State v. Garrison
| Decision Date | 01 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 18146-7-I,18146-7-I |
| Citation | 46 Wn.App. 52,728 P.2d 1102 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Lee GARRISON, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Dennis Benjamin, Appellate Defender, Seattle, for appellant James Lee Garrison.
Norm Maleng, King County Pros. Atty. and Stuart Heath, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent State of Wash.
James Lee Garrison has filed a motion for accelerated review of his sentence under RAP 18.15, alleging the sentencing court erred in calculating his offender score under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. We grant the motion and consider the matter on its merits, without oral argument. RAP 11.6.
Garrison appeals a judgment and sentence entered following his plea of guilty to the crime of burglary in the second degree in King County Cause No. 85-1-03858-1. Prior to the commission of the offense, Garrison had been found guilty of two burglaries. Between the date Garrison committed the current offense and the date of sentencing, Garrison was also convicted of escape and another burglary. The sentencing court used these four convictions in calculating his offender score of 4. Relying upon the offender score of 4, the court computed Garrison's presumptive sentence range to be between 12 + and 14 months.
On March 12, 1986, Garrison was sentenced to a term of 13 months in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Following the filing of a notice of appeal, Garrison moved for accelerated review, claiming his sentence was outside the presumptive range.
The key issue presented in this case is whether crimes committed before the current offense, but not adjudicated until after it, can be considered "prior convictions" for purposes of calculating a defendant's offender score under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. Garrison contends the trial court erred in computing his presumptive sentence range to be 12 + to 14 months. He claims that RCW 9.94A.360 is ambiguous because the term "prior conviction" is susceptible to two equally reasonable interpretations. "Prior convictions are used to determine the offender score which in turn is used to determine the applicable presumptive standard sentence range." State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175, 186, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986).
A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Adams v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 38 Wash.App. 13, 16, 683 P.2d 1133 (1984). The Sentencing Reform Act does not define the term "prior conviction." Garrison relies upon the definition of "criminal history" found in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 to support his argument that prior convictions must be limited to those offenses adjudicated prior to the commission of the current offense. "Criminal history" is defined in the Juvenile Justice Act to include all criminal complaints filed against an accused juvenile which, prior to the commission of the current offense, have been found correct by a court. RCW 13.40.020(6)(a).
Garrison was found guilty of two of his prior convictions after the commission of the current offense. Thus, he argues, these convictions cannot be used in computing his presumptive range and the true presumptive range should be 3 to 9 months. We disagree.
"In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires us to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the defendant." State v. Welty, 44 Wash.App. 281, 283, 726 P.2d 472 (1986). Courts will not, however, construe a statute in such a forced manner as to defeat the manifest intent of the Legislature. State v. Hartley, 41 Wash.App. 669, 673, 705 P.2d 821, rev. denied, 104 Wash.2d 1028 (1985). "In determining the meaning of a word as used in a particular instance, regard must necessarily be had to the subject matter in connection with which it is used, and also to the context of the statute wherein it may be employed." Cady v. Kerr, 11 Wash.2d 1, 10, 118 P.2d 182, 137 A.L.R. 713 (1941).
The purposes and policies underlying the Juvenile Justice Act are significantly different from the purposes and policies of the Sentencing Reform Act. The fundamental differences between the Juvenile Justice Act and the Sentencing Reform Act are aptly explained in State v. Rice, 98 Wash.2d 384, 393, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982).
[T]he [Juvenile Justice Act] has not utterly abandoned the rehabilitative ideal which impelled the juvenile justice system for decades. It does not embrace a purely punitive or retributive philosophy. Instead, it attempts to tread an equatorial line somewhere midway between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution.
The adult sentencing system, on the other hand, does not place such importance on rehabilitation. The fifth purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 is to "[o]ffer the offender an opportunity to improve him or herself". Offering a chance of self-improvement does not suggest to us the same degree of commitment to rehabilitation as is expressed by the Legislature in the [Juvenile Justice Act]. Punishment is the paramount purpose of the adult sentencing system.
Accord State v. Beard, 39 Wash.App. 601, 606, 694 P.2d 692, rev. denied, 103 Wash.2d 1032 (1985).
Although the Supreme Court in State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wash.2d 525, 531, 723 P.2d 1123 (1986), recently used language in the Juvenile Justice Act as a means of interpreting the term "clearly excessive" in the Sentencing Reform Act, that case is clearly distinguishable. In Oxborrow the court recognized that the interpretation of the words "clearly excessive" in the Juvenile Justice Act coincided with the recommendations of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to the Legislature in 1983. State v. Oxborrow, supra at 530-31, 723 P.2d 1123.
Unlike the Sentencing Reform Act, the emphasis of the Juvenile Justice Act remains on the interest, welfare, and rehabilitation of the individual offender. State v. Lawley 91 Wash.2d 654, 658, 591 P.2d 772 (1979). To interpret the term "prior conviction" as Garrison wishes would utterly frustrate the paramount purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, i.e., to hold an adult accountable for his criminal acts. State v. Rice, supra.
Further, the law is well settled that courts, in construing statutes, are to avoid absurd...
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