In re Detention of W.D.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | 50068-0-II |
| Citation | 3 Wn.App.2d 1052 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re the Detention of: W.D. Petitioner, |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
W.D appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings challenging his civil commitment under the Involuntary Treatment Act ("ITA").[1]He argues that the State may not commit him under the "felony predicate clause, " RCW 71.05.320(4)(c)(i), because he was not "in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3)."[2] We affirm.
On August 1, 2013, W.D. punched another individual in the face. After the State charged him with assault in the second degree, Western State Hospital (WSH) admitted him for a competency evaluation and, if necessary, restoration.
On November 6, 2013, the trial court dismissed the criminal charge, finding that, as a result of mental disease or defect, W.D. lacked the capacity to both understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. The trial court ordered that W.D. be committed to the care, control, and custody of the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services for up to 72 hours for evaluation for a civil commitment petition.
WSH then petitioned to have W.D. committed for 180 days. It alleged that W.D. was gravely disabled, that he was taken into custody as a result of conduct in which he inflicted physical harm upon the person of another, and that he continued to present, as a result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, a likelihood of serious harm. It also alleged that W.D. had been determined incompetent, that felony criminal charges, i.e. assault in the second degree, a violent offense, had been dismissed, and that W.D. had committed acts constituting a felony. As a result of a mental disorder, WSH alleged W.D. presented a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts.
The court committed W.D. for 180 days, ruling that W.D. was gravely disabled, that he was in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3), [3] and that he continued to present a substantial likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability. It also observed a previous special finding that the underlying offense was a violent felony offense. Per these findings, the court committed W.D pursuant to the felony predicate clause[4] and RCW 71.05.320(4)(d).[5]
WSH twice refiled its petition for 180 day commitment, alleging the same grounds for commitment. The court granted the petitions and committed W.D. until June 20, 2015, on grounds of grave disability and pursuant to the felony predicate clause.
On June 1, 2015, WSH moved to commit W.D. for another 180 days, but this time only on grounds of grave disability. The trial court granted the petition and committed W.D. for another 180 days. On similar petitions, the court granted two more 180-day commitments.
On October 26, 2016, WSH moved to commit W.D. for another 180 days. This time, however, it requested commitment both on grounds that W.D. was gravely disabled and under the felony predicate clause. W.D. moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing that he could not be committed under the felony predicate clause because he had not "continue[d] to be in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3)." Sealed Clerk's Papers (SCP) at 138. He alleged that, for the prior three commitment periods, he had been committed only based on his grave disability.
The trial court denied W.D.'s motion and ruled that W.D "remain[ed] in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3) because he ha[d] not had any period of unconditional release since his initial commitment on November 26, 2013." SCP at 150. It then committed him for another 180 days both under the felony predicate clause and because he was gravely disabled. W.D. appeals.
W.D. acknowledges that his case is technically moot because he was committed both pursuant to the felony predicate clause, which he challenges, and because he was gravely disabled, which he does not challenge. Nonetheless, W.D. contends that we should consider his appeal on the merits because the issue involves a continuing and substantial public interest.[6] We agree.
"A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief." Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). "The issue of mootness 'is directed at the jurisdiction of the court.'" Harbor Lands, LP v. City of Blaine, 146 Wn.App. 589, 592, 191 P.3d 1282 (2008) (quoting Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't v. City of Spokane, 99 Wn.2d 339, 350, 662 P.2d 845 (1983)). We may raise the issue of mootness sua sponte. See In re Det. of C.W., 105 Wn.App. 718, 723, 20 P.3d 1052 (2001), aff'd, 147 Wn.2d 259, 53 P.3d 979 (2002).
We may retain and decide a moot appeal "if it involves matters of continuing and substantial public interest." State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d 584 (2012). We recognize that issues pertaining to civil commitment raise "matters of continuing and substantial public interest" and bear consideration, despite their frequent mootness. See, e.g., In re Det of M.W., 185 Wn.2d 633, 649, 374 P.3d 1123 (2016); In re Det of C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 270, 53 P.3d 979 (2002); In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). Therefore, we consider W.D.'s substantive arguments.
W.D. contends that the plain language of the felony predicate clause only permits commitment of a person "in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3)." W.D. claims that, as of June 1, 2015, he was no longer in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3) because the State did not seek to commit him on that basis. He argues, therefore, that the trial court erred by committing him under the felony predicate clause.
The State responds that the correct reading of the felony predicate clause allows felony recommitments to "relate back" to an initial felony commitment, regardless of what grounds for commitment exist at the time of the petition. We agree with the State.
In interpreting statutes, our goal is to "ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent." Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). "[W]e derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). The Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 664, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007).
If a statute is ambiguous, "we employ tools of statutory construction to ascertain its meaning." Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d 194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006). A statute is ambiguous when it is "'susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, '" but is not ambiguous "'merely because different interpretations are conceivable.'" Agrilink Foods, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 153 Wn.2d 392, 396, 103 P.3d 1226 (2005) (quoting State v. Hahn, 83 Wn.App. 825, 831, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)). We decline "to add language to an unambiguous statute even if [we] believe[] the Legislature intended something else but did not adequately express it." Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wn.2d 16, 20, 50 P.3d 638 (2002).
"Chapter 71.05 RCW governs the involuntary treatment and civil commitment of mentally ill individuals." M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 641. "When a court declares that an individual is incompetent to stand trial for felony charges, the charges against that person are dismissed without prejudice and the person must undergo a mental health evaluation for civil commitment and treatment." M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 642. "The civil commitment scheme for these individuals generally involves short-term periods of confinement, with the option for the State to petition for additional terms by the expiration of each period of confinement." M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 642.
Because "'civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.'" In re Det. of R.H., 178 Wn.App. 941, 948, 316 P.3d 535 (2014) (quoting In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wn.App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996)).
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Det. of W.C.C., 185 Wn.2d 260, 265, 370 P.3d 1289 (2016).
The felony predicate clause provides that a committed person:
[S]hall be released from involuntary treatment at the expiration of the period of commitment imposed under subsection (1) or (2) of this section unless the superintendent or professional person in charge of the facility in which he or she is confined . . . files a new petition for involuntary treatment on the grounds that the committed person: . . . [i]s in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3) and as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior, when considering the person's life history, progress in treatment, and the public safety.
RCW 71.05.320(4)(c)(i) (emphasis added). In this case, the parties dispute only whether W.D. was "in custody pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3)" at the time the State petitioned for his commitment in October 2016.
RCW 71.05.280(3) provides that a committed person "may be committed for further treatment pursuant to RCW 71.05.320 if . . . [s]uch person has been determined to be incompetent and criminal charges have been dismissed pursuant to RCW 10.77.086(4), and has committed acts constituting a felony, and as a result of a mental...
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