Johnston v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 12–1294.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1294.,12–1294. |
| Citation | 829 N.W.2d 193 |
| Parties | Nathan Charles JOHNSTON, Petitioner–Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall, Judge.
Petitioner appeals the decision of the district court affirming the revocation of his driver's license for six years under Iowa Code section 321J.4(4) (2011). REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Matthew T. Lindholm, Des Moines, of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Linkvis, Assistant Attorney General.
Heard by EISENHAUER, C.J., and DANILSON and BOWER, JJ.
Petitioner Nathan Johnston appeals the decision of the district court affirming the revocation of his driver's license for six years under Iowa Code section 321 J.4(4) (2011) based on the Iowa Department of Transportation's determination he had three convictions for operating while intoxicated (OWI). He claims one previous conviction should not be considered because it was a violation of a municipal ordinance. He also asserts that even if a violation of an ordinance could be considered, the ordinance was not “substantially equivalent” to section 321 J.2(1), and therefore, may not be considered as a prior offense based on section 321J.2(8)(c). We conclude the term “statute” in section 321J.2(8)(c) does not encompass violations of city ordinances. We reverse the decision of the district court and the Department, and remand for further proceedings.
On October 8, 2011, the Iowa Department of Transportation gave notice to Johnston that his driving privileges were revoked for six years under Iowa Code section 321J.4(4) because he had three previous convictions for OWI within the last twelve years. The Department noted Johnston had a convictions for OWI in Nebraska on July 16, 2002, in Iowa on April 7, 2005, and another in Iowa on May 30, 2011.
Johnston appealed to the Department, arguing that his conviction in Nebraska should not be counted as a previous conviction under section 321 J.2(8). Johnston claimed his Nebraska conviction did not qualify as a previous offense because it was based on a violation of a city ordinance, Omaha City Municipal Code chapter 36, article III, section 36–115.1 He asserted section 321J.2(8)(c) only applied to statutes of other states, not ordinances. He also asserted that the Nebraska ordinance was not “substantially equivalent” to section 321 J.2(1), the Iowa statute setting out the elements of OWI.
Section 321 J.2(8) 2 provides:
In determining if a violation charged is a second or subsequent offense for purposes of criminal sentencing or license revocation under this chapter....
...
c. Convictions or the equivalent of deferred judgments for violations in any other states under statutes substantially corresponding to this section shall be counted as previous offenses. The courts shall judicially notice the statutes of other states which define offenses substantially equivalent to the one defined in this section and can therefore be corresponding statues. Each previous violation on which conviction or deferral of judgment was entered prior to the date of the violation charged shall be considered and counted as a separate previous offense.
The Department denied his request, stating,
Johnston then filed a petition for judicial review in district court, claiming the agency did not consider relevant and important matters as required by section 17A.19(10)(j), and its decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion under section 17A.19(10)(n). The case was submitted to the court based on the written record.
The district court affirmed the decision of the Department. The court found the Omaha ordinance was substantially equivalent to section 321 J.2(1), stating, “The penalty provisions, scope, and level of detail in the ordinance and the Iowa law may differ in some ways, but both forbid the same conduct.” The court found, “there is no requirement that the provision of law underlying the out-of-state conviction be absolutely identical to Iowa Code section 321J.2.” The court also determined, “the statute/ordinance distinction is irrelevant for purposes of license revocation.” The court noted that “[t]he conduct for which Johnston was convicted in Omaha would have also constituted a criminal offense under Nebraska's state OWI statute.” The court concluded the Department properly considered the Omaha offense.
Johnston filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The court denied the motion. Johnston now appeals.
In judicial review of agency actions, the district court reviews for the correction of errors at law. Welch v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 801 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2011). We apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Lee v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 693 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Iowa 2005). On factual issues, the agency's findings should be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. CMC Real Estate Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 475 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Iowa 1991).
On legal issues, our review is determined by whether the statutory provision in question has been delegated to the authority of the agency. Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 518 (Iowa 2012). The Iowa Supreme Court has stated:
We give deference to the agency's interpretation if the agency has been clearly vested with the discretionary authority to interpret the specific provision in question. If, however, the agency has not been clearly vested with the discretionary authority to interpret the provision in question, we will substitute our judgment for that of the agency if we conclude the agency has made an error of law. Deference may be given to an agency's interpretation in a specific matter or an interpretation embodied in an agency role. Indications that the legislature has delegated interpretive authority include “rule-making authority, decision-making or enforcement authority that requires the agency to interpret the statutory language, and the agency's expertise on the subject or on the term to be interpreted.”
Id. at 518–19 (citations omitted).
Under section 321 J.4(4) the Department “shall revoke” a driver's license if the person has three or more OWI violations. Section 321J.2(8)(c) provides parameters as to whether a violation should be considered a prior offense for purposes of license revocation. Specifically Section 321 J.2(8)(c) provides:
Convictions or the equivalent of deferred judgments for violations in any other states under statutes substantially corresponding to this section shall be counted as previous offenses. The courts shall judicially notice the statutes of other states which define offenses substantially equivalent to the one defined in this section and can therefore be considered corresponding statutes. Each previous violation on which conviction or deferral of judgment was entered prior to the date of the violation charged shall be considered and counted as a separate previous offense.
We conclude the Department's enforcement authority requires it to interpret section 321J.2(8)(c) in order to effectuate its statutory duty to revoke driver's licenses. We therefore conclude the legislature has delegated interpretive authority over this provision to the Department. Despite this deference, we may still reverse if we find there has been an error of law. See Furry v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 464 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1991).
Johnston has the burden to show that his driver's license should not be revoked. See Pointer v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 546 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa 1996).
Johnston contends the Omaha ordinance is not a statute, and section 321J.2(8)(c) specifically refers to “violations in any other states under statutes substantially corresponding to this section....” He states that only violations of statutes of other states can be considered in determining whether a violation in Iowa is a second or subsequent offense. We note that under section 321J.2(8)(c), “any OWI conviction or deferred judgment that occurs within the previous twelve years counts as a prior offense.” Bruno v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 603 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Iowa 1999). We must determine whether the violation of an ordinance may be considered a prior OWI conviction under section 321J.2(8)(c).
Our first goal in interpreting a statute is to determine legislative intent. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). We consider the language of the statute, “the statute's subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.” Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004). “In interpreting statutes, we will assume that the legislature intends to accomplish some purpose and that the statute was not intended to be a futile exercise.” State v. Reed, 596 N.W.2d 514, 515 (Iowa 1999).
Our supreme court has also recited:
“That intent is evidenced by the words used in the statute.” State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997). “When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms.” State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). In the absence of legislative definition, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Iowa 1996).
State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Iowa 2011). If, however, the language is ambiguous, “ ‘the manifest intent of the legislature is sought and will prevail over the literal import of the...
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