Uaw v. Greenland
Decision Date | 29 July 2015 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 147700.,Calendar No. 1. |
Citation | 870 N.W.2d 867,498 Mich. 282 |
Parties | UAW v. GREEN. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William A. Wertheimer, Bingham Farms, for all plaintiffs.
Michael B. Nicholson, Buchanan and Ava R. Barbour, Detroit, for International Union UAW and Local 6000.
Sachs Waldman, PC (by Andrew Nickelhoff and Mami Kato, Royal Oak), for SEIU Local 517M and the Michigan Corrections Organization.
Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, PC, Lansing (by Michael E. Cavanaugh and Brandon W. Zuk ), for the Michigan State Employees Association.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and Ann M. Sherman and Margaret A. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, for all defendants.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC, Lansing (by Michael J. Hodge and Scott R. Eldridge ), for the Michigan Civil Service Commission.
Dykema Gossett PLLC, Lansing, (by Gary P. Gordon, Leonard C. Wolfe, and Courtney F. Kissel ) and Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Grand Rapids, (by John J. Bursch ) for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.
Patrick J. Wright and Derk A. Wilcox for the Mackinac Center Legal Foundation.
John N. Raudabaugh for Thomas Haxby.
The Civil Service Commission's rules allow public collective bargaining agreements that require collection of a mandatory service fee, also known as an “agency shop fee,” from union-eligible employees who opt out of union membership. Civ. Serv. R. 6–7.2. Although we conclude that public collective bargaining is a method by which the Civil Service Commission (the commission) may choose to exercise its constitutional duties, we hold that the commission may not effectively require civil servants to fund the commission's own administrative operations. Accordingly, we affirm, albeit on different grounds, the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The legislation commonly known as the “Right to Work” laws—Public Acts 348 and 349 of 2012—were made effective March 27, 2013. 2012 PA 348 governs private employers and 2012 PA 349 governs public employers. This case concerns the constitutionality of 2012 PA 349. Section 3 of 2012 PA 349 amends the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq., to provide that public employers may not require their employees to join a union or pay union dues, fees, or other expenses “as a condition of obtaining or continuing public employment....” MCL 423.210(3) ().
The commission's current rules, however, affirmatively and expressly allow public collective bargaining agreements that provide for the collection of an agency shop fee from union-eligible employees who opt out of union membership. Civil Service Rule 6–7.2 (last amended April 29, 2004) provides:
Plaintiffs, union representatives of classified civil service employees, contend that agency shop fees defray various union activity costs. In accordance with the current rules, plaintiff unions have negotiated various agreements with the state that contain agency shop fee arrangements covering the employees whom they represent.
2012 PA 349 purports to make these mandatory agency shop fees illegal. Plaintiff labor unions filed the instant complaint in February 2013 challenging the validity of 2012 PA 349, § 3.1 Plaintiffs alleged that, under Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5, the statute's agency shop fee prohibition cannot apply to the commission because it infringes the commission's constitutional mandate to “regulate all conditions of employment” for civil servants.
The Court of Appeals in a split decision held that the Legislature possesses the authority to enact legislation concerning and restricting agency shop fees. Int'l Union v. Green, 302 Mich.App. 246, 839 N.W.2d 1 (2013). In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the commission's power to “regulate” conditions of employment is necessarily subservient to the Legislature's power to “enact laws” relative to hours and conditions of employment. The dissent, on the other hand, would have held that agency shop fees are “conditions of employment” by virtue of being “on-duty employment concerns.” Id. at 294, 839 N.W.2d 1 (Gleicher, J., dissenting).
Questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Hunter v. Hunter, 484 Mich. 247, 257, 771 N.W.2d 694 (2009).
Our primary goal in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intent of the people of the state of Michigan who ratified the Constitution, by applying the rule of “common understanding.” See Goldstone v. Bloomfield Twp. Pub. Library, 479 Mich. 554, 558–559, 737 N.W.2d 476 (2007) () (citations and quotation marks omitted). We identify the common understanding of constitutional text by applying the plain meaning of the text at the time of ratification. Wayne Co. v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 468–469, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). Interpretation of a constitutional provision also takes account of “the circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished.” People v. Tanner, 496 Mich. 199, 226, 853 N.W.2d 653 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Unless we are able to determine that a constitutional provision had some other particularized or specialized meaning in the collective mind of the 1963 electorate, we must give effect to the natural meaning of the language used in the Constitution. Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State (After Remand), 464 Mich. 359, 376, 630 N.W.2d 297 (2001) (Young, J., concurring). Technical legal terms are those that have acquired a special meaning and “must be interpreted in light of the meaning that those sophisticated in the law would have given those terms at the time of ratification.” Dep't of Transp. v. Tomkins, 481 Mich. 184, 191, 749 N.W.2d 716 (2008). The Address to the People, which was distributed to Michigan citizens in advance of the ratification vote and which explained in everyday language what each provision of the proposed new Constitution was intended to accomplish, Walker v. Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 425 Mich. 586, 597, 391 N.W.2d 296 (1986), and, to a lesser degree, the constitutional convention debates themselves are also relevant in determining the ratifiers' intent. Lapeer Co. Clerk v. Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich. 146, 156, 665 N.W.2d 452 (2003).
“The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional body....” Viculin v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 386 Mich. 375, 393, 192 N.W.2d 449 (1971). It possesses “plenary and absolute powers in its field.” Id. at 398, 192 N.W.2d 449. The constitutional provision concerning the commission, article 11, § 5, provides, in relevant part:
The Commission shall classify all positions in the classified service according to their respective duties and responsibilities, fix rates of compensation for all classes of positions, approve or disapprove disbursements for all personal services, determine by competitive examination and performance exclusively on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness the qualifications of all candidates for positions in the classified service, make rules and regulations covering all personnel transactions, and regulate all conditions of employment in the classified service. [Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5, ¶ 4.]
Article 11, § 5 thus sets forth the “duties of the Civil Service Commission [.]” See Mich. Coalition of State Employee Unions v. Civil Serv. Comm., 465 Mich. 212, 221, 634 N.W.2d 692 (2001). The commission possesses authority over and exercises its duties concerning, in part, “the procedures by which a state civil service employee may review his grievance,” Viculin, 386 Mich. at 393, 192 N.W.2d 449, as well as rates of compensation and conditions of employment. See Council No. 11, AFSCME v. Civil Serv. Comm., 408 Mich. 385, 406, 292 N.W.2d 442 (1980).
The commission's rules authorize the use of public collective bargaining agreements as a mechanism for exercising its constitutional authority over such matters as grievance procedures and rates of compensation. See, e.g., Civ. Serv. R. 6–9.6(a) (); Civ. Serv. R. 6–3.6(b) (). The commission retains absolute authority over the contents of a public collective bargaining agreement. Civ. Serv. R. 6–3.1(b) (...
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