Wright v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 15 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S92A1106,S92A1106 |
| Citation | 426 S.E.2d 870,262 Ga. 844 |
| Parties | WRIGHT v. ROBINSON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert G. Tanner, Milton B. Satcher, III, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Atlanta, for Wright.
Marc G. Melikian, Robert C. Koski, Remler, Koski & Near, P.C., Atlanta, for Robinson.
Roy M. Lilly, Thomasville, for other parties.
This case arises from medical care rendered to Robinson at Appellants' clinic beginning in April 1977 and ending in May 1983. Plaintiff-appellee alleges that appellants negligently prescribed the medication and that this negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries.
Plaintiff-appellee filed this medical malpractice action on June 18, 1984. The litigation continued for more than six years, during which both parties conducted extensive discovery. The superior court specially set the trial for November 20, 1990. After jury selection, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit. Plaintiff's counsel gave no other reason other than that he did not like the jury.
On May 16, 1991, Robinson refiled the action, under the renewal statute, in the same court. The suit contained the same allegations and claims against the same defendants. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the five-year statute of repose abrogated the right to pursue the action. After denying the motion, the trial court certified its order for immediate review. This Court granted the petition for interlocutory appeal.
At issue is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case can voluntarily dismiss a suit and refile it within the six-month renewal period when the statute of ultimate repose in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) has run. Appellants also contend that the dismissal and renewal statutes violate the Georgia constitution, denying them the impartial and complete protection of law. We find that the statute of repose abrogates plaintiff's cause of action. Therefore, she cannot renew her medical malpractice action beyond the five-year statutory period.
1. In 1985, the legislature enacted a five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice cases. In pertinent part it reads:
Notwithstanding [the two-year statute of limitation], in no event may an action for medical malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b). Subsection (c) of the same statute goes further and provides:
Subsection (b) of this Code section is intended to create a five-year statute of ultimate repose and abrogation.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(c).
There is a distinct difference between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose. James Ferrera & Sons, Inc. v. Samuels, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 170, 486 N.E.2d 58 (1985) 1 (quoting Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 702, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982)).
A statute of repose stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiff's right of action. The statute of repose is absolute; the bar of the statute of limitation is contingent. James Ferrera & Sons, supra, 486 N.E.2d 58. The statute of repose destroys the previously existing rights so that, on the expiration of the statutory period, the cause of action no longer exists. KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Amer., 732 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1984).
This case questions whether the right to dismiss voluntarily and refile within six months, as codified in OCGA § 9-11-41(a) and § 9-2- 61(a), contemplates actions extinguished by the statute of repose or only those barred by a statute of limitation.
To answer this question, we look to the plain language of the statutes and the sequence of their adoption. The renewal statute has been in effect since 1847 although amended several times. Clark v. Newsom, 180 Ga. 97, 178 S.E. 386 (1935). The legislature enacted the statute of repose in 1985. Ga.L.1985, p. 556, § 1. Because we presume the legislature enacts all statutes with knowledge of the existing laws, we construe the language of the statute of repose considering the preexisting dismissal and renewal statutes. Consequently, the provisions of the statute enacted latest in time carry greater weight. Foster v. Brown, 199 Ga. 444, 451, 34 S.E.2d 530 (1945); George C. Carroll Constr. Co. v. Langford Constr. Co., 182 Ga.App. 258, 260, 355 S.E.2d 756 (1987).
The renewal statute says "the renewed case shall stand upon the same footing as to limitation with the original case." OCGA § 9-2-61(a) (emphasis added). The statute of repose says "in no event may an action for medical malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred." OCGA § 9-2-71(b) (emphasis added). Both logic and the plain language of the statutes lead us to conclude that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose. A voluntary dismissal terminates the action completely. Page v. Holiday Inns, 245 Ga. 12, 13, 262 S.E.2d 783 (1980). "An action renewed pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61(a) is an action de novo. " Adams v. Gluckman, 183 Ga.App. 666, 359 S.E.2d 710 (1987); Archie v. Scott, 190 Ga.App. 145, 378 S.E.2d 182 (1989). We agree with these holdings, and it logically follows that a new suit on a nonexisting cause of action cannot proceed.
2. Because we have resolved this issue on statutory grounds, we need not reach appellants' constitutional claims.
Judgment reversed.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the statute of repose abrogates appellee's timely-filed renewal action.
Relying on foreign and federal case law, the majority describes a statute of repose as an absolute, unyielding barrier to a plaintiff's right of action, not related to the accrual of any cause of action. Maj. opinion, pp. 871-72. However, in Browning v. Maytag Corp., 261 Ga. 20, 401 S.E.2d 725 (1991), we held that a statute of repose cannot be applied retroactively to bar a cause of action that accrued prior to the enactment of the statute of repose. See also Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 262 Ga. 566(3), 423 S.E.2d 235 (1992). In Browning, a clothes dryer purchased by the Brownings in 1976 malfunctioned and allegedly caused a fire in 1985. They filed a products liability action based on negligence in 1988. In 1987, OCGA § 51-1-11(c), a statute of repose requiring that products liability actions based in negligence be brought within ten years of the first sale or use of the product, was enacted. In response to a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, this court held that the 1987 statute of repose could not bar the Brownings' cause of action that had accrued in 1985. Thus, the statute of...
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