GEL Corp. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, No. 5D03-13.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | SAWAYA, C.J. |
| Citation | 875 So.2d 1257 |
| Parties | G.E.L. CORPORATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al., Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 04 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D03-13. |
875 So.2d 1257
G.E.L. CORPORATION, Appellant,v.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al., Appellees
No. 5D03-13.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 4, 2004.
Rehearing Denied July 1, 2004.
Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel and W. Douglas Beason, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Environmental Protection, Tallahassee, for Appellee Department of Environmental Protection.
William E. Reischmann, Catherine D. Reischmann and Virginia Cassady of Stenstrom, McIntosh, Colbert, Whigham, Reischmann & Partlow, P.A., Sanford, for Appellee Orange City.
SAWAYA, C.J.
We are here confronted with the arduous task of interpreting and applying certain provisions of Florida's Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, we address
We will dispense with a discussion of the underlying facts because they are not necessary to the resolution of the issues; rather, the procedural history of this case will be the focal point of the discussion that follows. Thereafter we will discuss each issue in the order presented.
Procedural Background
G.E.L. Corporation [GEL] applied to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection [DEP] to renew its permit for operation of a construction and demolition debris facility in Orange City, Florida. Shortly after DEP issued a formal notice that it intended to issue the requested permit, Orange City filed a petition for a formal administrative hearing to challenge issuance of the permit. DEP referred the petition to the Department of Administrative Hearings, which assigned an ALJ to hear the matter. The ALJ issued a notice setting the final hearing date for June 3, 2002. In May, DEP issued two amended notices that it intended to issue the permit and, on the same day that DEP filed the second amended notice, GEL filed its motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2000). Immediately thereafter, and prior to the hearing date, Orange City filed its notice of voluntary dismissal. Orange City then filed a notice suggesting that DEP did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear GEL's petition for attorney's fees.
The ALJ commenced a hearing on the petition for fees and, after several witnesses testified, the hearing was continued until a later date. A little over a month later, having never reconvened the hearing, the ALJ entered a recommended order of dismissal. In the order, the ALJ held that pursuant to section 120.595, a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition filed by Orange City was a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under the statute. Because Orange City dismissed the petition before a full evidentiary hearing was completed, the ALJ reasoned that he did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the petition for attorney's fees. DEP subsequently adopted the ALJ's recommended final order of dismissal, including the ALJ's conclusion of law regarding jurisdiction. In its final order of dismissal, DEP stated that in its opinion, the ALJ was wrong as a matter of law in ruling that a full evidentiary hearing on the merits was a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595. Nevertheless, DEP held that it was powerless to correct the error because, pursuant to section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2000), the issue of attorney's fees did not fall within its substantive jurisdiction. It is from this order and these rulings that the issues we are asked to resolve emanate. The first issue is whether the ALJ was correct in ruling that a full evidentiary hearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595.
A Full Evidentiary Hearing Is Not A Jurisdictional Prerequisite To An Award Of Fees Under Section 120.595.
The ALJ did not recommence the hearing regarding GEL's petition for attorney's
(b) The final order in a proceeding pursuant to s. 120.57(1) shall award reasonable costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party only where the non-prevailing adverse party has been determined by the administrative law judge to have participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose.
(c) In proceedings pursuant to s. 120.57(1), and upon motion, the administrative law judge shall determine whether any party participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose....
The pertinent language in the above-quoted paragraphs is that which refers to proceedings under section 120.57(1). Section 120.57(1) provides in pertinent part that "an administrative law judge ... shall conduct all hearings under this subsection." § 120.57(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). Reading the provisions of sections 120.595 and 120.57 together, the ALJ came to the conclusion that a full evidentiary hearing adjudicating the merits of the underlying issues is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an award of fees under section 120.595. Orange City, advocating in favor of its interests as the potential payor of any award of fees, asserts the correctness of this ruling. While it agrees that sections 120.57(1) and 120.595(1)(b) should be considered together, GEL contends that a final order in a "proceeding" may refer to an order of dismissal and should not be restricted to an order rendered after a hearing on the merits of Orange City's petition. Hence, we must analyze these statutes and determine whether the terms "proceeding" and "hearing" are synonymous and refer to a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition or whether "proceeding" connotes a different meaning and refers to the filing of the petition and order of dismissal prior to an evidentiary hearing.
Our ultimate goal as we begin our task of analyzing and construing the pertinent statutory provisions is to give effect to legislative intent. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287 (Fla.2003). We begin by first considering the language of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statutory provisions according to their plain meaning and as the Legislature wrote them. Id. If, however, the language is ambiguous, we must apply time-honored rules of statutory construction to divine legislative intent. Id.
A dictionary may be utilized to ascertain the plain meaning of a particular term. Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294 (Fla. 2000). Random House Dictionary has defined the term "proceeding" as "a legal step or measure: to institute proceedings against a person." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1542 (2d ed.1987) (unabridged) (emphasis added). The term "hearing" is defined as "an instance or a session in which testimony and arguments are presented, esp. before an official, as a judge in a lawsuit." Id. at 882. Hence a "proceeding" generally refers to the initiation of the judicial process, typically by filing a complaint or petition and may include the filing of a notice of dismissal. See Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (holding that the filing of a notice of dismissal by the plaintiff constitutes a "proceeding."). The term "hearing" generally means that part of the judicial process where evidence is presented and arguments are made to the court by the parties. Therefore, the two terms as they are written in the statutes,
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that we construe statutes in a manner that does not lead to an absurd or ridiculous result. City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1983); Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So.2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), review denied, 790 So.2d 1102 (Fla.2001). Another maxim is that we should strive to construe related statutes in harmony with one another. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992). If that is not...
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...of [the statute] which the legislature believed was 12 contrary to" legislative intent); accord G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257, 1263 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (collecting cases); see also Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So.2d 1216, 1230 (Fla......
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Martin Daytona v. Strickland Const. Serv., No. 5D05-2432.
...confirm the arbitration award and ... petition[ed] for an award of attorney's fees...."). 7. See G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 875 So.2d 1257, 1262 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing State, ex rel. Szabo Food Servs., Inc. of NC v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529 (Fla.1973); Gay v. Canada Dry......
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Department of Children and Families v. A.S., No. 5D05-2906.
...with one another. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992); G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA Our analysis begins with the provisions of section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which establish the grounds for termin......
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N.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. 5D13–14.
...impression. When analyzing a statute, our ultimate goal is to give effect to legislative intent. G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287 (Fla.2003)). If the language is clear and unambiguous, ......
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Hull v. State, 2D20-2772
...of [the statute] which the legislature believed was 12 contrary to" legislative intent); accord G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257, 1263 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (collecting cases); see also Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So.2d 1216, 1230 (Fla......
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Martin Daytona v. Strickland Const. Serv., No. 5D05-2432.
...confirm the arbitration award and ... petition[ed] for an award of attorney's fees...."). 7. See G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 875 So.2d 1257, 1262 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing State, ex rel. Szabo Food Servs., Inc. of NC v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529 (Fla.1973); Gay v. Canada Dry......
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Department of Children and Families v. A.S., No. 5D05-2906.
...with one another. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992); G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA Our analysis begins with the provisions of section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which establish the grounds for termin......
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N.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. 5D13–14.
...impression. When analyzing a statute, our ultimate goal is to give effect to legislative intent. G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287 (Fla.2003)). If the language is clear and unambiguous, ......