Thompson v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 23 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 36277-5-II.,36277-5-II.
• Citation: 142 Wn. App. 803,175 P.3d 1149
• Parties: Barbara THOMPSON, Appellant, v. Terry WILSON, Lewis County Coroner, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

175 P.3d 1149

142 Wn. App. 803

Barbara THOMPSON, Appellant, v. Terry WILSON, Lewis County Coroner, Respondent.

No. 36277-5-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

January 23, 2008,

Royce A. Ferguson Jr., Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, for Appellant.

John Edward Justice, Law, Lyman, Daniel, Kamerrer & Bogdanovich, P.S., Olympia, WA, for Respondent.

VAN DEREN, A.C.J.

¶ 1 Barbara Thompson appeals the trial court's order of summary judgment dismissing her petition based on the statute of limitations for (1) judicial review under RCW 68.50.015, (2) a writ of Mandamus, (3) a writ of certiorari, and (4) declaratory judgment relief. She sought (1) judicial review of the accuracy of the coroner's determination that her daughter committed suicide, (2) a writ of mandamus requiring the coroner to "make accurate determinations and certifications," Clerk's Papers (CP) at 64, (3) a writ of certiorari compelling the coroner to review his determination, and (4) a declaratory judgment that her daughter's death was not suicide. We hold that, to the extent Thompson sought to compel the coroner's compliance with RCW 68.50.105, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissal based

FACTS

¶ 2 On December 16, 1998, Ronda Reynolds died from a single gunshot wound to the head. Ron Reynolds, her husband, reported her death and the Lewis County Sheriffs Office investigated. On the day Ronda died, the Lewis County Coroner, Terry L. Wilson, issued a coroner's determination and certificate of death, listing the cause of death as a "contact handgun wound of the head" and the manner of death as "undetermined." CP at 47. On August 9, 1999, the death certificate was amended to list the cause of death as a self-inflicted gunshot wound and the manner of death as suicide. Thompson, Ronda's mother, believed that Ronda was murdered and pressured the Lewis County Sheriffs Office to reinvestigate.

¶ 3 According to Wilson, on October, 23, 2001, the law enforcement investigation was reopened and the death certificate was again amended to reflect an undetermined manner of death. Finally, on May 30, 2002, that investigation confirmed that Ronda had died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound and the death certificate was amended accordingly.

¶ 4 On March 15, 2006, Thompson requested a meeting with Wilson "to discuss the Autopsy Report dated 12-31-1998 on my [d]aughter."¹ CP at 22. Thompson met with Wilson and apparently provided him a copy of an independent "Case Review", that disputed the manner of death.² CP at 23. But Wilson did not change the manner of death on Ronda's death certificate as a result of that meeting and he did not meet with Thompson again, despite his agreement to do so ¶ 5 On August 4, 2006, Thompson filed a petition for judicial review under RCW 68.50.015, which provides that "[a] county coroner ... shall be immune from civil liability for determining the cause and manner of death. The accuracy of the determinations is subject to judicial review." CP at 62. She also sought a writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus under chapter 7.16 RCW asserting that the coroner's actions were "arbitrary and capricious." CP at 63.

¶ 6 Specifically, Thompson's petition sought (1) "judicial review of [Wilson]'s actions and determinations"; (2) "the issuance of a writ of certiorari directed to [Wilson] to review his actions and determinations"; (3) "the issuance of a writ of mandate enjoining [Wilson] to make accurate determinations and certifications"; (4) "a jury to determine questions of fact"; (5) a "declaratory judgment that Ronda Reynolds [sic] death was not a suicide"; and (6) "an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees." CP at 64. Thompson's petition named Wilson as "Respondent/Defendant." CP at 61. Her petition also included the August 11, 2006 report from a firearms expert who concluded that "considerable doubt exists as to the determination that Ronda Reynolds committed suicide, and that probable cause exists that she was murdered." CP at 110. In answering Thompson's complaint, Wilson asserted, among other things, that Thompson had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that the statute of limitations barred her suit.

¶ 7 Wilson moved for summary judgment. He argued that: (1) no material issues of fact were disputed; (2) principle& of exhaustion did not apply because there were no required administrative procedures; and (3) in any case, the statute of limitations precluded Thompson's suit. Thompson argued that there were genuine issues of material fact about when her cause of action accrued and the manner and cause of Ronda's death; thus, summary judgment was not appropriate. Thompson also argued that, because she had not exhausted all administrative remedies until her March 24, 2006 meeting with Wilson, no limitation period had sufficiently accrued to preclude the suit. In the alternative, Thompson argued that the proper method for seeking judicial review under RCW 68.50.015 was through a writ and that the chapter 4.16 RCW general statutes of limitations did not apply to special proceedings such as writs. Finally, Thompson argued that a declaratory judgment action was not subject to any statute of limitations.

¶ 8 On May 4, 2007, the trial court granted Wilson's motion, dismissing all of Thompson's claims based on the statute of limitations.

¶ 9 Thompson appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 We review a summary judgment order de novo and engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Beal Bank, SSB v. Sarich, 161 Wash.2d 544, 547, 167 P.3d 555 (2007). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Clarke v. Office of Attorney General, 133 Wash.App. 767, 784-85, 138 P.3d 144 (2006), review denied, 160 Wash.2d 1006, 158 P.3d 614 (2007).

I. Incontrovertible Facts

¶ 11 The trial court decided this case solely on the basis of the pleadings, declarations, and affidavits before it. Because both Thompson's pleadings and her declaration were submitted on her behalf as the nonmoving party, the incontrovertible portions must be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment. See Owen v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R. Co., 153 Wash.2d 780, 787, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). Thus, the incontrovertible facts before the trial court were: (1) since her daughter's death on December 16, 1998, Thompson repeatedly attempted to exercise her rights under RCW 68.50.105 that requires the coroner "to meet with the family of the decedent to discuss the autopsy or post-mortem findings"; (2) when Wilson finally agreed to meet with Thompson on March 24, 2006, they did not discuss the autopsy and post-mortem findings. Instead, Wilson accepted Thompson's case file, agreed to review it, and agreed to later meet with Thompson to discuss the file and his findings; within (3) Wilson refused to meet again with Thompson as promised, and he at no time discussed the file, his findings, or the autopsy and post-mortem as required by RCW 68.50.105.

II. Judicial Review under RCW 68.50.015

¶ 12 Thompson appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her petition for judicial review under RCW 68.50.015. In his motion for summary judgment, Wilson asserted that the statute of limitations precluded Thompson's suit. In response, Thompson asserted that no statute of limitations applied or, if one did, it did not begin to accrue until after her March 24, 2006, meeting with Wilson. Both parties acknowledge that no case has specifically addressed the statute of limitations applicable to judicial review contemplated by RCW 68.50.015. Thus, this is a case of first impression.

¶ 13 Construction of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. City of Pasco v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992). We look to the statute's plain language in order to fulfill our obligation and give effect to legislative intent. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). When faced with an unambiguous statute, we derive the legislature's intent from the plain language alone. Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v. Util. Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wash.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994). "When a statute is ambiguous, `this court will resort to principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to assist in interpreting it.'" Yousoufian v. Office of King County Executive, 152 Wash.2d 421, 434, 98 P.3d 463 (2004) (quoting State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)).

¶ 14 Under RCW 4.16.080(5), a three-year statute of limitations applies to "[a]n action against a ... coroner upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity and by virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty." RCW 4.16.130 states that "[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced two years after the cause of action shall have accrued."

¶ 15 Thompson contends that (1) RCW 4.16.080(5) is not applicable because this is not an action in liability; and (2) no general statute of limitations applies to this "special proceeding." Br. of Appellant at 27. Wilson argues that either a two or three-year statute of limitations applies to judicial review permitted by RCW 68.50.015.

¶ 16 Because RCW 68.50.015 does not contemplate an action resulting in liability, RCW 4.16.080(5), by its plain language, does not apply. Thus, the three-year limitation period cited in RCW 4.16.080(5) is likewise inapplicable. But the Washington Supreme Court has said that RCW 4.16.130 "serves as a limitation for any cases not fitting into the other limitation provisions. This [catch-all provision] serves the State's purpose to compel prompt litigation and not leave persons fearful of litigation unlimited by time." Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 104 Wash.2d 710, 721, 709...