People v. Porter
| Citation | 221 Cal.App.3d 1213,270 Cal.Rptr. 773 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. A045382,A045382 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ace Leroy PORTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. Helfman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Ace Leroy Porter appeals his conviction of two counts of first degree burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), one count of auto theft (Veh.Code, § 10581), and one prior prison term allegation (Pen.Code, § 667.5(b)). Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error by admitting his confession, since it was improperly obtained after he invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. We agree and reverse.
About 10 p.m. on August 11, 1988, Jean Wright discovered someone had ransacked her apartment at 675 Summerfield Road in Santa Rosa. About $20 was missing from her purse and a box containing cash was missing from the apartment. A lug wrench had been left on Wright's dresser. A sliding glass door was off its tracks.
On the morning of August 12, 1988, Mary Ann Lindsay noticed the rear gate and a sliding glass door were open at Lawrence Ross' apartment at 603 Summerfield Road, one-half block from Jean Wright's apartment. She reported it to a gardener, who discovered the apartment ransacked and Ross' car missing from its designated parking space. 1
On August 10, defendant and Eric Waltman rode a freight train from Oregon to California. They spent the night in Santa Rosa with Eric's sister, Carla Waltman. When defendant arrived he did not have a car, but when he left Santa Rosa the evening of August 11, he did. Suspicious, Carla Waltman recorded the car's license number, which matched Lawrence Ross' vehicle. She later contacted the police.
Defendant's fingerprints were found on a jewelry box inside Lawrence Ross' apartment.
His fingerprints and palm prints were found outside a tampered window at Jean Wright's apartment. Defendant's palm prints were also found on a window of Ross' car, which was recovered in Klamath Falls, Oregon, where defendant was arrested. No lug wrench was found in Ross' car.
At trial, defendant objected in limine on Miranda grounds to the introduction of a taped confession he had given to police officers. After holding an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ruled defendant's confession admissible. A redacted version of the tape was then played for the jury.
Defendant presented no evidence. The jury found defendant guilty on all three counts.
The day after defendant's arrest, Santa Rosa Police Department detectives Brian Davis and Dave Gorman interviewed him in the county jail in Klamath Falls, Oregon. They recorded the interview with a concealed tape recorder. After obtaining background information, detective Davis read defendant his Miranda rights and asked if he understood those rights and wished to talk with the officers. Defendant responded, "sure." The following exchange then took place:
The interrogation then continued concerning the car and defendant's whereabouts before the crimes. When the detectives asked how he ended up with the car, defendant responded as follows:
Detective Davis then resumed his questions and defendant continued answering during the approximately one hour interview. Defendant ultimately confessed to the auto theft and both burglaries.
At the end of the interview, detective Davis explained that when someone dies during the course of a burglary it is first degree murder. Defendant responded that he did not know that and said, "I got to talk to a lawyer." At this, detective Davis stopped the interview, saying if defendant wanted to talk to them further he would have to initiate the discussion.
Defendant now asserts that by stating he would say no more than that he knew about the burglary and the car, and that he would "save it" for when he was extradited to California, he was invoking his right to remain silent. Accordingly, he urges, the further questioning violated his Miranda rights and rendered his later confession inadmissible.
Under Miranda, "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625.) A desire to invoke that right can be expressed by words or conduct inconsistent with any willingness to discuss the case freely and completely. (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 515, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114.) Whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent is a question of fact In this case, after admitting he knew about the car and the burglary at the outset of the interview, defendant said, "but I'm not gonna say any more than that." The People argue defendant was merely saying he was reluctant to talk about some portion of the crimes, but was not entirely refusing to discuss the case. (See People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629-630, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070.) Defendant's statement might be construed as meaning he would talk about the car theft, but not the burglary. However, since made immediately after the first question about the crimes, it could just as easily mean defendant wished to end the interrogation after admitting he knew something about the crimes.
based on the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 784, 214 Cal.Rptr. 652, 699 P.2d 1259; People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218, 238, 107 Cal.Rptr. 157, 507 P.2d 1365.) On appeal, we independently review the record to determine whether defendant invoked that right. (People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 979, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.)
The second statement is even more troubling. After a series of relatively innocuous questions about defendant's whereabouts before the crimes, detective Davis asked defendant specifically how he ended up with the car. Apparently recognizing the seriousness of the question, defendant asked whether he would be extradited to California and was told he would, for auto theft and burglary. By responding that he thought he would "save it" for when he got to California because he wanted to decide what he would do, defendant was arguably saying he did not want to discuss the case freely and completely at that time. 2
Given defendant's subsequent lengthy discussion with the officers, the statements in question are somewhat ambiguous. However, "[a]ny ambiguity as to whether a person intended to invoke his or her Miranda rights is to be resolved in favor of the defendant as an invocation...." (Peo ple v. Green (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 685, 693, 234 Cal.Rptr. 497; see People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114 [].) Thus, courts have found invocations of Miranda rights where suspects have said " 'I think you ought to have somebody protecting me right now because I ain't too, oh here man ...' " (People v. Pack (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 679, 690, 248 Cal.Rptr. 240), "I ain't got nothin' to say" (People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 99, 105, 227 Cal.Rptr. 813), where the defendant repeatedly asked to call his mother (People v. Soto (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 694, 704, 204 Cal.Rptr. 204), requested that a tape recorder be turned off (People v. Hinds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 222, 236, 201 Cal.Rptr. 104), and said, "Tell me the truth, wouldn't it be best if I had an attorney with me?" (Hinds, at p. 234, 201 Cal.Rptr. 104.) Resolving any ambiguity in favor of defendant, we must find the statements amounted to invocations of his Miranda rights.
The cases relied upon by the People are distinguishable. In People v. Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 630, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070, the defendant's statement "I really don't want to talk about that," when read in context, referred only to one question and not to the interrogation as a whole. Here, defendant's statements are more reasonably interpreted as referring to further interrogation generally, particularly the latter comment about "saving it" for after he was extradited to California.
In People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 979, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475, the defendant's statements that he was not going to talk any more were properly interpreted as meaning he was angry at, and would no longer speak to, one of the interrogating officers, but that he In People v. Hayes, supra, 38...
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