State v. Stueve, 52393

• Decision Date: 02 May 1967
• Docket Number: No. 52393,52393
• Citation: 260 Iowa 1023,150 N.W.2d 597
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Frank STUEVE, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 597

150 N.W.2d 597

260 Iowa 1023

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Frank STUEVE, Appellant.

No. 52393.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 2, 1967.

Rehearing Denied July 10, 1967.

Lloyd E. Humphreys of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack M. Fulton, Linn County Atty., for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

The record before us discloses that Frank Stueve, a young man just under 18 years of age, was on June 20, 1966, charged by county attorney's information with the crime of larceny of a motor vehicle in violation of section 321.82 of the 1962 code; that pursuant to a bench warrant he was taken into custody on June 25, 1966, arraigned on July 1, 1966, and an attorney was appointed to represent him; that he pleaded not guilty and, upon his application, was on July 12, 1966, sent to the Mental Health Hospital at Independence for psychiatric examination. It also appears that upon his return from the hospital he filed a motion on August 10, 1966, asking that he be tried as a juvenile, which after hearing was denied. Reserving an exception, defendant entered a plea of guilty after his 18th birthday, and on August 12, 1966, was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed ten years in the state reformatory and was paroled to the Iowa Board of Parole. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Assigned as error herein were (1) the district court's refusal to classify defendant as a juvenile when it appeared he was not yet 18 years of age when the alleged offense was committed; (2) the court's refusal to hold that under chapter 232 of the 1962 code as amended, now chapter 232 of the 1966 code, the defendant must be treated as a juvenile and not as an adult triable under the criminal laws of the state; and (3) the court's refusal to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in chapter 232 of the code.

I. Primarily this dispute involves the statutory interpretation of chapter 232, Code 1966, entitled 'Neglected, Dependent and Delinquent Childen.' Only the question raised by the second assignment need be determined at this time. It is whether under the provisions of chapter 232, as amended, the juvenile court was given exclusive jurisdiction of a minor under 18 years of age who commits a public offense classified as a felony or indictable misdemeanor, so that the criminal division of the district court is without jurisdiction to consider the matter. We are thus asked to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the ground that it was without jurisdiction of the defendant or the subject matter of the action, and to hold the court erred in overruling defendant's timely motion to transfer the matter to the juvenile court for investigation, trial and commitment, if found delinquent by that court. Chapter 231, Code 1962, now 1966.

Under the provisions of chapter 232 prior to amendment by the Sixty-first General Assembly, we held that jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the district court to consider criminal matters involving children was concurrent. Ethridge v. Hildreth, 253 Iowa 855, 857, 114 N.W.2d 311; State v. Reed, 207 Iowa 557, 218 N.W. 609. Unless, then, chapter 215, Laws of the Sixty-first General Assembly, amending the former chapter 232, expressed a different jurisdictional intent, those decisions appear applicable here. Although some provisions in the new chapter 232 are different from those in the old law, and it is now applicable to children accused of any crime, including murder, it is significant, we think, that the recent enactment included a provision now known as section 232.62 of the 1966 code, which provides: 'The criminal court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court over children less than eighteen years of age who commit a criminal offense.' This provision seems to reject the idea that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is to be primary or exclusive in such cases.

The State contends, and we agree, that section 232.62 is a clear pronouncement that the prior jurisdictional decisions of this court were approved by the legislature and were incorporated in the new law, and that it expresses the legislative intent that a juvenile under 18 years of age, charged with a crim, may be brought before either the district court or the juvenile court for trial. We have often said it is fair to assume that the legislature, at the time of the enactment or re-enactment of a statute, was advised of the prior holdings of this court, and that it would have specifically altered our interpreted intention if it so desired. Hale v. Board of Assessment and Review, 223 Iowa 321, 332, 271 N.W. 168. As bearing on this matter of legislative intent, see also Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 228, 117 N.W.2d 431. We are satisfied that, by adding section 232.62 to the present juvenile law, the legislature not only approved our interpretation of the Iowa law but clearly expressed the desire that both of these courts have equal and concurrent jurisdiction to consider such juvenile matters thereafter.

It will serve no useful purpose to repeat the logic expressed in Ethridge, but we should keep in mind that district courts in Iowa have jurisdiction of all indictable offenses. Section 769.1, Code 1962, and section 6, Article V, of the Iowa Constitution. Although it is doubtful that these provisions in our law can be substantially altered by any other manner than direct amendment, it is not doubted that before the jurisdiction of the district court is curtailed or limited, a clear and specific legislative intent to do so must appear. We find no such intent expressed in the new chapter 232, but find the clear intent is otherwise. The amendment adopted by the Sixty-first General Assembly does not specifically grant exclusive jurisdiction of such cases in the juvenile court, and we must agree with the State that, if such was the desire of the legislature, it could clearly state that requirement. We conclude that was not the legislative intent in this amendment. See opinion of Attorney General dated November 2, 1965.

II. Juvenile court proceedings are not in any sense criminal. As often stated, they are and have always been special proceedings looking to the care, education and training of the child. In re Morrison, Iowa, 144 N.W.2d 97; Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 816, 229 N.W. 205, 207, 67 A.L.R. 1075.

Not only the purpose, but the procedure in the district and juvenile courts, is different. They should not a be mixed. Certainly the purposes of the juvenile court are laudable and are very necessary in our present society. The Iowa legislature recognized this fact and wisely enlarged the power and duty of the juvenile court, but in so doing did not intend to deprive the district court of its jurisdiction to try juveniles accused of indictable offenses. This is not the situation where the legislation specifically provides that juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction to consider all complaints against the juvenile as is sometimes found in juvenile court acts. See annotations, 89 A.L.R.2d 506--527 and 48 A.L.R.2d 663--701. Even in such instances the courts generally hold that unless the juvenile court acquires and accepts jurisdiction of the child before the district court does, it does not bar district court action.

The fact that the acts of the juvenile might indicate he is a delinquent and authorize the juvenile court to take charge of him as such, will not relieve him of the consequences of his crime or abridge the right of the grand jury or county attorney to charge him with the crime. Although a child who commits a felony may be found to be delinquent, he may also be guilty of a crime. See State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N.W.2d 101.

In the case at bar the defendant was not taken before the juvenile court, but was arrested on a bench warrant and taken into the district court. The district court alone acquired jurisdiction, and later refused to refer the defendant and the charge against him to the juvenile court. The juvenile court made no attempt to exercise jurisdiction over him. Unless the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the case on motion, this judgment must be affirmed. For a like case and decision, see Gerak v. State, 22 Ohio App. 357, 153 N.W. 902, where it was held a boy of 17 years, who killed another while committing burglary, could be indicted and tried only in the district court. It was there pointed out the district court's purpose was to try the child for a crime and punish him if found guilty. That offense required district court action. Also see State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 286 P.2d 306. We are satisfied in Iowa the juvenile court's function is not to try the child as a criminal but to try him as a delinquent and to provide for his control and direction if needed. Different procedures of course, are necessary, and it is apparent the authorities that may prefer charges in these courts are designated and often differ.

III. In his third assignment appellant complains of the court's refusal to follow the procedures set forth in chapter 232 as amended, and seems to contend those procedures must be followed prior to the time of decision as to whether the juvenile be tried in the juvenile court or the district court. While we shall not set not or consider each of the 62 sections in this chapter, we are satisfied they refer only to the procedure in the juvenile court and do not prescribe or change in any way the procedure to be followed in bringing criminal matters before the district court. While section 232.62 does refer to the jurisdiction of the district court to try juveniles under 18 years of age, its purpose and meaning in this chapter, as we have pointed out, is to resolve the issue of jurisdiction which might be questioned as it had been before the new chapter was adopted. Probably it was added as a precaution as emphasis of the legislature's intent that ...