evidence." Id.

A. Evidence Jury Actually Considered. In this case, the State was required to prove the elements of five separate counts: (1) sexual abuse in the first degree, (2) sexual abuse in the second degree, (3) willful injury causing serious injury, (4) kidnapping, and (5) assault. Besides Walls' erroneously admitted testimony, the State presented four witnesses.

Susan Lombard testified...