In re Goodwin
| Decision Date | 25 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 70916-5.,70916-5. |
| Parties | In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Jerry GOODWIN, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
David Zuckerman, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Gerald Horne, Pierce County Prosecutor, Barbara Corey-Boulet, Deputy, Michelle Luna-Green, Deputy, Tacoma, for Appellee/Respondent.
Personal restraint petitioner Jerry Goodwin seeks relief from his sentence on the ground that his offender score was miscalculated because juvenile offenses that had "washed out" were used to determine the score. He asks to be resentenced based upon a corrected offender score. We grant the petition, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.
On August 17, 1998, the State charged personal restraint petitioner Jerry Goodwin with one count of intent to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. As to each count, the State alleged that Goodwin was armed with a firearm. The State also charged Goodwin with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. On September 22, 1998, as part of a negotiated plea agreement, the State filed an amended information charging Goodwin with one count of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. Goodwin entered an Alford plea of guilty to these charges.1
Goodwin's statement on plea of guilty shows that the standard range for the conspiracy charge (an unranked offense) was 0 to 12 months, and the standard range for the possession charge was 36 to 48 months. The range for the possession charge was determined using an offender score of 4, which was based upon a criminal history listed in the statement of robbery in California (Butte), some misdemeanors, auto theft, burglary 2, and robbery (Butte). With regard to this history, the statement provides that unless Goodwin had included a different statement, which he had not, he agreed that the prosecuting attorney's statement of his criminal history was correct and complete. The plea statement also contains a preprinted paragraph explaining when juvenile convictions were to be included in criminal history.
On the same day, September 22, 1998, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and entered a judgment and sentence that listed Goodwin's criminal history as auto theft, burglary 2, and robbery, all committed when Goodwin was a juvenile, and robbery, committed when Goodwin was an adult. The judgment and sentence includes Goodwin's birth date, June 10, 1970. The trial court determined that Goodwin's offender score was 4, and imposed a sentence of 12 months and one day on the conspiracy count and 48 months on the count of unlawful possession of a firearm, in accord with the plea agreement.
Goodwin did not file an appeal. On December 5, 2000, he filed a pro se personal restraint petition, contending that his juvenile convictions for auto theft and burglary "washed out" under former RCW 9.94A.030 (1989), and therefore these convictions were improperly used in calculating his offender score. He cited State v. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d 186, 189, 985 P.2d 384 (1999), which held that a 1990 amendment to this statute did not revive prior juvenile convictions for sex offenses that had already "washed out." Goodwin also contended that the two robberies listed in the judgment and sentence were the same offense, committed when he was an adult. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in reliance on State v. Hendricks, 103 Wash.App. 728, 14 P.3d 811 (2000),rev'd in State v. Smith, 144 Wash.2d 665, 30 P.3d 1245, 39 P.3d 294 (2001),
in which the Court of Appeals held that a 1997 amendment applied and required all juvenile offenses to be included in criminal history.
Goodwin filed a motion for discretionary review in this court. Consideration of the motion was stayed pending this court's decision in Smith, 144 Wash.2d 665, 30 P.3d 1245 (), as to the effect of the 1997 amendment. In Smith, this court held that neither the 1997 amendment to RCW 9.94A.030 nor a 2000 amendment, enacted in response to Cruz, 139 Wash.2d 186, 985 P.2d 384, applied to revive juvenile convictions that had "washed out" prior to the 1997 amendment. Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 668, 30 P.3d 1245. Once Smith was filed, the parties were directed to file additional briefing addressing that decision's application to Goodwin's case. The State then conceded that in light of Smith, Goodwin's juvenile convictions were improperly counted. The State contended, however, that Goodwin waived the issue by agreeing to the criminal history listed in his statement on plea of guilty. Alternatively, the State argued that Goodwin breached the plea agreement by collaterally attacking his sentence. Thereafter, this court granted discretionary review and appointed counsel to represent Mr. Goodwin.
Initially, the State appropriately concedes that Goodwin may challenge his sentence despite the one-year bar of RCW 10.73.090 because the judgment and sentence appears invalid on its face. RCW 10.73.090(1) provides that "[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." In determining what "valid on its face" means for purposes of RCW 10.73.090, we have referred to a case involving the question whether the State had to prove the constitutional validity of all prior convictions used in determining a sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. In re Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 141 Wash.2d 342, 353, 5 P.3d 1240 (2000) (citing and quoting State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175, 187, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986)); In re Pers. Restraint of Thompson, 141 Wash.2d 712, 718, 10 P.3d 380 (2000) (same). In Ammons, the court reasoned that "[c]onstitutionally invalid on its face means a conviction which without further elaboration evidences infirmities of a constitutional magnitude." Ammons, 105 Wash.2d at 188, 713 P.2d 719.
We have never held, however, that RCW 10.73.090 requires, merely by use of the words "valid on its face," that the only type of invalidity that will prevent operation of the one-year bar to filing a personal restraint petition is constitutional infirmity. By its plain language, the statute does not state that "valid" means "constitutionally valid." As we reasoned in Stoudmire and Thompson, under RCW 10.73.090(1), "invalid on its face" means the judgment and sentence evidences the invalidity without further elaboration.2 In this case, the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face, and Goodwin's petition is not barred because he filed it over one year after the judgment was final. Under former RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b), applicable here under Smith, prior juvenile class B and C felony convictions no longer count for purposes of calculating an offender score once the defendant turns 23. The sentence and judgment shows that Goodwin was a juvenile at the time of all but one of the convictions listed as his criminal history and that he was born in 1970, meaning he turned 23 in 1993. It also shows an offender score of 4, which could have been obtained only by counting the juvenile convictions.
When nonconstitutional grounds are asserted for relief from personal restraint, the petitioner "must establish (1) he or she is being unlawfully restrained, (2) due to a `fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 129 Wash.2d 529, 532, 919 P.2d 66 (1996) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wash.2d 802, 812, 792 P.2d 506 (1990)). Here, the State concedes that Goodwin's offender score was miscalculated because it was based upon juvenile offenses that had "washed out" under the relevant statutes as construed in Smith, and thus his judgment and sentence is fundamentally defective. The State argues in its supplemental brief, however, that Goodwin has not shown a complete miscarriage of justice because he agreed to the criminal history stated in the plea agreement and the State has detrimentally relied on that agreement. The State says that the parties made a "mutual mistake" that cannot be corrected because it is too late for the State to reinstate the original charges.
We first address the waiver issue raised by the State in the briefing we requested on the effect of the Smith decision. At the outset, we acknowledge that some of our cases are somewhat inconsistent on this question.
This court recently held, in a case in which no negotiated plea agreement was involved, that a petitioner is unlawfully restrained "to the extent he [or she] was sentenced on the basis of an incorrect calculation of his [or her] offender score." In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 568, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997).3 This is because "[a] sentencing court acts without statutory authority ... when it imposes a sentence based on a miscalculated offender score." Id. Moreover, a sentence that is based upon an incorrect offender score is a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice. Johnson, 131 Wash.2d at 569, 933 P.2d 1019. This is true even where the sentence imposed is actually within the correct standard range, if the trial court had indicated its intent to sentence at the low end of the range, and the low end of the correct range is lower than the low end of the range determined by using the incorrect offender score. Id. at 558, 933 P.2d 1019.4
The analysis in Johnson accords with early cases in this state, which drew a distinction between errors in a judgment resulting from some error or irregularity occurring at or before trial, and sentences imposed without jurisdiction or in...
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In re Jones
...Supreme Court, we do not question the ability of Walker and Jones to bring their petitions. See In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d 861, 867-68, 50 P.3d 618 (2002) (petitioner "must establish (1) he or she is being unlawfully restrained, (2) due to a `fundamental defect which inhe......
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State v. O'NEAL
...a defendant cannot waive a challenge to a miscalculated offender score. In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d 861, 874, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). When the sentencing error is a legal one, the waiver doctrine does not apply. Goodwin,146 Wash.2d at 874,50 P.3d 618......
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State v. Gouley
...based upon an incorrect offender score is a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice." In re Goodwin , 146 Wash.2d 861, 868, 50 P.3d 618 (2002).¶ 50 Gouley's criminal history includes convictions for possession of a controlled substance that increased his offen......
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State v. Ross
...included in their offender scores, constitutes legal error. They contend that pursuant to our decision in In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d 861, 50 P.3d 618 (2002), they cannot waive a challenge to a sentence based on a miscalculated offender score. Division One and Division ......
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Table of Cases
...Co., 75 Wn. App. 60, 877 P.2d 703 (1994), aff'd, 127 Wn.2d 401, 899 P.2d 1265 (1995): 11.7(2)(a)(iii) Goodwin, In re, 146 Wn.2d 861, 50 P.3d 618 (2002): 11.8, 24.4(2), 24.6(1) Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 133 Wn.2d 954, 948 P.2d 1264 (1997): 12.7(2) Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 37 ......
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§ 24.4 Requirement of Prejudice and Standard of Proof
...at 812. This demanding standard may be met, for example, by an unauthorized or illegal sentence. In re Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 864-65, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). Cases will be judged on the importance of the right involved and the degree of inherent prejudice (or manifestly wrongful conviction) sh......
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§ 24.6 Limitations On Personal Restraint Petitions
..."invalid on its face" if the judgment and sentence evidence the invalidity without further elaboration. In re Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 866, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). If a judgment is "invalid on its face," the facial defect can be challenged at any time. This does not, however, allow untimely chal......