United States v. Rivas
| Decision Date | 10 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 16-00272-KD-N |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. FELIX ALREDO RIVAS Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
On February 14, 2017, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 17).1 The Defendant, Felix Rivas, and his attorney, Daniel McCleave, Esq., were both present. Assistant United States Attorney George May was present on behalf of the United States. The Court has considered the parties' additional briefing (Docs. 26-27) and the matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion to suppress is DENIED.
On October 3, 2016, Officer Austin Sullivan of the Saraland, Alabama Police Department ("Sullivan") was patrolling southbound Interstate 65, around mile marker 15. At the suppression hearing, Sullivan testified he observed Rivas' truck touch or slightly cross the "fog line" eight times. Though the view is partially obstructed, a dashboard camera video of the traffic stop does not contradict Sullivan's testimony.
After observing what Sullivan determined to be eight traffic infractions, Sullivan initiated a traffic stop. Sullivan approached the vehicle and requested the Rivas' license and registration and inquired as to whether Rivas was sleepy. Sullivan also observed that there were only two keys on the key ring in the ignition and that Rivas had a small bag of luggage in the front seat ofthe truck. Sullivan also noticed that Rivas' hands were shaking. According to Sullivan, the shaking was severe enough that Rivas had trouble handing Sullivan his identification.
Shortly after his initial contact with Rivas, Sullivan determined that Rivas was not fluent in English. Sullivan asked Rivas to sit in the passenger seat of his patrol car so he and Rivas could utilize a translation program Sullivan had on his computer. Sullivan and Rivas then both sat in the patrol car and began to converse using the translation program. Sullivan also observed that Rivas seemed nervous, was avoiding eye contact, was breathing unusually, and that his carotid artery was visibly pulsating.
While continuing to try to communicate with Rivas via the translation program, Sullivan learned via the results of electronic records checks that Rivas had entered the United States from Mexico a few days prior to the traffic stop. Rivas also told Sullivan that he was on his way from Houston to Atlanta to stay with a person named Danielle Gonzalez. Sullivan inquired as to the nature of his trip, who Danielle Gonzalez was, and where he lived. Through the records checks, Sullivan also learned that Rivas had some connection to human trafficking.2
Before Sullivan issued Rivas a warning citation for the lane infractions, Saraland Police Lieutenant Gregory Cully arrived with drug detecting K-9, Chico. Lieutenant Cully and Chico completed a search around the truck. Chico alerted that drugs were present in the vehicle. Later, 136.4 grams of methamphetamine were found hidden in one of the trucks' two gas tanks. As a result, Rivas was indicted on the charges now pending in this Court.
There are two issues before the Court: 1) whether the initial traffic stop violated the Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment; and 2) whether the duration of the stop wasunreasonable in light of Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). As the answer to both questions is no, Defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED on both grounds.
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
"The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure." Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1275. A traffic stop, however, is constitutional if it is either based upon probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or justified by reasonable suspicion in accordance with Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1275. When determining whether an officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, the "officer's motive in making the traffic stop does not invalidate what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted). The Constitution also permits police officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), "if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts that" an individual is engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Powell, 222 F.3d 913, 917 (11th Cir.2000). A determination of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, and United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Additionally, the issue is not whether the particular officer involved "actually and subjectively had the pertinent reasonable suspicion, but whether, given the circumstances, reasonable suspicion objectively existed to justify [the investigatory stop]." United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.2006).
United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2008).
At the hearing, the Court expressed its concern regarding whether "touching" or "riding" a fog line was a violation of Ala. Code. § 32-5A-88. This code section states:
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply....A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety....
Ala. Code § 32-5A-88(1). Specifically, the Court inquired as to whether a simple contact with the fog line, which drivers frequently make when travelling along lined roads, was the type ofconduct prohibited by the statute at issue. For example, in Galindo v. State, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, by unpublished memorandum, a traffic stop in which the officer Galindo v. State, 949 So. 2d 951 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).3 Justice James Gregory "Greg" Shaw dissented, writing:
Many courts have held that a driver's slightly crossing over the fog line one time for a moment does not, standing alone, justify a traffic stop, and many of those cases involved lane-change statutes similar or identical to Alabama's statute. See, e.g., State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803 (Mo.Ct.App.2004); Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 769 A.2d 879, 883-89 (2001); Crooks v. State, 710 So.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998); State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 967 P.2d 363, 365-66 (1998); Brown v. State, 188 Ga.App. 184, 372 S.E.2d 514, 515-16 (1988); Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.Ct.App.1998); State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910, 911-12 (Tex.Ct.App.1998); Corbin v. State, 33 S.W.3d 90 (Tex.Ct.App.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 85 S.W.3d 272 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); State v. Livingston, 206 Ariz. 145, 75 P.3d 1103, 1105-06 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Cerny, 28 S.W.3d 796, 799-801 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Jordan v. State, 831 So.2d 1241 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002); People v. Leyendecker, 337 Ill.App.3d 678, 272 Ill.Dec. 543, 787 N.E.2d 358 (2003); State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978 (Me.1987); United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Ochoa, 4 F.Supp.2d 1007 (D.Kan.1998); State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 2004); United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct.App.1994); Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111, 785 A.2d 983 (2001); United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Sugar, 322 F.Supp.2d 85 (D.Mass.2004); United States v. Gastellum, 927 F.Supp. 1386 (D.Col.1996). Other courts have reached different conclusions. Compare State v. Tijerina, 61 Wash.App. 626, 811 P.2d 241 (1991); State v. Shivers, 827 So.2d 534 (La.Ct.App.2002); State v. Waters, 780 So.2d 1053 (La.2001); Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Director, 543 N.W.2d 479 (N.D.1996); State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69 (Minn.App.1997); Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745 (Tex.Ct.App.2005); State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550, 771 N.E.2d 331 (2002); United States v. Martinez, 354 F.3d 932 (8th Cir.2004). The majority does not address these cases.
Galindo v. State, 949 So. 2d 951, 954-55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). The Court notes that this case has no precedential value, but cites it to demonstrate the state court's discussion of Ala. Code § 32-5A-88, which is the statute the Defendant was pulled over for violating.
At the suppression hearing, Sullivan testified he saw eight violations of the above quoted statute. The Court has reviewed the dash camera video and the video, though it is partially obstructed, the video does not contradict the officer. Further, the Court found the officer's testimony at the hearing to be credible.
The Court notes that in similar circumstances courts have upheld the legality of stops based on violations of Ala. Code § 32-5A-88. United States v. Sierra, 501 F. App'x 900, 903 (11th Cir. 2012)( ...
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