State v. Morgan, A19-1902

• Decision Date: 21 December 2020
• Docket Number: A19-1902
• Citation: 953 N.W.2d 729
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Quanteze Damar MORGAN, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

953 N.W.2d 729

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Quanteze Damar MORGAN, Appellant.

A19-1902

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed December 21, 2020

Review Granted in part March 16, 2021

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Frisch, Judge.

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

In this direct appeal from final judgment of conviction for felony domestic assault, appellant Quanteze Damar Morgan challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in two ways when it determined his criminal-history score. First, Morgan argues that the district court erred by assigning one-half of a felony point for his prior conviction for fifth-degree possession of cocaine because, under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), that offense was a first-time possession offense that should be classified as a gross misdemeanor. It was a first-time offense, Morgan asserts, because his earlier petty misdemeanor for marijuana possession did not constitute a previous "conviction" under that statute.

Second, Morgan argues that the district court erred by assigning one-half of a felony point for each of his two prior convictions for fifth-degree sale of marijuana because respondent State of Minnesota failed to prove the weight amounts of the drugs involved or that the offenses involved sales for remuneration.

We conclude that Morgan's earlier petty misdemeanor for marijuana possession is a previous conviction under section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), that makes his fifth-degree cocaine-possession conviction not qualified for classification as a gross misdemeanor. We further conclude that the district court did not err when it found that the state proved that his two prior convictions for sale of marijuana were for felony-level offenses. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by assigning one-half of a felony point for each of the three previous convictions. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2019, Morgan entered a Norgaard guilty plea¹ to one count of felony domestic assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016). There was no agreement as to sentencing.

A presentence investigation and criminal-history worksheet assigned Morgan four and one-half felony points for purposes of sentencing. The criminal-history score included one-half of a felony point for each of Morgan's three prior drug convictions—specifically, a 2007 conviction for fifth-degree possession of cocaine and two 2008 convictions for fifth-degree sale of marijuana.

Morgan challenged the points assigned for these convictions at a sentencing hearing. The state entered into evidence certified court records of the three prior convictions. Morgan argued that his 2007 fifth-degree cocaine-possession offense should be reclassified as a gross misdemeanor under amendments to Minn. Stat. § 152.025 by the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) because it was a first-time fifth-degree possession offense. Morgan also argued that the state failed to prove that his prior convictions were for felony-level offenses.

The district court rejected Morgan's arguments. It determined that Morgan had a criminal-history score of four and one half points (including points not at issue here), denied Morgan's motion for a downward durational and dispositional departure, and sentenced him to an executed prison term of 24 months.

This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by concluding that Morgan's petty-misdemeanor marijuana offense constitutes a conviction for violating Minn. Stat. §§ 152.01 -.37, making his subsequent fifth-degree drug-possession conviction not qualified for classification as a gross misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2016)?

II. Did the district court err by assigning felony points for Morgan's two prior convictions for fifth-degree sale of marijuana?

ANALYSIS

A sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score is correctable at any time. State v. Maurstad , 733 N.W.2d 141, 146-47 (Minn. 2007) ; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 ("The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law."). At sentencing, the state bears the burden of proving the defendant's criminal-history score by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Griffin , 336 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1983). We review a district court's rulings with respect to a defendant's criminal-history score for an abuse of discretion. State v. Edwards , 900 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. App. 2017), aff'd mem. , 909 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2018). But, if the issue of the correct criminal-history score turns on an interpretation of the sentencing guidelines or of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Campbell , 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted).

I. Morgan's cocaine-possession conviction was not qualified for classification as a gross misdemeanor because of his previous petty-misdemeanor marijuana violation.

Morgan argues that the district court erred by assigning one-half of a felony point for his fifth-degree cocaine-possession conviction because it was a first-time possession offense that should be classified as a gross misdemeanor.

Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's criminal-history score depends on the classification of prior offenses. Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.B.7.a (2018). "The classification of a prior offense as a petty misdemeanor, misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony is determined by current Minnesota offense definitions ... and sentencing policies." Id. Current Minnesota offense definitions are found in the statutes "setting forth the elements of the crime." State v. Strobel , 932 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Minn. 2019). Morgan argues that, under current offense definitions for controlled-substance crimes, his 2007 fifth-degree cocaine-possession offense should be classified as a gross misdemeanor because he did not have a previous drug conviction.

When Morgan was convicted of cocaine possession in 2007, the offense was a fifth-degree felony under Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2006). In 2016, the Legislature enacted the DSRA. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160 at 576. The DSRA amended the law governing fifth-degree controlled-substance crimes to provide that "fifth-degree sale of a controlled substance remains a felony, but some first-time fifth-degree possession offenses are now classified as gross misdemeanors." State v. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. 2018). Specifically, while the penalty provision of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2016) generally makes fifth-degree drug crime a felony, see Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(b), it also provides that, for some possession offenses, "[a] person convicted [of a fifth-degree controlled-substance crime], who has not been previously convicted of a violation of this chapter or a similar offense in another jurisdiction, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor." Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added).

Morgan's cocaine-possession conviction is the type of possession offense that might qualify for classification as a gross misdemeanor under section 152.025, subdivision 4(a). Whether it does qualify turns on whether his previous petty misdemeanor for possessing a small amount of marijuana in violation of chapter 152 is a "convict[ion] of a violation" of chapter 152.

Because Minnesota appellate courts have not ruled on the issue, we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). The object of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the [L]egislature."

Linn v. BCBSM, Inc. , 905 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Minn. 2018) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018) ). "If the Legislature's intent is clear from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction." Id. (quotation omitted). "A statute is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis , 837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. 2013).

In determining whether a statute is unambiguous, appellate courts construe nontechnical words and phrases "according to their plain and ordinary meanings." Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 855 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014). Where appropriate, we may look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain meanings of words, but we will rely on statutory definitions of terms where relevant. See, e.g. , State v. Nodes , 863 N.W.2d 77, 80-82 (Minn. 2015) (relying on statutory definition of "conviction" and dictionary definitions of other, nonstatutorily defined terms).

Morgan argues that section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), is unambiguous and does not include petty misdemeanors when it refers to "convicted of a violation of this chapter." He cites to a statutory definition of "petty misdemeanor" as "a petty offense which is prohibited by statute, which does not constitute a crime." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 4(a) (2006). He then turns to a dictionary definition of "conviction" as "[t]he judgment of a jury or judge that a person is guilty of a crime as charged." Applying this dictionary definition, he concludes that "convicted of a violation of this chapter" can only reasonably refer to a violation of chapter 152 that is a "crime"—i.e., a misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony—and not a petty misdemeanor. Morgan argues that this interpretation is the most sensible in light of other considerations, such as the absence of the right to counsel in petty-misdemeanor proceedings and the treatment of petty-misdemeanor offenses in computing a criminal-history score.

We agree that the...