The State ex rel. Little Prairie Special Road District of Pemiscot County v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 15 June 1926
• Docket Number: 27027
• Citation: 285 S.W. 57,315 Mo. 56
• Parties: The State ex rel. Little Prairie Special Road District of Pemiscot County et al. v. L. D. Thompson, State Auditor
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

285 S.W. 57

315 Mo. 56

The State ex rel. Little Prairie Special Road District of Pemiscot County et al. v. L. D. Thompson, State Auditor

No. 27027

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 15, 1926

Peremptory writ awarded.

Ward & Reeves for relators.

(1) The question whether special road districts are political corporations or municipal bodies within the meaning of our Constitution, or are mere local assessment districts, is to be determined by the decisions of our State courts. Hancock v. Muskokee, 250 U.S. 454; Backus v Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 566; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 310-311; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685; Merchants' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461. (2) Special road districts are political corporations or political subdivisions of the State within the meaning of our Constitution (Sec. 12, Art. 10), and such districts can therefore incur bonded indebtedness and levy general taxes on all taxable property in the district to pay same without regard to the limits fixed by the Constitution as to rates of tax levies. Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664; State v. Burton, 266 Mo. 722; State v Walker, 301 Mo. 115; Embree v. Road Dist., 257 Mo. 593. (3) Since, under the decisions of our own courts special road districts are municipal corporations or political subdivisions of the State, the conclusion reached in the Texas case by the Supreme Court of the United States has no application here. In any political subdivision or municipal corporation the sworn officials act for the people at large and when the power of taxation has been given to such officials by the Legislature, such officials have the legal right while acting for the whole people to propose a bond election in such municipality for the purpose of determining the will of the voters respecting the incurring of such indebtedness. Such a power so conferred by the Legislature on local boards or commissioners of municipalities does not deny to the inhabitants the right of due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In such a political subdivision of the State no notice or hearing is necessary. Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 249 U.S. 63; Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454; Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester, 261 U.S. 155; Wight v. Police Jury, 264 F. 705. (4) Our Constitution and statutes provide for the issuing of bonds by special road districts if approved by a vote of the people and also provide for the levying of general taxes on all property in the district for their payment. The taxes so levied under our Constitution and laws are general taxes in special road districts and are not in any sense local benefit assessments. Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; Union Trust Co. v. Pagenstecher, 221 Mo. 121; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 275 Mo. 534; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190; Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester, 261 U.S. 155; Wight v. Police Jury, 264 F. 705.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and Geo. W. Crowder, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.

(1) A special road district, under Art. VII, Ch. 98, Revised Statutes 1919, is given sole, exclusive and entire control and jurisdiction over the construction, care and maintenance of all the public roads within its boundaries, which are outside of the corporate limits of any city or village therein (Sec. 10809), and power to improve roads to a limited extent within such cities. It also has power to make certain improvements on roads beyond its boundaries. Laws 1921, 1st Ex. Sess., p. 179. The district, when once organized, becomes a permanent institution, subject to dissolution only by resubmitting the question to the voters therein, which may be done at any time after the first four years of its existence. Sec. 10831, R. S. 1919. The district when organized, has the following specific powers, to be carried out by its board of commissioners, to-wit: (a) To enforce the collection of poll taxes within its boundaries. Secs. 10819-10822, R. S. 1919. (b) To sell the property of the district when the same is no longer needed, or its use no longer profitable. Sec. 10813, R. S. 1919. (c) To purchase all needed materials for road building and repairing. Sec. 10814, R. S. 1919. (d) To plant, protect and care for shade and ornamental trees along the roads. Sec. 10824, R. S. 1919, (e) To build bridges and culverts. Sec. 10815, R. S. 1919. (f) To take over for its own use a proportionate amount of moneys arising from taxes and licenses, but it has no power of special taxation. Secs. 10817-10818, R. S. 1919. (g) It may issue bonds, upon the approval of the qualified voters within its limits, such approval to be granted or withheld at an election called for that purpose by the board of commissioners, and the board of commissioners may levy a tax upon all the taxable property of the district for the purpose of paying interest on the bonds, and creating a sinking fund to pay the principal as it matures. Sec. 10847, R. S. 1919, as amended, Laws 1923, p. 345; Sec. 10848, R. S. 1919, as amended, Laws 1923, p. 339; Sec. 10850, R. S. 1919. The leading case in Missouri, on the question of the validity of what is now Art. VII, Ch. 98, is Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664, wherein it was held that said article violates no provision of the Missouri Constitution. (2) Due process of law, while difficult of exact definition, means that the citizen, in any contest which has for its purpose the taking of his property, or property rights, shall be accorded the right and opportunity to challenge the propriety of each and every essential step in the proceeding against him. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398; Citizens Saving & Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U.S.) 655, 670; Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269; Embree v. Kansas City Road District, 240 U.S. 242, Jones v. Yore, 142 Mo. 38; Barber Asphalt Co. v. Ridge, 169 Mo. 376; St. Louis v. Railway, 211 S.W. 671.

OPINION

White, J.

The relators present their petition for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent, L. D. Thompson, State Auditor, to register bonds amounting to $ 150,000 issued by the Little Prairie Special Road District of Pemiscot County. The respondent waived the issuance of an alternative writ, entered his appearance and filed his demurrer to the petition as and for such writ.

The facts stated in the petition are briefly as follows: The Little Prairie Road District of Pemiscot County was duly organized in 1917, under the statute which is now Article 7, Chapter 98, Revised Statutes 1919, and it is now and ever since 1917 has been organized, acting and functioning as a special road district. Said article was adopted by the people of said district at an election duly called for that purpose by the county court, and thereafter three commissioners for the government of said district were chosen as provided in said article. The commissioners received from the county court and used the machinery kept for working roads belonging to districts previously existing in said territory; exercised jurisdiction over the highways in said territory; improved and repaired the public highways in said district by employment of laborers, and by using rented, leased and purchased teams, tools and implements; held meetings as prescribed in said article, once a month or oftener; received the district's proportion of money collected from the dramshop, pool and billiard licenses by the county, and from 1917 to 1925, inclusive, collected upon the property in said road district all county taxes levied for road and bridge purposes, and in all respects discharged the functions which they were authorized to discharge under said Article VII. In 1919, after the said Little Prairie Special Road District had been functioning, as aforesaid, for a period of two years, the board of commissioners, authorized by an election of the voters of the district, issued bonds in the sum of $ 105,000. Beginning with that year the said district through its board of commissioners levied a general ad valorem tax upon all property subject to taxation within the district, and from year to year collected same for the purpose of providing funds to meet the interest and principal of said bonds. Beginning with the year 1921, the board annually, with the proceeds of said taxes, paid off and retired certain of said bonds, reducing the outstanding indebtedness to $ 81,500.

August 29, 1925, the board of commissioners made an order proposing to issue bonds in the sum of $ 150,000, on behalf of said district, for the purpose of construction and improvement of roads, bridges and culverts in said district, the first installment of said bonds to become due January 1, 1928. The order recited that the valuation of the property within the district was $ 6,745,000, and the bonds proposed, together with the existing indebtedness, would not exceed five per cent of the assessed valuation of the property of the district. A special election was called as provided in Sections 10747, 10748, 10749 and 10750, Revised Statutes 1919, amended by the Act of 1923, Laws 1923, pp. 346 to 349, and was duly held in accordance with the said order, September 24, 1925; the proposition to issue bonds for $ 150,000 was carried by a vote of 1231 for, and 52 votes against the proposition -- more than two-thirds voting for it, as the law required.

The bonds were duly printed, executed, and February 26, 1926 offered to the State Auditor, L. D. Thompson, respondent, for registration, and said State Auditor refused to register them or permit them to be registered, which refusal was not on account of any irregularity in the organization of said district, nor in the proceedings authorizing the issuance of said bonds,...