Sharrette v. P.P. (In re P.P. State)

• Decision Date: 11 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. 50773-1-II,50773-1-II
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the DETENTION OF: P.P. State of Washington; Johnathan Sharrette, Ph.D.; and Sukhinderpal Aulakh, M.D., Petitioners, v. P.P., Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

431 P.3d 550

In the MATTER OF the DETENTION OF: P.P.

State of Washington; Johnathan Sharrette, Ph.D.; and Sukhinderpal Aulakh, M.D., Petitioners,

v.P.P., Respondent.

No. 50773-1-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Filed December 11, 2018

Thomas E. Weaver Jr., Attorney at Law, Po Box 1056, Bremerton, WA, 98337-0221, for Appellant.

Brett Michael Jette, Washington State Attorney General's Office, Social and Health Services A.g. Office, Attorney at Law, 7141 Cleanwater Lane Sw, P.o. Box 40124, Olympia, WA, 98504-0124, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Bjorgen, J.¶ 1 The State filed a petition for involuntary commitment after the superior court declared P.P. incompetent to stand trial on felony charges. The superior court granted the petition for involuntary commitment, dismissed the felony charges against P.P., and ordered that P.P. be involuntarily committed for a period not to exceed 180 days.

¶ 2 P.P. appeals the involuntary commitment order, arguing that the superior court erred when it concluded that the law does not allow him to become a good faith voluntary patient. P.P. also argues that our court should remand this matter to the superior court for de novo review of the commissioner’s findings of fact. P.P. concedes that the order is moot, but the State and P.P. both agree on the need to clarify whether an individual who has been found incompetent to stand trial on felony charges may become a good faith voluntary patient instead of being involuntarily committed. We agree and reach the merits because it is a matter of continuing and substantial public interest.

¶ 3 On the merits, we hold the law does not provide mentally ill persons found incompetent to stand trial for felony charges the legal opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients. We affirm the superior court’s involuntary commitment order.

FACTS

¶ 4 In 2017, the State charged P.P. with three counts of felony indecent exposure and one count of voyeurism. The superior court found P.P. incompetent to stand trial, dismissed his criminal charges, and committed him to a state hospital for an involuntary 72-hour evaluation and treatment period for the purposes of civil commitment.

¶ 5 After the 72-hour evaluation, Dr. Sukhinderpal Aulakh and Dr. Johnathan Sharrette filed a petition for a 180-day involuntary civil commitment on the basis of former RCW 71.05.280(3) and (4) (2015). At the beginning of the involuntary civil commitment hearing, P.P. requested that he be found a good faith voluntary patient and that the petition be dismissed. The commissioner denied the motion, but invited the parties to brief the issue and continued the hearing.

¶ 6 At the next hearing, the commissioner determined that petitioners are required to prove that an individual is not a good faith voluntary patient at 90- and 180-day civil commitment hearings. The commissioner then heard testimony on this issue.

¶ 7 Dr. Sharrette testified that, in his opinion, he did not believe P.P. would in good faith seek voluntary treatment. He stated that P.P. recently lied to an evaluator during a competency evaluation. He also testified that P.P. had recently left a voluntary hospitalization after only seven days and that his explanation for doing so was because he felt the hospitalization was doing him no good. In addition, Dr. Sharrette testified that P.P. explained to him that he believed a computer controlled his physical, emotional, and hormonal body. Dr. Sharrette also provided testimony regarding his concerns about medical compliance in the community, P.P.’s lack of insight into the benefit of treatment, and his long hospitalization history.

¶ 8 After hearing testimony from both Dr. Sharrette and P.P., who admitted that he lied to the competency evaluator to avoid potential hospitalization, the commissioner found that P.P. did not meet the criteria for a good faith voluntary patient. The commissioner further found that P.P. committed acts constituting the felony indecent exposure and that, due to his mental illness, he was likely to commit similar felony acts in the future. The commissioner entered an order for involuntary commitment not to exceed 180 days.

¶ 9 P.P. filed a motion for revision with the superior court, seeking to be found a good faith voluntary patient. The petitioners’ then filed a cross motion for revision. At the hearing on the motions, the superior court found that P.P. would not be a good faith voluntary patient. Specifically, the superior court stated,

Even if the good faith voluntary status is available, it’s been demonstrated, as previously noted, that the respondent is not a good faith volunteer based on his failure to comply with voluntary treatment at the UW [University of Washington] Medical Center in 2015, when he left after seven days, because the treatment wasn’t helping, as well as his admission to providing inaccurate information to skew the results of the competency evaluation and avoid further treatment and his admission that he wants to get out of treatment and that it doesn’t really work.

The most recent involuntary hospitalization is not helpful in establishing a track record because it doesn’t establish that he’s a good faith volunteer when he has the complete freedom to walk away.

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Aug. 11, 2017) at 33-34.

¶ 10 On August 11, 2017, the superior court entered an order that denied P.P.’s motion for revision and granted the petitioners’ cross motion to revise. The superior court also concluded that " RCW 71.05.280, and RCW 71.05.320 do not require Petitioners to prove ‘good faith voluntary’ status prior to civil commitment." Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 135. Therefore, and consistently with the arguments made, we read the superior court’s ruling to conclude that the State is not required to prove good faith voluntary status because P.P. did not have an opportunity under the relevant statutes to become a good faith voluntary patient. Based on this conclusion, the order stated,

The Court Commissioner’s July 14, 2017 order is revised striking the "finding" on page 2, lines 8-9 that "during any commitment hearing, 14, 90, or 180 day hearing, the issue of voluntary admission may be raised" and replacing it with this Court’s conclusion of law that petitioner is not required to prove "good faith voluntary status prior to civil commitment."

CP at 135-36.

¶ 11 P.P. appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. MATTERS OF CONTINUING AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST

¶ 12 P.P. concedes that his case is technically moot because the 180-day involuntary commitment order has expired. However, both P.P. and the State agree that we should decide his case on the merits because the issue presented involves a matter of continuing and substantial public interest. Assuming without deciding that P.P.’s appeal is moot,¹ we agree that we should reach the merits because this case involves a matter of continuing and substantial public interest.

¶ 13 Even if an appeal is moot, we may still reach the merits if it involves "matters of continuing and substantial public interest." Sorenson v. Bellingham , 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). The criteria to be considered in determining whether a continuing and substantial public interest is involved include: (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination which will provide future guidance to public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Sorenson , 80 Wash.2d at 558, 496 P.2d 512.

¶ 14 Our Supreme Court has consistently stated that the need to clarify the statutory scheme governing civil commitment is a matter of continuing and substantial public interest. See , e.g. , In re Det. of M.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. , 185 Wash.2d 633, 649, 374 P.3d 1123 (2016) ; In re Det. of R.S. , 124 Wash.2d 766, 770, 881 P.2d 972 (1994) ; Matter of Det. of Swanson , 115 Wash.2d 21, 24-25, 804 P.2d 1 (1990) ; In re Det. of LaBelle , 107 Wash.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986) ; In re Det. of Cross , 99 Wash.2d 373, 377, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).

¶ 15 P.P.’s first issue on appeal involves whether the superior court erred when it concluded he did not have an opportunity under the law to become a good faith voluntary patient. Applying the Sorenson criteria to this issue, we conclude that it is public in nature because it involves significant constitutional questions and statutory interpretation, an authoritative determination will provide future guidance to public officials, and given the relative frequency of involuntary commitments, the issue is certain to recur on a regular basis.

¶ 16 For these reasons, we address the merits of whether the superior court erred when it concluded P.P. did not have the opportunity under the law to become a good faith voluntary patient.

II. GOOD FAITH VOLUNTARY STATUS

¶ 17 P.P. argues that the superior court erred when it concluded that the law does not allow him to become a good faith voluntary patient. He bases this argument on statutory, due process, and equal protection grounds. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 18 We review constitutional questions de novo, with a presumption that the challenged measures are constitutional. M.W. , 185 Wash.2d at 647, 374 P.3d 1123. The party challenging a statute has the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional. Id.

¶ 19 We similarly review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Det. of Marcum , 189 Wash.2d 1, 8, 403 P.3d 16 (2017). The primary objective of any statutory interpretation and construction inquiry is to determine and carry out the intent of the legislature. In re Det. of Martin , 163 Wash.2d 501, 506, 182 P.3d 951 (2008). If possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , ...