GEL Corp. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection

• Citation: 875 So.2d 1257
• Decision Date: 04 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 5D03-13.,5D03-13.
• Parties: G.E.L. CORPORATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

875 So.2d 1257

G.E.L. CORPORATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al., Appellees.

No. 5D03-13.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

June 4, 2004.

Rehearing Denied July 1, 2004.

Dennis Wells of Webb, Wells, & Williams, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for Appellant.

Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel and W. Douglas Beason, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Environmental Protection, Tallahassee, for Appellee Department of Environmental Protection.

William E. Reischmann, Catherine D. Reischmann and Virginia Cassady of Stenstrom, McIntosh, Colbert, Whigham, Reischmann & Partlow, P.A., Sanford, for Appellee Orange City.

SAWAYA, C.J.

We are here confronted with the arduous task of interpreting and applying certain provisions of Florida's Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, we address those provisions relating to awards of attorney's fees and agency jurisdiction to correct what it considers an erroneous legal ruling by an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] when the ruling concerns an area that may not fall within the umbra of the agency's "substantive jurisdiction." The issues we must resolve are: 1) whether an ALJ has jurisdiction to award attorney's fees under section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2000), when a notice of dismissal is filed before a formal hearing on the merits; and 2) whether an agency has "substantive jurisdiction" under section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2000), to correct an erroneous legal ruling made by an ALJ regarding a party's entitlement to attorney's fees.

We will dispense with a discussion of the underlying facts because they are not necessary to the resolution of the issues; rather, the procedural history of this case will be the focal point of the discussion that follows. Thereafter we will discuss each issue in the order presented.

Procedural Background

G.E.L. Corporation [GEL] applied to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection [DEP] to renew its permit for operation of a construction and demolition debris facility in Orange City, Florida. Shortly after DEP issued a formal notice that it intended to issue the requested permit, Orange City filed a petition for a formal administrative hearing to challenge issuance of the permit. DEP referred the petition to the Department of Administrative Hearings, which assigned an ALJ to hear the matter. The ALJ issued a notice setting the final hearing date for June 3, 2002. In May, DEP issued two amended notices that it intended to issue the permit and, on the same day that DEP filed the second amended notice, GEL filed its motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2000). Immediately thereafter, and prior to the hearing date, Orange City filed its notice of voluntary dismissal. Orange City then filed a notice suggesting that DEP did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear GEL's petition for attorney's fees.

The ALJ commenced a hearing on the petition for fees and, after several witnesses testified, the hearing was continued until a later date. A little over a month later, having never reconvened the hearing, the ALJ entered a recommended order of dismissal. In the order, the ALJ held that pursuant to section 120.595, a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition filed by Orange City was a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under the statute. Because Orange City dismissed the petition before a full evidentiary hearing was completed, the ALJ reasoned that he did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the petition for attorney's fees. DEP subsequently adopted the ALJ's recommended final order of dismissal, including the ALJ's conclusion of law regarding jurisdiction. In its final order of dismissal, DEP stated that in its opinion, the ALJ was wrong as a matter of law in ruling that a full evidentiary hearing on the merits was a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595. Nevertheless, DEP held that it was powerless to correct the error because, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2000), the issue of attorney's fees did not fall within its substantive jurisdiction. It is from this order and these rulings that the issues we are asked to resolve emanate. The first issue is whether the ALJ was correct in ruling that a full evidentiary hearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595.

A Full Evidentiary Hearing Is Not A Jurisdictional Prerequisite To An Award Of Fees Under Section 120.595.

The ALJ did not recommence the hearing regarding GEL's petition for attorney's fees because he concluded that the dismissal of the underlying petition deprived him of jurisdiction, and he could proceed no further. This conclusion is premised on the provisions of sections 120.595(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000), which state in pertinent part:

(b) The final order in a proceeding pursuant to s. 120.57(1) shall award reasonable costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party only where the non-prevailing adverse party has been determined by the administrative law judge to have participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose.

(c) In proceedings pursuant to s. 120.57(1), and upon motion, the administrative law judge shall determine whether any party participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose....

The pertinent language in the above-quoted paragraphs is that which refers to proceedings under section 120.57(1). Section 120.57(1) provides in pertinent part that "an administrative law judge ... shall conduct all hearings under this subsection." § 120.57(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). Reading the provisions of sections 120.595 and 120.57 together, the ALJ came to the conclusion that a full evidentiary hearing adjudicating the merits of the underlying issues is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595. Orange City, advocating in favor of its interests as the potential payor of any award of fees, asserts the correctness of this ruling. While it agrees that sections 120.57(1) and 120.595(1)(b) should be considered together, GEL contends that a final order in a "proceeding" may refer to an order of dismissal and should not be restricted to an order rendered after a hearing on the merits of Orange City's petition. Hence, we must analyze these statutes and determine whether the terms "proceeding" and "hearing" are synonymous and refer to a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition or whether "proceeding" connotes a different meaning and refers to the filing of the petition and order of dismissal prior to an evidentiary hearing.

Our ultimate goal as we begin our task of analyzing and construing the pertinent statutory provisions is to give effect to legislative intent. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287 (Fla.2003). We begin by first considering the language of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statutory provisions according to their plain meaning and as the Legislature wrote them. Id. If, however, the language is ambiguous, we must apply time-honored rules of statutory construction to divine legislative intent. Id.

A dictionary may be utilized to ascertain the plain meaning of a particular term. Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294 (Fla. 2000). Random House Dictionary has defined the term "proceeding" as "a legal step or measure: to institute proceedings against a person." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1542 (2d ed.1987) (unabridged) (emphasis added). The term "hearing" is defined as "an instance or a session in which testimony and arguments are presented, esp. before an official, as a judge in a lawsuit." Id. at 882. Hence a "proceeding" generally refers to the initiation of the judicial process, typically by filing a complaint or petition and may include the filing of a notice of dismissal. See Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)

(holding that the filing of a notice of dismissal by the plaintiff constitutes a "proceeding."). The term "hearing" generally means that part of the judicial process where evidence is presented and arguments are made to the court by the parties. Therefore, the two terms as they are written in the statutes, while not mutually repugnant, are not consistent and unambiguous. It is, therefore, not clear from the provisions of the statutes whether a full evidentiary "hearing" is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595. We therefore turn for guidance to the rules of statutory construction.

A basic tenet of statutory construction is that we construe statutes in a manner that does not lead to an absurd or ridiculous result. City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1983); Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So.2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), review denied, 790 So.2d 1102 (Fla.2001). Another maxim is that we should strive to construe related statutes in harmony with one another. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992). If that is not possible, and when "two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent." McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (citing Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So.2d 813 (Fla.1962); State v. Ross, 447 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 456 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1984)); see also State v. Parsons, 569 So.2d 437 (Fla.1990)

. Moreover, "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms." McKendry, 641 So.2d at 46; see Barnett Banks, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 738 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Hudson v. State, 711 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see also State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 996 (Fla.1998).

To construe the statutes as Orange City suggests would promote an unjust outcome in many instances. Future petitioners in contested...