Mall, Inc. v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 02 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 51539-5,51539-5
• Citation: 108 Wn.2d 369,739 P.2d 668
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: MALL, INC., a Washington corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

Page 369

108 Wn.2d 369

739 P.2d 668

MALL, INC., a Washington corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

No. 51539-5.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

July 2, 1987.

Ferguson & Burdell, Henry C. Jameson, Seattle, for appellant.

Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Judith B. Barbour, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

GOODLOE, Justice.

Appellant Mall, Inc. (Mall) applied for permission to construct a 35-story building on the site of the Bartell Building in downtown Seattle. Its application was denied by the Seattle Department of Construction and Land Use (DCLU) because the building's proposed total floor area greatly exceeded the maximum allowed under the Seattle Municipal Code. The Seattle Hearing Examiner and trial court upheld the DCLU's interpretation. Mall contends on appeal that its fee interest in the land underlying Westlake Avenue, which lies adjacent to the site, should be included in the computation of its lot area, thereby increasing the allowable floor space in its proposed structure. We disagree. We hold that the code excludes streets from the definition of lot area. This exclusion holds true whether the street was created by dedication or, as in the case of Westlake Avenue, by power of condemnation. We affirm.

Mall's property is located in Seattle's downtown retail core. Until very recently, the property has housed a 2-story triangular building commonly referred to as the Bartell Building. The building sat alongside the Westlake Mall, a portion of Westlake Avenue now used as a pedestrian shopping mall. The Westlake Mall project has been the subject of several lawsuits between the City of Seattle and Mall. See In re Seattle, 96 Wash.2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981); In re Seattle, 104 Wash.2d 621, 707 P.2d 1348 (1985). In In re Seattle, 104 Wash.2d 621, 707 P.2d 1348, supra, this court upheld the City's condemnation of Mall's property for use as a public park. This case is related to the condemnation case only in that resolution of this case may have an effect on the amount of compensation the City pays for Mall's property.

The area surrounding Westlake Mall in downtown Seattle was platted as A.A. Denny's Third Addition in 1869. Pine Street to the north of Mall's property and Fourth Avenue to the west were dedicated as streets at that time. Mall's chain of title is traceable back to 1902. In February of that year, Seattle authorized the creation of Westlake Avenue by condemnation in Ordinance 7733. Final judgment was entered in a condemnation lawsuit in 1903. Portions of lots 1, 4, and 5 of block 19 were condemned for Westlake Avenue. For purposes of this proceeding, the parties have stipulated that the interest acquired by the City in Westlake Avenue is a street easement (rather than a fee). The parties' stipulations were accepted in full by both the hearing examiner and trial court. Since these fact findings remain unchallenged, they will be accepted as verities on appeal. See Painting & Decorating Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Ellensburg Sch. Dist., 96 Wash.2d 806, 814, 638 P.2d 1220 (1982); Yakima Cement Prods. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 93 Wash.2d 210, 213, 608 P.2d 254 (1980).

Following the condemnation, Mall's predecessors in interest conveyed portions of lots 4 and 5 lying easterly of Westlake Avenue to third parties. Mall acquired title to its property by a statutory warranty deed dated March 14, 1963. The deed describes Mall's property as "[t]hat certain triangular piece of real estate lying on the west side of Westlake Avenue in the City of Seattle, being parts of lots 1, 4 and 5, in block 19, Addition to the Town of Seattle, as laid out by A.A. Denny". Exhibit 1. The parties have stipulated that the deed contains an accurate description of Mall's property. The following diagram illustrates Mall's property as described in the deed.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

Although not expressed in the deed, the parties have further stipulated that Mall owns an underlying fee to the full portion of Westlake Avenue stretching across lots 1, 4 and 5. Since no assignment of error was made, this stipulation must also be accepted as verity on appeal. See Painting & Decorating Contractors, at 814, 638 P.2d 1220; Yakima Cement Prods., at 213, 608 P.2d 254. Reconciling this stipulation with the deed, at most it can be said that Mall's interest in the property underlying Westlake Avenue is by virtue of its predecessor's interest and not due to any recorded transfer of rights.

In August of 1983, Mall applied for a Master Use Permit to demolish the Bartell Building and to construct a 35-story building devoted to mixed retail, office, and residential use. The Seattle Municipal Code regulates the size of buildings through a "floor area ratio" (FAR) formula. The "Metropolitan Business Zone" regulations govern Mall's property. ¹ See SMC 24.06.070(D); 24.12.020. In the Metropolitan Business Zone, the code specifies that the gross floor area of a structure "shall not exceed ten (10) times the lot area". SMC 24.46.110(A).

Mall computed the floor area for its proposed 35-story building based on its fee ownership of 4,170 square feet of land underlying the Bartell Building and an estimated 11,056 square feet of land underlying the easement for Westlake Avenue, a total of 15,226 square feet. The proposed building's total floor area was approximately 150,000 square feet.

The director of DCLU issued a decision on December 2, 1983, denying the Master Use Permit for the 35-story building. The director ruled that Mall's total lot area under the code was 4,170 square feet; i.e., that portion of Mall's fee ownership bounded by Westlake Avenue, Fourth and Pine. Thus, the director concluded, Mall's proposed building was limited by the FAR requirement to a maximum floor space of 41,700 square feet, or approximately 12 stories.

A hearing was held before the Seattle Hearing Examiner whose findings and decision affirmed the decision of the director. Mall then filed an application for writ of certiorari with the King County Superior Court. The trial court affirmed the hearing examiner. Mall appealed directly to this court.

The standard of judicial review of zoning actions is whether the action was " 'arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.' " Lewis v. Medina, 87 Wash.2d 19, 22, 548 P.2d 1093 (1976) (quoting Reiger v. Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 651, 653, 359 P.2d 151 (1961)); Murphy v. Seattle, 32 Wash.App. 386, 389-90, 647 P.2d 540 (1982); see RCW 7.16.120. This appeal involves an issue of law only, the correct interpretation of terms in the Seattle Municipal Code. We review de novo the written record of the administrative hearing. Murphy, at 390, 647 P.2d 540.

The agreed issue before us is whether Seattle zoning law allows a landowner to count that portion of his land which is encumbered by a condemned street easement in computing the allowable floor area for a structure. More specifically, does "lot area" as defined in the Seattle Municipal Code include a landowner's underlying fee interest in a condemned street?

I. The Ordinary Meaning and Agency Interpretation of the

Code Term "Lot Area"

The gist of Mall's argument is that because condemned street easements are not expressly excluded from the code's definition of lot area, they must be included. This argument overlooks the plain meaning and purpose of the code and distorts the well-established common law and everyday understanding of the word "lot". Mall would have us redefine "lot" to include certain public streets, despite the code's clear expression and intent that "lot" and "street" should be distinct.

For the downtown Metropolitan Business Zone, the FAR formula is defined in relevant part as follows:

The gross floor area of any structure ... shall not exceed ten (10) times the lot area ...

(Italics ours.) SMC 24.46.110(A). Resolution of this dispute turns upon the meaning of "lot area", which is defined as "the total horizontal area within the lot lines of a lot." (Italics ours.) SMC 24.08.130(4). "Lot lines" are defined in turn as "the property lines bounding a lot." (Italics ours.) SMC 24.08.130(12).

Thus, the code leads us to rely on the term "property lines" to determine what is included within lot area. Since "property lines" are not expressly defined by the code, one must look to their common and ordinary meaning. See Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wash.2d 25, 27, 548 P.2d 541 (1976); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. 10, 88 Wash.2d 286, 291, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977). Property lines are commonly understood as those lines which separate one's lot from adjoining lots or the street. Linneman Constr., Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 504 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir.1974); Loveladies Property Owners Ass'n v. Barnegat City Serv. Co., 60 N.J.Super. 491, 502-03, 159 A.2d 417 (1960); Ujka v. Sturdevant, 65 N.W.2d 292, 294 (N.D.1954); Gage v. Chicago, 223 Ill. 602, 605, 79 N.E. 294 (1906); 34A Words and Phrases, "Property Line", 323 (1957). This understanding of property lines is consistent with the code's definition of "lot" as a "parcel of land ... abutting by not less than twenty feet (20') upon a street", SMC 24.08.130(3), and of "front lot line" as "the lot line separating the lot from the street", SMC 24.08.130(10). See also SMC 24.08.130(5), (10), and (15) (defining "corner lots" in relation to street boundaries). Since property lines bound a lot, and a lot extends only so far as the adjoining lot(s) and street(s) upon which it abuts, the code's definition of "lot" sets the outer limits for code purposes at which "property lines" or "lot lines" may lie. This interpretation also comports with the position of the DCLU: "[W]hen the street comes into being, the property line becomes that line that separates the street from the lot." Hearing Examiner Transcript, at 77 (February 7, 1984).

Mall does not directly quarrel with the proposition that property lines run between a...