People v. Walker
| Decision Date | 03 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | 2007KN034302. |
| Citation | 21 Misc.3d 748,2008 NY Slip Op 28373,865 N.Y.S.2d 530 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. KEYIA WALKER, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Cyril Thomas of counsel), for plaintiff.
The defendant, Keyia Walker, is charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (driving while ability impaired) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 RD, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (driving while intoxicated) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), and driving without a license (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]). She has moved for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument on the grounds that the information is facially insufficient and that her speedy trial rights pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law §§ 30.30 and 30.20 have been violated. The People oppose these motions.
This court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
On May 7, 2007, the People served and filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the above-mentioned offenses. In pertinent part, the factual portion of the complaint of Police Officer Nadia M. Mathurin alleged the following:
Minutes of the proceeding show that the People did not answer ready for trial. The defendant was arraigned. The case was adjourned until June 14, 2007 for discovery by stipulation (DBS). On June 14, 2007, the People served and filed the above-mentioned DBS materials and answered ready for trial. The court adjourned the case for trial until September 20, 2007. On September 20, 2007, the People were not ready for trial and requested a 14-day adjournment because the arresting officer was not available. The court adjourned the case until October 30, 2007. On October 30, 2007, the People were not ready for trial and requested a seven-day adjournment. The court adjourned the case until December 12, 2007 for trial. On December 12, 2007, the People were not ready for trial and requested a 14-day adjournment. The court adjourned the case until January 28, 2008 for trial.
On January 28, 2008, the People were not ready for trial and requested a 14-day adjournment. The court adjourned the case until February 20, 2008 for trial.
On February 20, 2008, the People were not ready for trial and requested a 14-day adjournment. The court adjourned the case until March 18, 2008 for trial.
On March 18, 2008, the People were not ready for trial and requested a three-day adjournment. The court required the People to file a statement of readiness and adjourned the case until March 26, 2008 for trial. The People filed a statement of readiness on March 21, 2008 off calendar.
On March 26, 2008, the People were not ready for trial and requested a five-day adjournment. The court adjourned the case until May 12, 2008 for trial.
On May 12, 2008, the People were ready for trial. No trial parts were available. The court adjourned the case until June 11, 2008.
On June 11, 2008, the People were not ready for trial. The court adjourned the case until July 1, 2008 for trial. The People filed a statement of readiness on June 19, 2008 off calendar.
On July 1, 2008, the People were not ready and requested a one-day adjournment. The defendant requested a schedule for CPL 30.30 motion practice. The court adjourned the case until July 31, 2008 for serving and filing of these motions and the People's response. The defendant served the present motions on July 17, 2008.
On July 31, 2008, the People had not served and filed a response to the instant motions. The court adjourned the case until September 11, 2008 for response and decision. On August 4, 2008, the People served and filed a response to the instant motions.
To be facially sufficient, an accusatory instrument must allege nonhearsay facts that would give the court reasonable cause to believe that a defendant committed the offense(s) charged and establish, if true, every element of any such offense. (See CPL 100.40; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 137 [1987].)
The defendant contends that the factual allegations fail "to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPL 100.40 (1) (a) and 100.15 (3) because her alleged admission that she was driving the automobile has not been corroborated. CPL 100.40 (1) (a) states that an accusatory instrument is facially sufficient if it "substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15." CPL 100.15 (3) prescribes that the instrument state "facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support" the charges.
A cardinal rule of evidence in our law is that "[a] person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed." (CPL 60.50.) As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Chico (90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]):
CPL 60.50, of course, refers only to "convictions." However, the requirement that a defendant's confessions or admissions be corroborated has been extended to the accusatory stage of felonies (CPL 190.65 [1]; People v Batashure, 75 NY2d 306, 308 [1990]), Family Court juvenile delinquency petitions (Matter of Rodney J., 108 AD2d 307, 311 [1st Dept 1985]) and misdemeanors (People v Dolan, 1 Misc 3d 32, 34 [App Term, 1st Dept 2003]; People v Olwes, 191 Misc 2d 275, 280 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2002]; People v Haddock, 2001 NY Slip Op 40138[U] [Nassau Dist Ct 2001]; People v Mauro, 147 Misc 2d 381, 388 [Crim Ct, NY County 1990]; People v Kaminiski, 143 Misc 2d 1089, 1092 [Crim Ct, NY County 1989]; People v Alvarez, 141 Misc 2d 686, 691 [Crim Ct, NY County 1988]; contra People v Espanda, 11 Misc 3d 1067[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50408[U] [Crim Ct, Queens County 2006]; People v Heller, 180 Misc 2d 160, 165-166 [Crim Ct, NY County 1998]; People v McKinney, 145 Misc 2d 460, 463 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1989]).
Like an indictment or delinquency petition, an information is usually the "instrument of ultimate prosecution" in a misdemeanor case. (See People v Kaminiski, 143 Misc 2d at 1092.) Unlike a felony complaint or indictment an information must set forth factual allegations amounting to a prima facie case. (See People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d at 138.) The reason for this strict showing is that the filing of an information is not followed by a preliminary hearing and a grand jury proceeding where the People must establish facts establishing a prima facie case. (Id.)
To be sure, there is no statutory provision compelling corroboration of confessions or admissions at the accusatory stage of misdemeanors comparable to CPL 190.65 (1) for presentations before a grand jury. However, this court agrees with the conclusion in People v Kaminiski (143 Misc 2d at 1092), that this omission was likely an oversight on the Legislature's part. This is especially likely when one considers that Alejandro was decided after the Legislature amended CPL 190.65 to include the corroboration requirement. For all of these reasons this court can conceive of no justification in law or logic for requiring the corroboration of a defendant's otherwise unsupported confession for grand jury indictments and juvenile delinquency petitions, while dispensing with this requirement for misdemeanor informations. (People v Kaminiski, 143 Misc 2d at 1092.)
In this matter, the factual allegation that the defendant operated a vehicle, an element of all three counts (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1], [3]; § 509), is derived entirely from the defendant's alleged admission to Police Officer Mathurin. The accusatory instrument does not allege that the officer or any other person observed the defendant operating any such vehicle, occupying it (see People v Dolan, 1 Misc 3d at 33; People v Haddock, 2001 NY Slip Op 40138[U] [2001]) or even standing near it (see People v Kaminiski, 143 Misc 2d at 1090). Indeed, the accusatory instrument does not independently allege that the vehicle existed on the date of the alleged offenses. But for the defendant's alleged admission that she had been driving said automobile, there is no corpus delicti of any of the offenses charged in the accusatory instrument. Without a factual basis for the allegation of operation of a vehicle, the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective.
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