HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 26 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15177,BARBOUR-WAVERLY,15177
• Citation: 235 Conn. 650,668 A.2d 1309
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HUD/v. Lenora WILSON.

Page 1309

668 A.2d 1309

235 Conn. 650

HUD/BARBOUR-WAVERLY v. Lenora WILSON.

No. 15177.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 1, 1995.

Decided Dec. 26, 1995.

Carmen Reyes Neale, with whom was David A. Pels, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Jeffrey A. McChristian, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The sole issue in this certified appeal ¹ is whether, in an appeal from a judgment of possession in a summary process eviction proceeding, the failure of the defendant to comply with the five day time limit specified by General Statutes § 47a-35 deprived the Appellate Court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, HUD/Barbour-Waverly, is the owner and operator of Chappelle Gardens, an apartment complex located at 108 Waverly Street, Hartford, in which the defendant, Lenora Wilson, formerly resided. ²

On November 24, 1992, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-15, ³ sent the defendant notice of a violation of her lease agreement. ⁴ Having failed to correct the alleged violation, on December 29, 1992, the defendant was served, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23a, ⁵ with a notice to quit possession of her leased premises on or before January 4, 1993. The defendant did not vacate the premises and, on January 5, 1993, the plaintiff brought a summary process action under § 47a-23a seeking to evict the defendant from her apartment on the basis of her alleged violation of the rental agreement between the parties. After a trial, the trial court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff on August 5, 1993. Within the five day period allowed by General Statutes § 47a-35 ⁶ for an aggrieved party in a summary process action to file an appeal, the defendant moved the trial court for an extension of time to do so pursuant to Practice Book § 4040. ⁷ That motion was granted by the trial court on August 16, 1993, although neither the defendant's motion for an extension of time nor the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion specified the length of time for which the extension was sought or granted.

Subsequently, on August 30, 1993, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, nineteen days after the expiration of the appeal period set forth in § 47a-35. The Appellate Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the defendant's appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal had not been timely filed. After reviewing the briefs and hearing oral argument on the jurisdictional issue, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. We affirm that judgment of dismissal.

In Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993), we held that the issue of whether a statutory time limitation for the filing of an appeal implicates appellate subject matter jurisdiction "devolves into a question of statutory construction: did the legislature, in imposing the time limitation, intend to impose a subject matter jurisdictional requirement on the right to appeal? 'We approach this question according to well established principles of statutory construction designed to further our fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984). In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 572, 522 A.2d 763 (1987).... Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 589, 522 A.2d 771 (1987).' " Id., at 764, 628 A.2d 1303; see Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). The issue presented, therefore, is whether the legislature intended to make the five day time limitation set forth in § 47a-35 a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from a housing court ruling in a summary process eviction proceeding. We conclude that it did.

As with any issue of statutory interpretation, our initial guide is the language of the statute itself. Frillici v. Westport, supra, 231 Conn. at 430, 650 A.2d 557; West Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 508, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994); Stitzer v. Rinaldi's Restaurant, 211 Conn. 116, 118, 557 A.2d 1256 (1989); Federal Aviation Administration v. Administrator, 196 Conn. 546, 549-50, 494 A.2d 564 (1985). In Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra, 226 Conn. at 762, 628 A.2d 1303, we concluded that a time limitation expressed in language similar to the language of § 47a-35 was jurisdictional. General Statutes § 52-278l (b), the statute at issue in Ambroise, provides: "No such appeal [from an order granting or denying a prejudgment remedy] shall be taken except within seven days of the rendering of the order from which the appeal is to be taken." (Emphasis added.) Section 47a-35, the statute presently at issue, allows for a five day stay of execution of a summary process judgment and then clearly provides that "[a]n appeal shall not be taken except within such period." (Emphasis added.) The legislature is the branch of government empowered to bestow subject matter jurisdiction upon the courts. See Grieco v. Zoning Commission, 226 Conn. 230, 231, 627 A.2d 432 (1993). If its language in drafting and enacting a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for alteration of the legislative decision by the judicial branch through Practice Book provision or otherwise. See Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra, at 763, 628 A.2d 1303. As we stated in Ambroise, "[t]hat language means what it says." Id., at 765, 628 A.2d 1303. "A statute which provides that a thing shall be done in a certain way carries with it an implied prohibition against doing that thing in any other way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction, 222 Conn. 254, 258, 608 A.2d 1174 (1992) (habeas statute that provides that "[n]o appeal ... may be taken" except within statutorily prescribed period gives habeas court no discretion to hear untimely appeals; id., at 256-57, 608 A.2d 1174). The absolute nature of the legislative pronouncement regarding the ability to appeal a summary process judgment strongly suggests that compliance with its mandate is a necessary prerequisite to an appellate court's subject matter jurisdiction.

In addition, our conclusion that the requirement is jurisdictional is supported by two of the other Ambroise factors--the statute's relationship to the common law and the legislative policy that triggered its enactment. ⁸ In Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra, 226 Conn. at 766, 628 A.2d 1303, we relied on the fact that "[t]he right to a prejudgment remedy of attachment is purely statutory" in order to support our conclusion that the seven day time limitation of § 52-278l (b) is to be strictly construed. Our inquiry in Ambroise into the right of attachment at common law arose from "the customary presumption in favor of retaining common law standards...." Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, supra, 202 Conn. at 572, 522 A.2d 763. In Ambroise, we pointed out that although attachment had common law antecedents, the statutory right to obtain an attachment is "in derogation of both common right and common law" and is therefore "to be strictly interpreted and pursued." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra, at 766 n. 10, 628 A.2d 1303. We previously have held that summary process eviction proceedings are similarly in derogation of common law; Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp., 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797 (1973); and therefore that the summary process statutes must be strictly interpreted.

The legislative policy that the statute was designed to implement also supports our conclusion that the statutory language that requires the filing of an appeal within the statutory five day time limit is to be strictly construed and is jurisdictional. We have previously recognized that "[t]he purpose of summary process proceedings ... is to permit the landlord to recover possession on termination of a lease; Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn. 434, 436, 151 A.2d 891 [1959]; without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which he may be subjected under a common-law action. Housing Authority v. Alprovis, 19 Conn.Supp. 37, 39, 109 A.2d 884 [1954]. The process is intended to be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession. Mayron's Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 154, 176 A.2d 574 [1961]; Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, 131 Conn. 528, 530, 41 A.2d 109 [1945]." Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra, 164 Conn. at 292-93, 320 A.2d 797. A holding that the five day time period is discretionary and therefore can be waived would undermine the clear legislative policy favoring prompt resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants.

In light of the plain language of § 47a-35, the fact that the summary process statutes are in derogation of common law and the legislative policy in favor of the swift resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants regarding rights of possession, we conclude that an appeal pursuant to § 47a-35 must be brought within five days of the rendering of a summary process judgment.

The defendant argues for a variety of reasons that the five day time limit does not allow indigent persons sufficient time within which to file an appeal. Without passing on the merits of the defendant's contention, we note that "this court is precluded from substituting its own ideas of...