Clark v. Labor & Indus. Relations Com'n, WD

• Decision Date: 10 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 875 S.W.2d 624
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: Thomas J. CLARK, Appellant, v. LABOR & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, and Eagle Mill, Inc., et al., Respondents. 48586.

Page 624

875 S.W.2d 624

Thomas J. CLARK, Appellant, v. LABOR & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, and Eagle Mill, Inc., et al., Respondents.

No. WD 48586.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

May 10, 1994.

Andrew Jay Gelbach, Warrensburg, for appellant.

James Crenshaw, Jefferson City, Sharon Ann Willis, Kansas City, for respondent Labor & Indus. Relations Com'n.

Troy L. Daugherty, Kansas City, for respondent Eagle Mill, Inc.

Before TURNAGE, P.J., and FENNER and SPINDEN, JJ.

FENNER, Judge.

Appellant, Thomas J. Clark, appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri, granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by respondents, Eagle Mill, Inc. and Rollie Jenkins and Donna Jenkins, f/d/b/a Eagle Mill and Elevator Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as Eagle Mill). ¹ The trial court found that the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission), denying Clark unemployment benefits, was based on competent and substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. In the underlying action, Clark sought unemployment benefits after leaving his employment with Eagle Mill. This request was denied because it was found that Clark voluntarily left his work without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer. § 288.050.1(1), RSMo Supp.1993. ²

Clark allegedly sustained an on-the-job injury on November 8, 1991, when he slipped and fell on ice while working at Eagle Mill. Eagle Mill, however, denies that Clark was injured as he alleged. Clark's last day working at Eagle Mill was on November 25, 1991.

Clark sought benefits, effective February 2, 1992, under the Missouri Employment Security Law. A deputy determined that Clark was disqualified for benefits because he voluntarily left his work on that date without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer. Clark appealed the deputy's determination. The Appeals Tribunal heard Clark's appeal at a hearing on April 22, 1992. Clark and Rollie Jenkins testified at the hearing.

On May 4, 1992, the Appeals Referee denied Clark unemployment benefits under the Missouri Employment Security Law, finding as follows:

By failing to keep the employer informed of his whereabouts and his prospects for returning to work on at least a weekly basis (or other frequency as specified by the employer had there been communication between the parties), the claimant demonstrated his intention to give up his employment. The claimant did not tell the employer why he was leaving his job and failed to make a good faith effort to retain his employment by giving the employer an opportunity to correct the conditions intolerable to the claimant. A good faith effort to retain his employment was essential to establishing good cause for leaving work to receive unemployment insurance benefits, and it is found the claimant voluntarily left his work effective January 31, 1992, without good cause attributable to his work or to the employer.

Clark appealed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. On September 17, 1992, the Commission entered an order affirming and adopting the decision of the Appeals Tribunal.

Clark filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri, on September 28, 1992, requesting review of the Commission's order. In his petition, Clark asserted that he did not voluntarily or otherwise quit his employment at Eagle Mill and that he had "good cause and reason" in not returning to work because of on-the-job injuries and the fact that his employer did not carry workers' compensation insurance. Clark asked the court to reverse the Commission's decision.

On July 13, 1993, Eagle Mill filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment. In its motion, Eagle Mill argued that there was substantial and competent evidence before the Appeals Referee and Commission from which to find that Clark left his work or quit his job effective January 31, 1992. Eagle Mill contended that Clark's testimony at the hearing in April of 1992 made it clear that he was able to go back to work after his surgery but was not willing to do so and, thus, had effectively abandoned or quit his job. Furthermore, Clark failed to communicate with his employer his intentions, and his employer could not contact him because he had an unlisted telephone number. After not hearing from Clark for over two months, Mr. Jenkins felt that Clark had abandoned his job.

Eagle Mill further argued in its Motion for Summary Judgment that its failure to maintain workers' compensation insurance did not justify Clark's abandonment of his job. Moreover, Eagle Mill denied that Clark's injury was work-related and that Eagle Mill was ever notified of Clark's injury. Eagle Mill contended that it was never given the opportunity to make suitable arrangements for Clark because Clark failed to communicate his intentions.

The trial court entered judgment on October 15, 1993, granting Eagle Mill's Motion for Summary Judgment and finding that the Commission's decision was based on competent and substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law "because the administrative transcript clearly shows that [Clark] voluntarily left his work without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer." Thus, the trial court affirmed the Commission's decision. This appeal followed.

In his first point on appeal, Clark argues that the Commission's and trial court's findings are erroneous and contrary to law and not supported by competent and substantial evidence because Clark had "good cause" for leaving his job for the following reasons: (1) his employer, contrary to Missouri law, failed to carry workers' compensation insurance; and (2) his employer never advised him that the workers' compensation insurance violation had been rectified and/or that the employer would be responsible for Clark's medical expenses and lost time from work.

As correctly pointed out by respondent Eagle Mill, we note that the issue in this appeal does not focus on the employer's failure to carry workers' compensation insurance; rather, the issue is whether Clark acted in good faith and had good cause to leave his employment within the meaning of section 288.050.1(1).

On appeal in unemployment compensation cases, this court reviews the decision of the Commission, not the judgment of the circuit court. IXL Mfg. Co. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 679 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Mo.App.1984). The findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, are conclusive; judicial review then is confined to questions of law. Tin Man Enterprises, Inc. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 866 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Mo.App.1993); § 288.210, RSMo 1986. Where the Commission as trier of fact has reached one of two possible conclusions from the evidence, this court will not reach a contrary conclusion even if such a conclusion might have reasonably been reached. Tin Man, 866 S.W.2d at 149. We defer to the Commission's resolution of witness credibility, and consider only those facts and inferences favorable to and consistent with the Commission's decision. Thurman v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 706 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo.App.1986).

Section 288.050.1(1) provides as follows:

1. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, a claimant shall be disqualified for waiting week credit or benefits until after he has earned wages for work insured under the unemployment compensation laws of any state equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount if the deputy finds:

(1) That he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer ...

Thus, a worker is denied unemployment benefits if he voluntarily quits his job absent good cause. A claimant has the burden of proving good cause. Tin Man, 866 S.W.2d at 149. Whether a claimant had good cause for terminating his employment is a matter of law. St. John's Regional Medical Center v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 814 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Mo.App.1991).

Good cause is a standard of reason applied to the average person, not to the supersensitive. Tin Man, 866 S.W.2d at 149. Voluntary termination of employment must be in good faith. Id., at 149. A worker has good cause to terminate employment voluntarily when that conduct conforms to what an average person, who acts with reasonableness and in good faith, would do. Contractors Supply Co. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 614 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Mo.App.1981). Thus, good faith is an essential element of good cause. Belle State Bank v. Industrial Comm'n, Div. of Employment Security, 547 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Mo.App.1977).

"To establish good faith the employee must prove an effort was made to resolve the dispute before resorting to the drastic remedy of quitting his or her job." Tin Man, 866 S.W.2d at 149. This is consistent with the purpose behind the Missouri Employment Security Law which is to provide monetary relief for persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Division of Employment Security v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 625 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo.App.1981); § 288.020.1, RSMo 1986. For example, when an employee never speaks to management about a work grievance and instead quits "in disgust," that precipitate conduct is unreasonable and manifests a lack of good faith to consult with the employer to resolve the grievance. Contractors Supply Co., 614 S.W.2d at 565.

"Good cause" has been said to be "limited to instances where the unemployment is caused by external pressures so compelling that a reasonably prudent person would be justified in giving up employment." Division of Employment Security, 625 S.W.2d at 884 (quoting Citizens Bank of Shelbyville v. Industrial Comm'n, 428 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo.App.1968)). Furthermore, the claimant must act consistently with a genuine desire to work and...