Woodson v. State

• Citation: 65 S.W. 465,69 Ark. 521
• Parties: WOODSON v. STATE
• Decision Date: 26 October 1900
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

65 S.W. 465

69 Ark. 521

WOODSON v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 26, 1900

Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Greenwood District STYLES T ROWE, Judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

C. C Woodson, the agent and manager of the Central Coal & Coke Company, a corporation engaged in the business of mining and selling coal in this state, was indicted for failing to weigh coal before it was screened and pay for it according to the weight so ascertained. Upon a trial of such charge in the circuit court, Woodson was convicted and fined $ 25. From this judgment he appealed.

Judgment affirmed.

W. C Perry, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellants; Ira D. Oglesby, of counsel.

The act of April 10, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 165) is unconstitutional. 51 S.W. 638; Const. Ark. art. 2, §§ 2, 3, 8, 29; Const. U. S. Amdt. xiv, § 1. The statute is void because, without just cause or distinction, it imposes unequal burdens upon those whom it arbitrarily classifies. Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.), 484, 486; 142 Ill. 380; 42 N.J.L. 435, 440; 1 Thompson, Corp. § 593; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 429, 482, 483; 44 N.J.Eq. 427, 435; 82 F. 257; 13 F. 722, 723; 165 U.S. 150, 165; S. C. 17 S.Ct. 255; 40 F. 126; 40 N.E. 156-7; 59 N.W. 362, 364; 71 F. 931; 22 S.W. 350, 351; 31 S.W. 781; 29 A. 646; ib. 734; 118 U.S. 356; S. C. 6 S.Ct. 1054, 1070; 154 U.S. 362; S. C. 14 S.Ct. 1047; 164 U.S. 578; S. C. 17 S.Ct. 198, 204; 48 Minn. 236; 38 P. 500; 43 N.E. 490; 26 La.Ann. 671; 22 A. 120; 26 N.E. 1069; 32 Kan. 431, 434; 55 P. 878; 134 U.S. 232; S. C. 10 S.Ct. 533; 45 N.W. 156; 113 U.S. 27; 58 Ark. 407; S. C. S.W. 75; 55 Pac. ; 49 Ark. 291; S. C. 5 S.W. 294; 51 N.W. 136; 51 N.E. 872; 43 S.W. 513. The evidence in the case fails to sustain the charge of fraud. The statute was not valid as an exercise of police power. Tied. Lim. Pol. Pow. 572, 233, 234, 289, 290; 2 Hare's Am. Const. Law. 450; 16 S.E. 459; 19 S.E. 458, 470; Cooley' Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 706; Potter's Dwarris, Stat. 458; 16 Pick. 121; 7 N.E. 631, 634; 31 N.E. 395, 399; 98 N.Y. 98, 107, 110; 17 N.E. 343, 346; 39 Ark. 353; Dill. Munn. Corp. (3d Ed.) 142; 66 Ill. 37; 77 Wis. 288; 60 N.W. 355, 357; Black, Const. Prohib. 62, 82; 55 Cal. 550; 86 Tenn. 272; 98 N.C. 778; 98 Cal. 73; 24 L. R. A. 226; 47 N.E. 302; 71 N.W. 400; 46 P. 255; 44 P. 803; 2 Wils. Works, 393; 9 Mich. 285, 309; 115 U.S. 650; Suth. Stat. Const. 370; 27 Vt. 154; 153 N.Y. 188; 137 U.S. 90. The act is void, as violative of both state and federal constitutions, because it restricts the right to contract, attempts to take property without due process of law, and denies to certain citizens the right of civil liberty and to the pursuit of happiness. 25 S.W. 77; 111 U.S. 746; 53 Tex. 172; 32 N.E. 274; 118 U.S. 369; 1 Coke's Inst. ch. II, 81a; 2 Yerg. 260, 269; ib. 599, 605; 1 Dev. Law (N. C.), 15; 2 Tex. 250; 5 Mich. 25; 11 Mass. 405; 40 N.E. 454, 455. The right to contract in a lawful private business, on terms satisfactory to the parties, is a part of the natural liberty of the citizen. 2 Story, Const. § 1950; 4 McLean, 489; 6 N.Y. 341; 53 N.Y. 245; 2 Wilson's Works, 300, 302; Cooley, Prin. Const. Law, 255; Mill on Liberty, 27, 28; Lieber, Civ. Lib. 270; Spencer, Social Statics, 36, 45, 55; Spencer, Ethics, 45, 46, 47, 58, 59. The act is void because it takes from a man the result of his labor without due process of law. 95 U.S. 714; 92 U.S. 480; 111 U.S. 701; 24 U.S. 511; 4 Hill, 140, 143; 35 Kan. 271, 277; 1 F. 481; 111 U.S. 746. The act is void as an attempt to regulate wages. Tied. Lim. Police Power, 509, 569, 572, 233, 234; 53 P. 371; 51 N.E. 853; 8 Pa. S.Ct. 339.

Jefferson Davis, Attorney General, Charles Jacobson and Morris M. Cohn. for appellee.

Foreign corporations have no absolute rights beyond those given by the legislature, which may dictate the terms on which they may do business in the state. 155 U.S. 648, 652; 13 Pet. 519; 18 How. 404; 6 Wall. 594; ib. 611; ib. 632; 8 Wall. 168; 10 Wall. 410; 15 Wall. 284; 18 Wall. 5; ib. 206; 92 U.S. 575; 122 U.S. 326; 127 U.S. 1; 134 U.S. 594; 142 U.S. 217; 153 U.S. 436, 445; 66 Ark. 466; S. C. 51 S.W. 693; 62 Ark. 63, 69; 125 U.S. 181, 190; 4 Thomp. Corp. § 7898; 15 Pet. 519, 588. No one, not interested in or affected by it, can question the constitutionality of a statute. 85 Ky. 557; 20 S.W. 285; 23 Miss. 600; 7 Nev. 223; 24 N.J.L. 266; 72 N.Y. 211; 89 N.Y. 75; 90 N.Y. 498; 49 Hun, 466; 47 Ohio 478; 3 R. I. 64; 47 S.C. 75; 22 Gratt. 833; 25 W.Va. 427; 3 Wy. 719; 48 Ala. 540; 110 Ala. 308; 24 Fla. 55; 145 Ind. 439; 73 Ky. (10 Bush.), 681, 691; 79 Ky. 22; 47 La.Ann. 568; 51 Me. 449; 18 Neb. 416; 3 S. Dak. 29; 4 Blatchf. 263; 3 Mackey, 32; 48 Ala. 540; 6 Allen, 360; 3 S.W. 580; 8 Cow. 543; 25 W.Va. 427. If appellant had been a domestic corporation, the legislature still had power to bind it by the act in question. 58 Ark. 407, 428; 25 A. 246. The act was a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 165 U.S. 165; 169 U.S. 366, 391, 392, 395, 397; 165 Mass. 462; 113 U.S. 703; 65 Cal. 33; 113 U.S. 27; 39 Oh. St. 651; 84 Ala. 17; 76 Tex. 559; 53 Ga. 613; 56 Conn. 216; 127 U.S. 678; 81 Ia. 642; 38 N.H. 426; 45 Hun, 41; 36 W.Va. 82; 55 Ind. 74; 16 Wall. 36; 76 Ala. 60; 104 N.C. 714; 32 W.Va. 802; 23 N.E. 253; 53 P. 371; 147 U.S. 449; 143 U.S. 110; 164 Pa.St. 306; 113 U.S. 703; 113 U.S. 27; 169 U.S. 366. Cf. Sand. & H. Dig., §§ 1513, 1515, 1510, 1517, 1539, 1584, 1586, 1590, 1627. Doubts respecting the constitutionality of a statute are to be resolved in its favor. 56 Ark. 485, 495; 59 Ark. 513; 58 Ark. 407; 11 Ark. 481; 36 Ark. 171.

W. C. Perry, for appellants, in reply; Ira D. Oglesby, of counsel.

Corporations are persons within the fourteenth amendment. 18 F. 385, 398, 402, 404; 164 U.S. 578, 592; id. 686, 689.

RIDDICK J. WOOD, J., not participating.

OPINION

RIDDICK, J., (after stating the facts).

The only question that we are asked to determine on this appeal is whether the act of April 10, 1899, upon which the prosecution and judgment in this action are based, is a constitutional and valid statute. The first section of the act makes it "the duty of every corporation, company or person engaged in the business of mining and selling coal by weight or measure, and employing twenty or more persons, to procure and constantly keep on hand at the proper place the necessary scales and measures, and whatever else may be necessary, to correctly weigh and measure the coal mined by such corporation, company or person." The second section is as follows: "All coal mined and paid for by weight shall be weighed before it is screened, and shall be paid for according to the weight so ascertained, at such price per ton or bushel as may be agreed on by such owner or operator and the miners who mined the same; provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to prevent said owner or operator from having the right to deduct the weight of any sulphur, slate, rock or other impurities contained in the car and not discoverable until after the car has been weighed." Another section provides a punishment for failure to comply with the provisions of the act on the part of persons, corporations and their agents and employees.

It is said by counsel for appellant that this is class legislation, that it is an arbitrary and unreasonable attempt on the part of the legislature to divide the operators of coal mines into two classes, that it permits such an operator employing less than twenty men to pay for digging his coal according to the weight of screened coal produced, while the operator employing twenty men must weigh his coal before screening it, and pay according to the weight thus ascertained. But we do not so understand the statute. The first section, it is true, requires only those operators of coal mines that employ twenty or more persons to keep on hand certain weights and measures, but the second section, for a violation of which the defendant is being prosecuted, applies, it seems to us, to all operators of coal mines. The language is, "all coal mined and paid for by weight shall be weighed before it is screened," etc. This includes the small as well as the large operator, though by the first section the operator employing less than twenty men is not required to procure and keep on hand the weights and measures mentioned. He can, if convenient, use the scales or measures belonging to others, but if there are none such convenient he must necessarily keep them, or he cannot pay for his coal by weight. The obvious reason for the distinction in the first section is that it might be very burdensome to require the small operator to keep on hand an expensive set of scales and measures, when his situation might make this unnecessary; whereas the large operator would usually need such scales and measures, and the requirement as to him would usually be less burdensome than it would be upon the small operator. This, it would seem, furnishes a justification for the distinction made by the legislature in the first section, while as to the second section, the one involved here, there is no distinction made. All operators are by it treated alike, and required to weigh before screening all coal mined and paid for by weight. It therefore seems to us that the contention that this statute is an example of arbitrary and unreasonable class legislation cannot be sustained.

It is next said that the act violates the constitution of the United States "by restricting the right of contract by taking property without due process of law, and by denying to certain operators and workers in coal mines the right of civil liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In support of this contention, counsel for appellant has favored us with an able and entertaining brief, in which they discuss at considerable length the question of the...