IN RE 1992 HONDA ACCORD, 21383-8-III.

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 21383-8-III.,21383-8-III.
• Citation: 117 Wash.App. 510,71 P.3d 226
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the Matter of the 1992 HONDA ACCORD. Jose L. Becerra, Petitioner, v. City of Warden, Respondent.

71 P.3d 226
117 Wash.App. 510

In re the Matter of the 1992 HONDA ACCORD.
Jose L. Becerra, Petitioner,
v.
City of Warden, Respondent

No. 21383-8-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel Five.

June 19, 2003.

71 P.3d 227

Dennis W. Morgan, Attorney at Law, Ritzville, WA, for Appellant

71 P.3d 228

Michael Wyman, James A. Whitaker, Lemargie & Whitaker, Ephrata, WA, for Respondent

BROWN, C.J.

The City of Warden (City) impounded Mr. Becerra's motor vehicle in connection with his arrest for driving with a suspended license. Although the district court overturned the license suspension, it did not allow recovery of impound fees to Mr. Becerra, citing a good faith exception under RCW 46.55.120(3)(e). The superior court affirmed. We granted Mr. Becerra's petition for discretionary review for this first impression issue. Because we decide the good faith exception does not apply under these facts, we reverse.

FACTS

The critical facts are uncontested. On May 12, 2000 Mr. Becerra was cited for driving under the influence (DUI). He pleaded guilty on February 14, 2001. Between May 12, 2000 and February 14, 2001, Mr. Becerra's driver's license was suspended for three unpaid tickets, and was still suspended when he pleaded guilty to the DUI. The Department of Licensing (DOL) did not suspend Mr. Becerra's license at the time of his February 14 DUI conviction.

Between February 14 and March 14, 2001, Mr. Becerra paid off his outstanding tickets. Mr. Becerra paid a $150 reinstatement fee on March 14, 2001, and DOL issued him a new driver's license on that date.

On March 27, 2001, DOL issued a notice of suspension of Mr. Becerra's driver's license retroactive to February 14, 2001. DOL did not offer Mr. Becerra an opportunity for a hearing in connection with the suspension.

On March, 31, 2001, a Warden police officer stopped Mr. Becerra and issued him a criminal complaint for driving while license suspended in the second degree. The City impounded Mr. Becerra's car and issued him with a criminal traffic complaint for driving while licensed suspended in the second degree. On April 2, 2001, Mr. Becerra received notice from DOL of the retroactive license suspension. On April 26, 2001, Mr. Becerra filed a request for an impound vehicle hearing in the Grant County District Court. Mr. Becerra redeemed his vehicle on May 4, 2001.

On July 11, 2001, the district court dismissed the criminal traffic complaint because DOL's procedures deprived Mr. Becerra of due process, and issued consistent findings of fact and conclusions of law one week later. On August 20, 2001, the district court ruled the impoundment of Mr. Becerra's vehicle was proper because a Warden ordinance required impoundment where the driver's license is suspended. The district court further ruled the good faith exception set forth under RCW 46.55.120(3)(e) applied, thus precluding Mr. Becerra from any monetary relief. On September 21, 2001, the district court denied Mr. Becerra's CRLJ 59 motion for reconsideration.

Mr. Becerra then appealed to the Grant County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the district court in a written decision. We granted discretionary review.

ISSUES

First, we determine whether the trial court erred in deciding the impoundment was proper. If so, we analyze whether the "good faith" defense set forth in RCW 46.55.120(3)(e) precludes the owner of an improperly impounded vehicle of all monetary recovery for impoundment, towing, and storage fees. Last, we address attorney fees.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This appeal turns on the correct meaning of the towing and impoundment statute, chapter 46.55 RCW and chapter 10.38 of the Warden Municipal Code (WMC). Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 344, 60 P.3d 586 (2002); Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 104-05, 26 P.3d 257 (2001). The reviewing court interprets the statute "to best advance the legislative purpose." State v. C.J., 148 Wash.2d 672, 685, 63 P.3d 765 (2003) (citing Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wash.2d 133, 143, 821 P.2d 482 (1992)).

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We begin our analysis with a plain meaning interpretation of the relevant statutory language in light of the underlying legislative purposes. Wash. Pub. Ports Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue, 148 Wash.2d 637, 645, 62 P.3d 462 (2003); Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002); see also Wagg v. Estate of Dunham, 146 Wash.2d 63, 73, 42 P.3d 968 (2002) (noting appellate court interprets statutory provision in light of entire statute and the legislature's intent as set forth in the entire act and related statutes). Similarly, we interpret the statute in its entirety, reviewing all provisions of the statute in relation to each other. In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 490, 55 P.3d 597 (2002)

If the statute is unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial construction. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (2002); State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 415, 54 P.3d 147 (2002). We will not add language to an unambiguous statute even if we believe the legislature intended something else but failed to adequately express the alternative intent. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 20, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). We assume the legislature meant exactly what it said when it enacted the statute. In re Pers. Restraint of King, 146 Wash.2d 658, 663, 49 P.3d 854 (2002); Berger, 144 Wash.2d at 105, 26 P.3d 257.

If the statute is ambiguous, we resort to tools of statutory construction, such as legislative history and relevant case law, to discern the meaning of the statute. Kilian, 147 Wash.2d at 21, 50 P.3d 638; Dep't of Ecology, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4; Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001). "A statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable." Kilian, 147 Wash.2d at 20-21, 50 P.3d 638 (citing State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130, 122 S.Ct. 1070, 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002)).

B. Impoundment Decision

Was the impoundment proper under the relevant impoundment statutes? A municipality's authority to impound a vehicle derives from chapter 46.55 RCW. See RCW 46.55.240(1). Under the statute, whenever a driver of a vehicle is arrested for an enumerated offense, such as driving with a suspended license, "the vehicle is subject to impoundment, pursuant to applicable local ordinance or state agency rule at the direction of a law enforcement officer." RCW 46.55.113.

The Supreme Court very recently interpreted RCW 46.55.113 as a permissive statute that does not authorize mandatory impoundment regulations. In re Impoundment of Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wash.2d 145, 157-59, 60 P.3d 53 (2002). The court struck down WAC 204-96-010, a Washington State Patrol (WSP) regulation mandating impoundment, "because it exceeds the legislative grant of authority in RCW 46.55.113." Id. at 159, 60 P.3d 53. The court further noted, without addressing the constitutionality of the regulation, the constitutional requirement that impoundments be reasonable; the concerned officer must exercise his or her discretion by considering reasonable alternatives to impoundment. Id. at 151, 156 n. 10, 60 P.3d 53.

Here, the officer impounded Mr. Becerra's vehicle pursuant to Warden Municipal Code. WMC 10.38.010(A) provides where a driver is arrested for the enumerated offense, including driving with a suspended license, "the vehicle is subject to impoundment at the direction of a police officer." That permissive language is consistent with RCW 46.55.113. Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wash.2d at 158, 60 P.3d 53.

The officer then directed Mr. Becerra's vehicle be impounded pursuant to WMC 10.38.010(D) or (E), which state the vehicle "shall be impounded" for 30 days where the driver has been arrested for driving with a suspended license in the first or second degree. In terms of their mandatory effect, the Warden Municipal Code provisions are nearly identical to WAC 204-96-010, which states the "vehicle shall be impounded" and "the vehicle shall be held" for a certain period

71 P.3d 230

of time depending on the enumerated offense. See Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wash.2d at 153-54, 60 P.3d 53. By contrast, RCW 46.55.120(1)(a) permissively states the vehicle "may be held" for the relevant period of time. The City's code affords no room for discretion as to the term of impoundment.

As noted, the Supreme Court invalidated WAC 204-96-010 because it exceeded the legislative authority afforded under RCW 46.55.113. Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wash.2d at 159, 60 P.3d 53. The same reasoning...