Commw. v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 09 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. SJC-08086,SJC-08086
• Citation: 431 Mass. 442,727 N.E.2d 1157
• Parties: (Mass. 2000) COMMONWEALTH, vs. STEPHEN W. ROBBINS. Barnstable County
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1157

727 N.E.2d 1157 (Mass. 2000)

COMMONWEALTH, vs. STEPHEN W. ROBBINS.

No. SJC-08086

Barnstable County

Argued May 11, 2000.

Decided March 9, 2000.

Practice, Criminal, Plea, New trial, Competency to stand trial, Waiver, Instructions to jury. Constitutional Law, Plea, Fair trial. Waiver. Mental Impairment. Homicide.

Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 14, 1993.

A guilty plea was accepted by Gerald F. O'Neill, Jr., J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on October 23, 1996, was heard by him. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

James H. Budreau for the defendant.

Julia K. Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Marshall, C.J., Abrams, Lynch, Greaney, Ireland, Spina, & Cowin, JJ.

ABRAMS, J.

On February 21, 1995, the defendant, Stephen W. Robbins, pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree. On October 23, 1996, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, seeking to vacate his guilty plea. The trial judge heard and denied the motion. A single justice of this court granted the defendant's petition to appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. See Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 744 (1986). See also G. L. c. 278, § 33E.¹ On appeal, the defendant argues that his conviction should be vacated because (1) he was not competent to plead guilty to murder in the first degree;(2) the judge erred in not ordering, sua sponte, a competency hearing; and(3) his plea was involuntary because he did not understand the charges against him. We affirm the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.

1. Facts.We summarize the facts admitted by the defendant at his plea colloquy. The defendant married the victim in 1988. In the years preceding the murder, there was a history of physical and emotional abuse of the victim by the defendant. In 1993, the victim decided to leave the marital home to live with her parents. Because the defendant and the victim had raised children together, the two were in communication with one another.

At some point, the victim became involved with another man. Approximately one week before the murder, the victim decided to make a "clean break" from the defendant by moving in with that man. The defendant, on the other hand, was determined to win the victim back and, to that end, stopped drinking.

On the night of the murder, the victim and the defendant went shopping, rented a movie, and had dinner together. The victim indicated to the defendant that her decision to leave him was a firm decision. She also indicated that she planned to take custody of the children. That night, the victim fell asleep on the defendant's couch.

For some period of time, the defendant watched her sleep.² He then stood up, went to a closet, and took out a baseball bat. He also took out a recently purchased hunting knife. The defendant bludgeoned the victim with the bat, delivering three to five blows to her head. Then, he took the hunting knife and stabbed her in the neck.

After the murder, the defendant took the children out of his house and drove them to a house that he had visited in his work with a pest control company. He broke into that house and put the children to bed. During the night, he wrote several notes to the children and others. The next morning, the defendant turned himself in to the police.

The defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife. After a jury was empanelled, but before the jurors were sworn, the defendant indicated that he wished to plead guilty to murder in the first degree. After a colloquy, the judge accepted the defendant's guilty plea.

2. Standard of review."Once accepted, '[a] plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. . . . More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.'" Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 481, 481 (1982), and cases cited. Therefore, "[a] postsentence motion to withdraw a plea is a request for postconviction relief[,]" and "[p]ostconviction motions to withdraw pleas are treated as motions for a new trial." Id. 481-482, and cases cited. "A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's disposition of the motion will not be reversed unless" "it appears that justice may not have been done." Commonwealth v. Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 318 (1995), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 378 Mass 900 (1979). See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, supra at 482.

3. Defendant's competence."When a criminal defendant pleads guilty, he waives his right to be convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, his right to stand trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers." Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 398 Mass. 288, 292 (1986), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). "Because a plea of guilty involves these constitutional rights, the plea is valid only when the defendant offers it voluntarily, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-749 (1970), and with the advice of competent counsel." DelVerde, supra at 292-293, quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 390 Mass. 714, 715-716 (1984).

Because a defendant's waiver of these rights must be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must possess a certain degree of competence to plead guilty. "The test of competence to plead is similar to that for standing trial." Russin, supra at 316, quoting Commonwealth v. Blackstone, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 211 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Leate, 367 Mass. 689, 696 (1975). "The standard for determining competency to stand trial is 'whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Russin, supra at 317, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 469 (1998). "When reviewing the judge's finding of competency, we give substantial deference to his findings of fact." Id. at 466, citing Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 574 (1995).

The defendant claims that the judge's determination that he was competent to plead was "against the weight of the evidence." The evidence presented by the defendant consists, essentially, of two affidavits -- one by the defendant and one by his mother -- attached to the defendant's motion for a new trial. In his affidavit, the defendant makes the following statement: "I believe that I was suffering from a mental condition at the time of the plea which significantly impaired my judgment and my ability to make a reasoned decision." The defendant states that he was "extremely depressed," possibly due to a head injury he suffered as a child or to his previous drug and alcohol abuse. The defendant's mother submitted an affidavit as well, in which she states that she "could easily detect that he was off his medication [Prozac] on that day." According to her affidavit, the defendant "was a different person off the medication. He was extremely depressed and anxious. He was twitching, his eyes were darting back and forth, and his speech was accelerated."

There is nothing in the record before us to substantiate the defendant's ex post facto assertion that he was not competent to plead guilty. Nor is there any indication that his demeanor at the plea colloquy was anything but appropriate and rational. In the months prior to his plea, the defendant was examined by at least three psychologists.³ Dr. Wesley E. Profit noted that the defendant "did not suffer from any unusual childhood diseases";⁴ "answered questions without hesitation or apparent difficulty"; and was "alert and oriented." Dr. Profit concluded that his "examination has not revealed any material or evidence which would rise to the level of clinical significance when considering whether . . . [the defendant] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the judicial proceedings against him." Dr. Stephen DeLisi noted that the defendant had stopped taking Prozac that had been prescribed while he was in prison. According to Dr. DeLisi, the defendant did "not believe that the Prozac was helping him . . . . He has consistently denied any symptoms of depression and has not been noted to be in any acute distress." Dr. Marc A. Whaley, who was hired by the defendant, concluded that the defendant's condition "does not meet the standard of a major mental illness."⁵

The defendant's trial counsel also indicated that the defendant was competent. At the plea colloquy, defense counsel gave the following report to the judge: "I have never had any question about his [the defendant's] competency. I think he thoroughly understands the issues, I think he knows what he's giving up . . . .""[I]n reviewing the judge's determination of competency, we must give weight to the judge's opportunity to observe the defendant's demeanor during the trial and the plea hearing." Russin, supra at 317, citing Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 408 Mass. 230, 236 (1990). The judge asked the defendant if he was "currently affected by any mental illness." The defendant answered, "No, I'm not." Immediately after the plea was taken, the judge noted that the defendant was responsive and alert and did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs. The judge was well aware that guilty pleas to murder in the first degree are unusual and observed that he "wouldn't have touched it [the plea] witha [ten]-foot pole if I had any question in my mind. [The defendant] was responsive, intelligent and appeared to me to be sincere in whatever would motivate a person to do this; i.e., the only possible motivation is to spare the victim's family from any further trauma . . . ."

In his memorandum denying the defendant's motion for a new trial,...